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Preface
This book is the result of papers first presented at two seminars organised by 
the Sino-Nordic Welfare Research Network (SNoW) in Shanghai (October 
2011) and Helsinki ( June 2012). We have included in this book a selection 
of subsequently revised papers from the seminars. 
The SNoW project is an offshoot of the activities of the Nordic Centre 
of Excellence NordWel (The Nordic Welfare State – Historical Foundations 
and Future Challenges), hosted at the University of Helsinki, financed during 
2007–2013 by NordForsk. NordForsk is a Nordic intergovernmental research 
funding organisation under the Nordic Council of Ministers. SNoW has 
received additional funding for the period 2013–2015 from the Nordic Council 
of Ministers, and the network includes researchers active in the other Nordic 
Centre of Excellence in welfare research, REASSESS (Reassessing the Nordic 
Welfare Model), which was also financed by NordForsk 2007–2013, and based 
at NOVA (Norwegian Social Research) in Oslo. Thanks to NordWel, and 
long-term collaboration in particular between the University of Bergen and 
Fudan University through its Nordic Centre, the book, The Nordic Welfare State 
was published in Chinese by Fudan University Press in 2010, edited by Stein 
Kuhnle (University of Bergen), Chen Yinzhang (Fudan University), Klaus 
Petersen (University of Southern Denmark) and Pauli Kettunen (University 
of Helsinki). Since February 2013, an electronic SNoW Newsletter has been 
published and disseminated on a quarterly basis from the Nordic Centre, 
Fudan University.
The seminars in Shanghai and Helsinki invited papers from Nordic and 
Chinese scholars in the field of social policy and welfare research, as it was 
broadly defined. Papers were presented within the following three topics, which 
all concern common or similar challenges in the Nordic countries and China:
10
 
 · Norms and institutions
 · Labour markets, migration/immigration and social rights
 · Ageing populations as a challenge to social security systems
History teaches us that there are different roads to welfare and well-being, 
and different perspectives across time, space and governments, as to what the 
scope of the welfare role or responsibility of the state should be. Since the 
early 1990s, there has been much research on different types or ‘models’ of 
welfare states or regimes in the West. This field of research has subsequently 
given rise not only to comparisons of different types of Western welfare 
states, but also to comparisons of welfare and social security development 
in different parts of the world. Concepts of an ‘East Asian welfare model’ 
or ‘Confucian welfare model’ have been introduced by some researchers to 
emphasise embedded fundamental ‘cultural’ norms and values which have 
given rise to different kinds of public policies and welfare and social security 
institutions. Perhaps several ‘welfare models’ can be distinguished in East 
Asia, as we can distinguish different welfare models in Europe.
In the first part of the book, focusing on norms and institutions, Yuegen 
Xiong provides a historical institutional perspective on social policies in China; 
Yi Pan describes the basic elements of China’s welfare system; Byung-Cheol 
Kim and Keqing Han analyse the development and current changes of China’s 
social welfare by a comparison with South Korea in the framework of East 
Asian welfare regime; Pauli Kettunen examines conflicts and compromises 
in the Nordic pattern of social regulation; Nanna Kildal and Stein Kuhnle 
analyse trends towards a possible ideational shift in the Norwegian welfare 
state; and Pirjo Markkola studies family duties in the history of poor relief 
and social legislation in Finland.
Discussions on labour market mobility, migration and immigration are 
salient and important both in China and the Nordic countries. Although 
there are clearly structural differences, e.g. domestic migration vs. foreign 
immigrants, and the systems of social protection and labour market regulation 
are different, many general problems and questions are similar, including those 
concerning basic social rights and labour standards for moving populations, 
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the social and economic costs of (im)migration and integration, and the 
political challenges related to (im)migration issues. Papers were concerned 
with identifying the challenges, how they are understood, and what kind of 
public policy solutions are formulated and decided on in this field. 
In this book, four chapters cover this area of study: one by Åsmund 
Arup Seip on work migration and labour market regulations in the Nordic 
countries; one by Saara Pellander on family migration and gender equality 
in the Nordic welfare state; one by Ka Lin, Longfei Yi and Shuang Wu on 
the social protection of migrant workers, housing policy and the ‘new citizen’ 
of the Chinese city; and one by Heng Quan comparing income inequality 
in China and in India.
Both China and the Nordic countries are undergoing a process of 
demographic change towards an ageing population, which have implications 
for both the ‘cash’ and ‘care’ aspects of public policies for the elderly. Chapters 
covering the sustainability of pensions systems in the Nordic countries, a 
chapter by Jørgen Goul Andersen and Aksel Hatland, and one covering the 
status of and solutions for elderly care in China and the Nordic countries, 
written by Hua Fu and Rolf Rønning, are included in this book.
We, the three editors, have written an introductory chapter on the 
development and diffusion of welfare systems and policies in the Nordic 
countries and China.
We would like to extend a note of thanks to NordForsk and the Nordic 
Council of Ministers for their generous support for the Sino-Nordic Welfare 
Research Network, and to the Nordic Centre at Fudan University for its 
crucial role facilitating network-building activities. We would also like to 
thank Sophy Bergenheim for editorial assistance in preparing the book and 
Liz Broomfield for improving the quality and style of the English prose of 
all of the chapters.
This book, supplemented with additional chapters on developments in 
China, will be published in Chinese by Fudan University Press in spring 2014.
Helsinki/Bergen/Shanghai, February 2014
Pauli Kettunen, Stein Kuhnle and Yuan Ren
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The development and diffusion of welfare systems and  
policies in the Nordic countries and China
Pauli Kettunen, Stein Kuhnle and Yuan Ren
In the world of extended and intensified transnational interdependencies, 
international comparisons between different societal models are not only 
a fashionable scholarly approach but also an integral part of political, 
economic and cultural action. The so-called Nordic model is a benchmark 
and concept that has attracted international attention. At the same time, the 
ever more significant role of China in the globalised economy has increased 
international interest in the preconditions of China’s economic growth and 
associated structural transformations. The social aspects and impacts of these 
transformations have for their part, in China as well as internationally, inspired 
discussion on various models and paths of welfare policies. Concepts such as 
‘the East Asian welfare model’ and ‘the Confucian welfare model’ have been 
introduced by some researchers to emphasise that historically embedded, 
fundamental cultural norms and values give rise to different kinds of public 
policies and welfare and social security institutions.  Indeed, in current 
debates, ‘models’ may refer to persistent path dependencies or to transferable 
knowledge about best practices to be utilised in policy learning.
In this book, Nordic and Chinese researchers on welfare policies discuss 
normative and institutional characteristics of Nordic and Chinese societies. 
They go further, examining two major areas of current welfare policies both in 
China and the Nordic countries, namely the problems and solutions associated 
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with migration and labour market mobility, and the ageing society. In order 
to initiate these analyses, this introductory chapter will briefly highlight 
three topics framing the Sino-Nordic scholarly cooperation in welfare policy 
research: (1) historical changes in the welfare state in the Nordic countries and 
future challenges and prospects for Nordic welfare states (Pauli Kettunen); 
(2)  a Chinese perspective on implications of the Nordic experience and 
institutional characteristics for China’s welfare reform (Yuan Ren); and (3) a 
Nordic perspective on features and changes in China’s welfare system and 
possible future direction of development (Stein Kuhnle).
1. History and future challenges of the Nordic model 
In international comparisons, the five Nordic countries, Denmark, Finland, 
Iceland, Norway and Sweden, constantly appear among those offering the 
highest levels of social security and public health, care and education services. 
Nordic citizens are among those who are least at risk of poverty and have 
the highest life expectancy in Europe, and comparative studies indicate their 
high levels of human and social capital and happiness. The Nordic model 
is praised for combining economic competitiveness and growth with social 
and gender equality, solidarity, individual freedom and stable democracy. 
Simultaneously with the increasing international interest in the Nordic 
model over the last decades, it has been widely recognised that the Nordic 
welfare state is being challenged by major transformations, including 
globalisation, European integration, immigration, the ageing society and 
increased individualisation. The accounts of the role of the Nordic welfare 
state during these transformations are controversial. Some commentators have 
argued, either regretfully or hopefully, that the Nordic model, alongside other 
models of the national welfare state, are likely to disappear in the face of the 
imperatives of global competition. On the other hand, the Nordic pattern of 
social regulation is seen as a sustainable model to enable a consensual response 
to the new challenges by means of human and social capital. It is also valued 
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as a set of ethical principles and social innovations to be applied not only on 
the national level, but also in European integration and global governance. 
When discussing the global preconditions and impacts of the Nordic 
model, one should take into account that the Nordic countries are rather small, 
currently having a combined population of about 25 million inhabitants in the 
northernmost part of Europe. Furthermore, there are differences between the 
five countries and similarities with non-Nordic countries, in particular with 
other small Western European countries. The ‘Nordic model’ is a model of a 
national society, and there is “one model with five exceptions” (Christiansen 
& Åmark 2006, 335). However, this in no way precludes the importance of 
a Nordic transnational regional context, in which national identities and 
institutions have been shaped, and of an inherent Nordic element within the 
national identities and institutions of Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway 
and Sweden. 
In general, inter- and transnational processes were constitutive of the 
formation of the national welfare states (Kettunen & Petersen 2011). In the 
19th century, the intertwined ideas of historical progress and transnational 
interdependence became crucial ingredients for the notion of modernising 
nation-state society in the Nordic countries. The elite groups that were active 
in nation-building processes consciously adopted the distinction between 
what came to be referred to as centre and periphery. According to this view, 
the educated elite of a peripheral country, and later the popular movements, 
especially labour movements, could and should define their political tasks on 
the basis of knowledge about more developed – or more ‘civilised’ – countries. 
Problems should be anticipated and solutions should be planned by acquiring 
information on the experiences, solutions and mistakes in what was conceived 
to be the centre of industrial modernisation. 
The Nordic countries developed into small relatively open economies that 
were – each country in its specific way – highly dependent on exports and 
exposed to the cycles and crises of the world economy. This international 
dependence provided preconditions for the articulation of strong notions of 
national economy and national society and for the legitimacy of the active 
role of the nation-state in the processes of modernisation. As the German 
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development researcher Dieter Senghaas (1985, 71–94) argues, “there is no 
automatic connection between growth and the lack or elimination of absolute 
poverty”. What was required was the development of a combination of 
world market integration and internally consolidated national economy. The 
‘Scandinavian development path’ is his main example. A constitutive factor 
was a formation of national political, economic and cultural identity as well as 
“considerable political control over domestic and external economic processes, 
in order to prevent export growth from making society more oligarchic and 
producing a sort of rentier capitalism”.
During the last couple of decades, many researchers have discussed the 
origin of the Nordic welfare state. They have tried to find it in the 19th 
century processes of modernisation or the structures of pre-industrial rural 
communities, in socialism or nationalism, in the rise of Social Democracy in 
the 1930s or the Reformation and the creation of the Lutheran state church 
in the 16th and 17th centuries. Instead of making a choice between these 
different proposals, it is reasonable to re-interpret the divergent ‘origins’ as 
temporal layers in the Nordic welfare state. Mediated through mentalities, 
traditions, values, epistemic practices and social movements, these layers are 
present in the formal and informal rules and norms of the Nordic model 
(Kildal & Kuhnle 2005), and in the tensions and contradictions associated 
with these rules and norms. 
Historical accounts of the Nordic welfare state tend to exaggerate the 
ethnic and cultural homogeneity of these countries. However, one can say 
that particular historical preconditions existed in the Nordic countries for 
utilising an ideal of cultural homogeneity in the construction of the nation-
state and the welfare-state. One should not bypass the role of religion here. 
The Reformation, carried out in the spirit of Lutheran Protestantism in the 
16th and 17th centuries, was a process of making the centralised state. The 
state was inseparably intertwined with the Lutheran church and its lessons 
combining conformity and an individual relationship to God. Homogeneity 
and conformity have by no means implied an absence of class conflict and 
class consciousness. Rather, the development of the nation as an ‘imagined 
community’ (Anderson 1983) offered moral criteria by means of which the 
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socially subordinated groups could interpret their experiences of suppression 
and injustice and elaborate their individual and local experiences into political 
class consciousness and strong labour movements.
The class compromises of the 1930s, reflecting political conclusions from 
the Great Depression and the international threat of fascism, were important 
for the formation of the Nordic welfare model. They included the political 
coalitions of ‘workers and farmers’, i.e. the Social Democrat and Agrarian 
Parties, and the consolidation of the practice of collective agreements in 
the industrial labour markets. A virtuous circle was supposed to connect 
the interests of worker-consumers and farmer-producers on the one hand, 
and of workers and employers on the other. However, this was not just 
an idea of a positive-sum game between different organised interests. The 
trust in a virtuous circle between increased social equality, economic growth 
and widening democracy came to widely colour the future horizon in the 
post-Second World War decades, the Social Democratic labour movement 
being the main carrier of this mode of thought and action. In the 1970s, 
national institutions, policies and future prospects indicated what are referred 
to in current debates as traditional characteristics of the Nordic model: 
the public sector is large and expensive; welfare benefits and services are 
financed primarily by taxes; the principle of universalism extends; the welfare 
state empowers women in the family, labour market and society; and the 
comprehensive organisation of an autonomous labour market works in a 
smooth relationship with the state.  
Since the 1980s, crucial aspects of the notion of national society that 
were associated with the vision of the expanding welfare state and parity 
based negotiations and agreements in labour market have been severely 
challenged in the Nordic countries, as elsewhere. The transformations labelled 
as globalisation have meant increasing economic and social asymmetries 
concerning the role of spatial ties. The increased mobility and the increased 
asymmetries between different actors in terms of their mobility have reinforced 
the role of economic competitiveness in the defining of national political 
agendas. 
18
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In the Nordic countries, changes have taken place within a considerable 
institutional continuity. According to a far from unsuccessful argument, the 
high levels of social security, comprehensive public social and educational 
services and agreement-based industrial relations are not only compatible with 
the objective of economic competitiveness but also provide crucial competitive 
advantages. In the shaping of the European Union’s social policies, it has been 
easy for those coming from the Nordic countries to develop and support the 
principle of “social protection as a productive factor” that was adopted into 
the EU strategy in 2000. The principle implies an economisation of social 
policy in two different senses: as an argument for the recognition of the 
economic importance of social policy and also as an argument for reforming 
social policy in a way that could meet the demand of being a productive 
factor and providing ‘social investments’. We can recognise an incremental 
discursive and institutional change, in which welfare-state institutions are 
modified to serve competition-state functions.
At the same time, the welfare state is very popular in the Nordic countries. 
No political party can expect to gain electoral success by declaring its 
opposition to the welfare state. The arguments for a radical deregulation 
that emerged in the 1980s have been pushed to the margin and everyone 
seems to be in favour of the welfare state. Rescuing the welfare state is one 
of the most widely shared arguments in the politics associated with the 
financial crisis that began in 2008 or with the long-term concerns about 
demographic structures and the so-called sustainability gap. Those concerned 
about economic competitiveness or advocating austerity politics motivate these 
concerns with the necessity of creating or rescuing resources for the welfare 
state. The welfare state is used as an argument for restrictive immigration 
policies as well as for the promotion of labour immigration. Those defending 
the welfare state against the pressures of globalised capitalism argue that 
the welfare state, through its security networks and risk sharing systems, 
actually generates competitive advantages. Rescuing the welfare state seems 
to be a goal that sanctifies many different means, and a means that sanctifies 
many different goals, yet it is not clear how well the Nordic welfare state is 
withstanding the operations by which it is rescued.
19
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2. A Chinese perspective on implications of the Nordic 
welfare model for China’s social transition
In the context of the market economy, under the influence of labour unions’ 
collective bargaining, through strengthening and enhancing legislation, 
Nordic countries have established a relatively developed and comprehensive 
social welfare system and social policy framework, which has now become an 
important pillar for their nations’ development. The positive role of their social 
welfare system is to promote movement from the early capitalist economic 
model, which is typically characterised by free competition and survival of 
the fittest, and to emphasise the role of the state in providing social security 
and in improving the welfare of workers and citizens. The Nordic welfare 
state model originated in the late 19th century and has experienced rapid 
development during the post-war period. Most Nordic countries have already 
built social welfare systems and worked out the relevant public policies, 
covering education, public health, medical care, employment, elderly care, 
protection for the disabled, family, housing, etc. Such an integral social 
welfare system has become an important feature of the Nordic countries 
and provided them with great advantages. It has made great contributions 
to alleviating poverty and fostering social equality and justice. And this also 
plays an important role in promoting economic innovation and sustainable 
development.
At present, China is experiencing rapid economic growth as well as social 
transition. This transition is a move from the danwei-based welfare system 
under the planned economy towards a more market-orientated social welfare 
system; from a dualistic and segregated rural-urban system and unequal social 
welfare system towards a flexible and integrated rural-urban welfare system; 
from economy-driven development and reform towards an economy and 
society coordinated and more holistic development.
During the process of transformation, China’s social security and welfare 
system has lagged behind its economic growth. At the same time, terms of 
both rural and urban areas and different social groups, a series of problems 
have appeared, including the widening income gap, the poverty problem in 
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the cities, aggravated social stratification, the housing problem, discrimination 
against migrants regarding social rights and basic public services, weak 
protection for special vulnerable groups, etc. The increasingly serious social 
issues and social stratification have highlighted the shortcomings in China’s 
social security and welfare system and are making an urgent call for the system 
to be enhanced. Taking China’s realistic conditions, the characteristics of the 
state system and its socialist features into consideration, Nordic countries’ 
social welfare system, compared to that of the United States, which is relatively 
more market-orientated, can provide transitional China with more knowledge 
and lessons. 
The comprehensiveness of the Nordic welfare system does not only 
lie in its wide coverage, from cradle to grave and including various social 
affairs, such as employment, living and personal development. It also lies 
in its elaborate design. For example, for elderly care, it even specifies the 
situations where the third generation should take responsibility for looking 
after their grandparents; for child care, it even stipulates the age under which 
the family has the responsibility to look after children and secure their life 
and development; in migrant welfare, it also has clear rules which provide 
the standard that international migrants should satisfy in order to enjoy 
the same social welfare and public service as citizens. Furthermore, the 
comprehensiveness can also be seen in a series of social welfare legislation 
to guarantee the welfare of the elderly and the disabled, poverty relief, etc. 
Through legal and institutional construction and improvement, the social 
welfare system has become an important part of the national economic and 
social system.
Transitional China will definitely face a challenge to speed up the 
construction and improvement of its social welfare system and a challenge 
to extend social security and support to satisfy the various demands of urban 
and rural residents. The insufficiency of the welfare and support for social 
affairs including maternity, childcare, pensions, employment and so on, in 
turn, increases the pressure on family life, increases the risk to the citizens in 
a transitional society and decreases their well-being. Meanwhile, the relevant 
legislation and institutional construction are still unsatisfactory. Legislation 
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and administration on some social affairs are still stagnating in words but 
not appearing in the form of actions. For instance, some laws appeal for 
protection of the legitimate right of the elderly and encourage children to 
go home often, but without any concrete provision for action. Moreover, the 
legitimate rights for different social groups must be defined more clearly, and 
specific guidelines for their implementation also need further refinement.
The typical feature of the Nordic model is the universality of its social 
welfare system. By providing social welfare to all members of society, the 
nations demonstrate their responsibility in building up the welfare system 
and also promoting social equality. However, some scholars claim that the 
Nordic welfare system is still not universal, or even conditional. For instance, 
there are differences in approving employment visas for international migrants 
and in providing housing benefits. However, the universality essentially lies in 
the universal access to various kinds of basic social security, in an attempt to 
minimise a situation where minorities fall into hardship because of inadequate 
security and being excluded from the welfare system; and in an effort to 
promote social integration and social equality as much as possible through 
the welfare system. Therefore, the universality of the Nordic welfare system, 
to a large extent, is that of basic livelihood security and that which values 
more highly social support for disadvantaged social groups. To provide basic 
and universal social service and target groups with special difficulties is also 
an important purpose for constructing the social security system.
In the transition period, the characteristic and weakness of China’s 
welfare system lies in its inequality. Such inequality is even presented in 
the hierarchical distribution of welfare. The dual social security system for 
government administrative organs and enterprises, the lower social security 
coverage among migrant workers, the lower level of new agricultural insurance 
and NCMS (New Cooperative Medical System): all these indicate that 
social groups in the upper classes enjoy a higher level of social security and 
welfare while disadvantaged groups have a lower level of security or even 
cannot enjoy any security. Such a hierarchical distribution of welfare will not 
only damage the underlying social values of universality and equality, but 
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also break the social security principle - to provide support for those who 
are most in need of risk aversion and social protection.
Therefore, transitional China should first strengthen the spirit of equality 
and the universality in building up its social security and welfare system. 
Through establishing a universal social welfare system, China can support 
and enhance labour market mobility and social mobility in its structural 
transformation.
Considering the fact that the percentage of social welfare expenditure to 
GDP is often high in Nordic countries, it seems that comprehensiveness and 
universality have increased the burden on the government’s budget. However, 
the European debt crisis since 2008 has not seriously affected the Nordic 
countries with higher level of social welfare but rather Greece, a southern 
European country with deeper marketisation but a lower level of social welfare.
To rediscover the competitive advantages of the Nordic welfare model, 
firstly, the high–level welfare system can help to promote economic innovation. 
The Nordic countries are relatively more successful in innovation and have 
made remarkable achievements in information, design, environmental 
protection, new energy and creative industries, etc. To some extent, such 
success can be attributed to their relatively developed universal and lifelong 
education system. The huge investment in education, culture, art and public 
affairs of Nordic countries has exerted a positive effect on their economic 
innovation.
Secondly, the welfare state system can also help to reduce unemployment 
and cope with economic crisis. For instance, in the face of crisis, the Nordic 
countries, with their powerful labour unions and employment benefit system, 
have not experienced a serious increase in unemployment and aggravation 
of poverty problems. By retraining workers and promoting industrial 
transformation, these countries have taken the lead in crisis recovery.
Thirdly, the welfare state system itself is built upon the basis of the well-
developed market economy and labour market. The reform of the welfare 
system in these Nordic countries also places emphasis on the close relationship 
between employment and welfare, on the demand for high-quality workers, 
and on the close relationship between welfare provision and labour market 
23
INTRODUCTION
participation. In addition, reforms also aim at fostering a more active role of 
the labour market. Therefore, the development of the social welfare system and 
economic growth objectively establish a well-coordinated, well-reinforcing 
relationship. Those who have much concern about the weaknesses of the 
Nordic model and its excessive provision either hold the opinion that social 
welfare is unproductive expenditure and will increase the pressure on the 
government budget, thus depressing the driving force of economic growth, 
or think that it will weaken the competitiveness of the labour market. With 
a higher level of welfare, workers may have weaker motivation to work and 
reduce their labour supply, thus causing the problem of ‘supporting the 
lazy’. Based on the experience of the Nordic countries, we come to the 
conclusion that the two consequences of this concern will not transpire. 
On the contrary, building up the social security and welfare system itself is 
competitive and neglecting its construction and improvement will probably 
hinder the sustainable and coordinated development of economy and society.
In this social transformation period, China has to face an increasingly 
serious and urgent demand for social welfare and social security construction. 
We should note not only that the provision of social welfare has lagged 
behind the economic development but that the institutional construction 
of our social welfare system is also relatively inadequate. Fortunately, the 
Nordic countries have provided us with long-term and detailed experience 
in regard to institutional construction. Therefore, to reform and improve 
China’s social security and welfare system, the welfare institution reform 
should learn from the comprehensiveness, universality and competitiveness 
of the Nordic welfare model; from its countermeasures to cope with specific 
problems, such as housing, employment, education, etc.; and from the way in 
which the Nordic countries have considered changes in their welfare system 
and policy design.
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3. A Nordic perspective on changes in China’s welfare 
system and its possible future direction
China has over the last three decades emerged as one of the leading economic 
powers and crucial political players in the world. It has quickly advanced to 
become the second largest economy after the USA, and will in all likelihood 
soon have regained its position as the world’s leading economic power, a 
position which China has held during 18 of the last 20 centuries. China’s 
social, political and economic development is of more crucial importance 
than ever before for the rest of the world, in which interdependence between 
nations has grown markedly in recent decades. Not least, the latest global 
financial crisis since 2007 has demonstrated China’s crucial role for the world 
economy. But although consistently record-high rates of economic growth 
since 1980 have lifted many hundred millions of people out of poverty, Gross 
Domestic Product per capita is low, giving China a rank position between 80 
and 90 among the world’s nations. The gap between rich and poor people, 
between rich and poor regions, between the urban and rural population, has 
widened dramatically, and the lack of adequate social protection for large 
population groups, not least for the around 260 million migrants to cities 
and urban areas, represent major problems and challenges for the Chinese 
government and society.
What has happened to social policy development in China since the 
People’s Republic was established in 1949? What are the current trends, and 
towards what kind of ‘welfare state’ – or towards what kind and scope of state 
responsibility for welfare - is China moving? Is the idea and phenomenon of 
a ‘welfare state’ globalising? Do the globalisation of social policy discourses 
and the possible ‘globalisation of the welfare state’ make the Nordic welfare 
state experience more visible and relevant for China? These are some of the 
questions to be dealt with and discussed in the following. Given China’s 
increased and increasing role in world politics, it matters for the rest of the 
world what kind of state welfare responsibility China develops. 
Chinese social policy has undergone tremendous changes since the 
establishment of the PRC, from a highly centralised communist ‘iron-rice-
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bowl’ regime into a socialist market economy. Briefly and schematically we can 
say that the PRC has gone through three phases of social policy development.
The first phase of social policy development after the foundation of the 
PRC can be labelled the ‘Maoist period’, lasting until the beginning of the 
opening up and reforms initiated by Deng Xiaoping in 1979. Welfare in 
urban areas was guaranteed through the danwei (working unit) system in 
State Owned Enterprises (SOEs), providing cradle-to-grave social security, 
and government employees were covered by social insurance based on a 
law from 1951. The danwei system acted as a kind of mini-welfare state 
and played a key role in providing health services. The rural population 
obtained minimum security through the public ownership of land and the 
establishment of People’s communes in 1958. The household registration 
system (Hukou) introduced under Mao in the late 1950s gave people social 
entitlements according to their place of birth. This law cemented the rural-
urban differences which have persisted up until the present day. 
The second phase of social policy development lasted from the initial 
steps of economic reform in 1979 up until the late 1990s or the early 
2000s, and saw a far-reaching erosion of the previous welfare arrangements 
and emphasis on market-orientated flexibility, competitiveness and cost-
containment that played down attention to social security and the role of 
the state in the responsibility for citizen welfare. Generally, the government 
adopted an approach characterised by a clear priority for economic growth. 
The danwei system was dismantled and urban health care, for example, was 
delegated to local authorities; through a management reform, hospitals 
were generally transformed into profit-orientated entities endowed with 
substantial autonomy. The overall trend was characterised by state withdrawal 
and increased out-of-pocket payments by workers for health services (Saich 
2011). Rural areas experienced a similar process of health care deterioration, 
due to the collapse of the Cooperative Medical Schemes. Village collective 
funds virtually disappeared, leaving – in the 1980s – 900 million rural residents 
without health insurance coverage (Chan et al. 2008).The third phase, which 
China is currently experiencing, can be said to have started in the late 1990s, 
and more explicitly after Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao became the new leaders 
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of the party and government in 2003. Both political rhetoric and practice 
changed. Attention shifted from pure economic growth orientated policies 
towards a more balanced, sustainable and socially equitable approach to 
development. The vision and ambition was to move towards a ‘harmonious 
society’ – xiaokang shehui.
In recent decades, the separation of welfare provision from SOEs and 
the rapidly growing numbers of migrants from rural to urban areas, many of 
them informal workers, have left many without basic and/or adequate social 
security or protection. The most severe source of income inequality in today’s 
China lies in the striking urban-rural disparities. The Chinese authorities have 
acknowledged the destabilising potential of the highly unequal distribution 
of income and access to social security and health care. Government and 
party authorities have become increasingly aware not only of the tremendous 
beneficial effects of economic growth, but also of the significant social and 
political problems that the rapid development of the economy has created. 
Accordingly, a great number of social policy initiatives have been taken and 
many laws enacted during the last 15–20 years, over a broad range of social 
policy and welfare. Let us briefly mention some of the major social policy 
reforms that have been passed:
 · Basic medical insurance scheme for urban areas (1998)
 · Minimum standard of living scheme: urban areas (1997),  
rural areas (2007)
 · New rural cooperative medical scheme (2003)
 · Pension scheme for all urban workers (2005)
 · Decisions on new measures to provide social protection  
for migrant workers (2006)
 · Labour contract law (2008)
 · Free nine years compulsory education for all (2008)
 · New health care reform (2009)
 · First comprehensive social insurance law (2010)
From 2003 onwards, the social policy agenda has shifted towards the inclusion 
of larger proportions of the population and the most vulnerable groups, i.e. 
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rural residents, the unemployed or migrant workers. We might say that the 
recent vision to establish a ‘harmonious society’ with nation-wide universal 
health care and pension systems by 2020 reflects a more people-centred 
development than was the case during the previous two decades of economic 
reform. Social justice, equality, sustainable development and making welfare a 
top priority have to a greater extent shaped the discourse over the last decade. 
Besides fulfilling these goals, the aim is also to preserve social stability, which 
in turn is considered the main precondition for continued and stable economic 
growth (Saich 2011). It remains to be seen to what extent visions and goal 
statements on paper can be transformed into successful implementation.
Is the Chinese social policy development following Western patterns 
of ‘welfare state’ development? There are similarities in terms of widening 
the scope of state responsibility for welfare, although the underlying values 
and understanding of ‘welfare’ may be different. The challenges of social 
inequality, new social divisions of welfare, population ageing, changing labour 
markets and family structures, migration and globalisation are common to 
both Western, including the Nordic, countries and China and other East 
Asian nations. Chinese social challenges may to some extent be unique, 
and are certainly on another scale. Also, problem perceptions and concrete 
social policy solutions may differ. Although modifications of elements of 
the Nordic welfare states have taken place, for example increased individual 
responsibility for pensions; less generous unemployment schemes; more co-
payments in the health sector, overall public expenditure levels persist, in 
both relative and absolute terms. Given a historically relatively successful 
interplay of market economies, the role of organisations in the labour market 
and their collaborative relations with the government, and the comparatively 
successful management of the recent global financial crisis, the experience 
of the Nordic countries may appear to be both more visible and relevant for 
other countries and regions of the world, including China. To some extent, 
one might say that recent reforms and agreed-upon plans in China point in 
a more ‘Nordic’ direction, for example, universal coverage of health care and 
pensions; efforts to narrow social divisions; and increased public responsibility 
for the welfare of citizens. China’s social policy choices can potentially have 
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a significant impact regionally as well as globally as China takes a greater 
role in international political forums and social policy epistemic communities 
in which scholars and practitioners representing different ‘welfare model’ 
traditions and experiences meet. Ideas and policy learning will diffuse globally 
more easily than before, and will likely have an impact upon social policy 
thinking and reform developments in both the Nordic countries and in 
China and East Asia. 
The spread of the idea of ‘the welfare state’ is one element in the on-going 
process of the globalisation of economics and politics. Public responsibility 
for citizen welfare is increasing, as measured both by public expenditure data 
and scope of legislation, in emerging economies around the world (Castles et 
al. 2010). It will be a major task of scholars in the field of social policy and 
welfare research to comparatively analyse policy reforms and institutional 
changes as responses to the challenges mentioned, the norms, logic and 
mechanisms underlying processes of change, and the social and political 
outcomes of policies.
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Chapter 2
The unbearable heaviness of welfare and  
the limits of social policy in China
A historical institutionalism perspective
Yuegen Xiong
“An essential feature of society is tradition – the handing of formed ways 
of acting, a formed way of living or developing their social membership 
– and the transmitter of a message cannot do without some image of a 
message which he has received and of the way in which he received it.” 
( J.G.A. Pocock (1989), Politics, Language and Time, Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, pp. 233–234.)
1. Introduction
To interpret the meaning of the heaviness of being, the German philosopher 
Nietzsche once argued that this heaviness could be either a tremendous 
burden or great benefit, depending on the individual’s perspective. Welfare, 
as a measure aimed at generating human well-being, can either be regarded 
as a rational instrument of promoting government responsibility or as a 
familial obligation of care. Rapid economic growth and drastic social 
transition has created an enormous impact on the pattern and pace of social 
welfare expansion in post-socialist China during the past decade. Given the 
successively increasing size of social expenditure, China is apparently “bringing 
a strong state back in” in order to maintain a balance between economic growth 
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and social development (Xiong 2012). In recent years, welfare expansion in 
China has represented a significant social and political phenomenon driven 
by popular ideas on justice and the ruling party’s belief about the legitimacy 
of regime-maintenance, suggesting how important it is for us to rethink and 
re-elaborate the tradition of welfare in Chinese society.
 However, the concepts of welfare that lie behind China’s social policy-
making and implementation in recent years still reflect the Party’s sobering 
considerations on the crisis of the welfare states in Europe and the potential 
challenges of creating universal generous social welfare provision. From my 
point of view, in explaining the changes in social policy in recent years in 
China, one must link the present with the past. In short, history matters.
In contemporary China, the reform of social welfare and progress of 
social policy have been portrayed as outcomes of social change (Davies 1989; 
Selden & You 1997). For decades, residual welfare, mainly administered by the 
Ministry of Civil Affairs and other related government sectors, was designed 
to provide a social assistance scheme and social services. In terms of policy 
implementation, the Chinese government has strongly emphasised a top-
down model which exhibits a salient power-responsibility structure between 
central government and local governments. Meanwhile, popular perceptions 
of welfare and the responsibilities of government in China are different from 
those of Western societies, because the history, culture and organisational 
framework of a country create enormous impact on social policy process. 
In particular, the ideas of welfare (or welfare ideologies) can influence the 
process in a very profound way (Burstein 1991).
This paper aims to discuss ideas around welfare and its policy practice 
in Chinese society from a historical institutional perspective by focusing on 
an analysis of the Dibao System (The Minimal Living Standard Scheme, 
MLSS) as the core component of the social assistance policy. The research 
questions in this paper include: First, interpret how the concepts of order, 
relations and needs are constructed as a set of core norms and meanwhile 
how key social institutions influence the formation of the Chinese welfare 
regime; Second, analyse recent progress and constraints of social assistance 
policy implementation as a tool of value realisation under the Party-state 
35
THE UNBEARABLE HEAVINESS OF WELFARE AND THE LIMITS OF SOCIAL POLICY IN CHINA
fabric to maintain social order and strengthen institutional legitimacy; Third, 
understand the Chinese welfare regime as an East Asian welfare regime from 
a comparative perspective based on normative discussions.
2. Understanding cultural norms and institutions that shape 
and reshape the Chinese welfare regime 
When explaining the trajectories and patterns of social welfare development 
in various societies, their history, culture and institutions play a pivotal role 
(Skocpol 1992; Jones 1993; Chan 1996; Rothstein 1998; Lin 1999; Swank 
2001; Pierson 2004; Béland 2005; Pfau-Effinger 2005; Lin & Kangas 2006). 
In this regard, some researchers in this field tend to emphasise that ideas, 
norms, values and institutions can determine the paths and patterns of social 
welfare models or welfare regimes (Hall 1990; Immergut 1992; Crawford & 
Lijphart 1997; Berman 1998; Campbell 1998; 2002; Cox 2004). As a philosophy 
of lifestyle or a product of life politics, social welfare has been arguably 
considered as a problematic modern social phenomenon in the West since the 
19th century (Goodin 1988). Since the 1980s, plenty of discourse has surfaced 
on the theme of the crisis of the welfare states, which has created a sense 
of the ‘heaviness of welfare’ as a burden on smooth economic development. 
As Walter Korpi argues in his essay (2000), many critics of the welfare 
state hold misleading impressions and incoherent evidence is used to jump to 
implausible conclusions. In fact, the relationship between economic growth 
and welfare spending is more complicated than people might speculate. 
Compared to the European welfare states, the Asian countries are latecomers 
to social welfare development. With the rapid progress of industrialisation 
and urbanisation in the 1960–70s, social welfare gained its marginal status 
in national development strategies. For a relatively long period, the welfare 
state was regarded as a Westernised (Europeanised) dream full of illusions 
and heaviness. 
In the past decade, however, there has been a growing interest in comparing 
different welfare systems or different models in the non-welfare states, 
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especially in Asian societies. The primary attention to this topic has mainly 
been paid to the discussions on the ‘East Asian Welfare Model’, ‘East Asian 
Welfare Regimes’, or ‘Confucian welfare states’. As a socialist market economy 
in transition, China did not occupy a significant position in the discourse on 
East Asian welfare models or regimes until very recently, when scholars have 
sought to explain the pattern of social welfare or social security development 
in China from a comparative perspective (Goodman et al. 1998; Walker & 
Wong 2005; Xiong 2008; Chan et al. 2008; Xiong 2011).
In China, social welfare has been mainly regarded as a residual public 
provision beyond the remit of the family. Unlike European advanced 
industrialised democracies, China has not yet built a solid welfare state system 
to meet social needs, address domestic social problems and realise social justice. 
Only in recently years have Chinese people felt it to be problematic that the 
state (or government) does not shoulder more responsibilities when family 
and informal social networks fail to respond to individual contingencies. 
To understand the ideas of welfare in Chinese society in general, and the 
Chinese welfare regime in particular, one has to put the subject of welfare 
into its historical, cultural and political context. 
Historically, neither the discourse nor the practice of welfare was developed 
in feudal China. In ancient China, the long-standing absence of the state 
in social protection exactly reflects the government’s primary desire to 
fully control the social system and augment its economic power through 
its centralised administrative system. Given the depressed growth of the 
moral economy in feudal China, researchers can hardly ignore the fact that 
the missions of the state did also aim to do good to the mostly vulnerable 
groups in society, but for the sole purpose of maintaining social stability and 
keeping the social order. There was a longstanding tradition of social relief 
in ancient China, varying from providing disaster relief to establishing local 
community-based welfare provision. The current Dibao System is actually 
deeply rooted in Chinese histories of social relief.
In this country, long periods of feudalism did not yielded a constant 
process of industrialisation and modernisation until the mid-20th century. 
After 1949, socialist China founded its dual social security system for the 
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urban and rural areas, in which work units (or Danwei, workplace) played 
a central role in guaranteeing a basic livelihood for employees and their 
dependent family members, with the commune acting as a safeguard to ensure 
a minimum living standard for vulnerable people in rural areas. The civil affairs 
sector will shoulder its responsibilities to take care of truly disadvantaged 
people by providing basic social assistance. In a seminal article, Chow (1987) 
argues that Western social welfare is determined by industrialisation-driven 
public expenditure and state responsibility towards the well-being of citizens. 
However, Chinese social welfare is more or less influenced by its own culture 
and its government’s reluctance to institute social programmes.
In Chinese culture, there is a striking difference between individual 
perception of well-being and government’s sense of responsibility, because 
the individual weights personal relationships more than his own material gain 
and the state usually regards performing a merciful deed by providing relief to 
vulnerable people affected by misfortunes as a manner of governmentality. In 
feudal China, one of the major ethical and political concerns of government-
run social relief was to maintain the status quo of the social order by exhibiting 
the state’s mission of doing good deeds through its centralised power structure. 
Owing to the long-standing ideological influence of the former Soviet 
Union and its absence of social policy, China barely gained any international 
status in terms of human development during the planned economy period. 
The post-1978 economic reform initially changed the productive mode of the 
rural household economy and later reconstructed State-Owned Enterprises 
(SOEs), aiming to emancipate productivity and promote modernisation in 
China. The rapid industrialisation and economic growth from this point 
onwards created enormous pressure on urban areas, when the old social 
security system was unable to address emerging social issues, such as the 
needs of unemployed people, new migrants and other vulnerable people, as 
part of the process of unplanned urbanisation (Li & Piachaud 2006). 
When interpreting the nature and idiosyncratic pattern of Chinese social 
welfare or the Chinese welfare regime, researchers are constantly confronted 
by a series of thorny questions: First, how to appropriately define the concept 
of social welfare in Chinese context? Second, how to treat culture, values and 
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history when a comparative approach is employed for theorising Chinese 
welfare regime in the East Asian context? As an outcome of modern politics, 
social welfare development has been interpreted as institutionalised by state-
building and actors’ interests, and as evolutionary, owing to the dynamic 
changes caused by the interplay between time and circumstances. 
Although institutional analysis is widely-used in welfare state research 
and social policy studies, many faces of institutionalism still remain to be 
considered. In this paper, the author adopts a historical institutionalism 
approach to interpret the ideas of welfare and the recent progress of social 
policy reform in China, because of the significance of ‘history’ in understanding 
institutions and their durability. According to historical institutionalism 
analysts, the past trajectory of social welfare development shapes the present 
and future of the Chinese welfare regime in the context of social change. 
3. The use of historical institutionalism in analysing social 
assistance policy in China
Historically, social welfare as both a concept and as a practice did not gain a 
significant position in social or political discourse. The state would only provide 
social assistance or public relief when people could not rely on their family 
members or communities under certain circumstances. During the planned 
economy period, social welfare was marginal, established as an instrument 
of social control to meet the basic needs of the most vulnerable groups in 
the society. Either the family or the work-unit played a significant role in 
taking care of individual needs. 
To understand the ideas of welfare, the theme of welfare should be 
integrated into a consideration of the complex historical, cultural and political 
context shaping the Chinese welfare regime over its long history. In ancient 
and modern China, the histories of relief in times famine and other natural 
disasters (for instance, the frequent flooding) basically reflects a major 
trajectory of state intervention in the domain of social welfare. However, in 
normal periods, family and kinship played a dominant role in meeting the 
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needs of individuals, where the concept of well-being more or less emphasises 
the harmony and order of interpersonal and ethical relationships as well as 
the satisfaction of basic material needs. Therefore, the ideas and practice 
of welfare in Chinese society had been profoundly influenced not only by 
people’s perceptions around the values of life and equity, but also by people’s 
recognition of the extent to which the role of the state in providing support 
to meet individual needs is desirable.
Institutional theories have been widely utilised for analysis in the field 
of social sciences, which has a relatively early origin in the work of Karl 
Polanyi (Polanyi 1944). As one branch of institutionalism theory, historical 
institutionalism aims to take a historical viewpoint using past event analysis 
to interpret the causes of social phenomena or social consequences, in which 
researchers tend to summarise different kinds of elements attributed to change 
and consequences as institutions by emphasising how institutions shape the 
behaviours of actors. In the past two decades, historical institutionalism as a 
theoretical framework has been broadly applied in sociology, political science, 
economics and comparative studies.
In the field of comparative politics, historical institutionalism emerged 
as an analytical framework in the early 1990s (Steinmo 2008). There are 
many facets of institutionalism in the field of social sciences. Contrary to 
its counterpart of institutionalism driven by rational choice, which stresses 
coordination as a major function of institutions, historical institutionalism 
tends to place more emphasis on the concrete short period in which institutions 
are generated (Thelen 1999). In the work of historical institutionalism analysis, 
researchers emphasise the formation of ‘path dependence’ in institutional 
evolution and continuity (Pierson 1996; 2004; Pierson & Skcopol 2002; 
Lustick 2011). In theorising the analytical framework of path dependence, 
scholars also attempt to treat it as a whole system that is associated with 
consequences (Mahoney 2000; 2001; Pierson 1993; 2000; Thelen 1999; Thelen 
& Steinmo 1992). Researchers state that equal attention should be paid to 
both change and resistance, which coexist in the process of institutional 
analysis, while the critical juncture usually plays a pivotal role in influencing 
institutional change. In the policy domain, a contingency – either a sudden 
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event or a human action – may change the trajectory of policy development 
(Hacker 2009).
In Socialist China, the development trajectory of social welfare has been 
closely bound up with the reform of the planned economy in past decades. 
Meanwhile, the collapse of the enterprise-based social protection system 
caused by economic reform gradually shifted people’s ideas about the role of 
collective social welfare. However, the retreat of the state in the area of social 
protection in the 1980s was not obvious. On the contrary, some SOEs were 
strengthened in self-autonomy and control of running their own business 
because of economic reform. Therefore, compared to the early period of 
economic reform, the work-unit’s function as a welfare umbrella drastically 
reduced in the context of marketisation after the mid-1990s. In a way, the 
socialist system based on centralisation and authoritarianism had developed 
a strong preference for state intervention in political and socio-economic 
arenas. The dual track of institutional work-unit welfare provision and residual 
need-based social assistance has profoundly formed an idiosyncratic feature 
of the Chinese welfare regime.
Thus, researchers in the field of historical institutionalism may have 
noticed that the past of planned economy and the inertia of political control 
dominated by the party have been the main drivers of social policy-making 
and implementation in the process of social transformation. In the new era of 
building social harmony after 2004, welfare politics driven by social instability 
and growing social needs has reshaped the ideas and path of social policy 
implementation in China. In short, the practice of strengthening vulnerable 
people’s basic livelihood has become a vital task involving maintaining social 
order for the sake of managing social risks.
In the past decade, institutional analysis and theories of institutionalism 
had been widely adopted in the field of social policy research, both in the 
advanced welfare states and the transitional economies (Offe 1993; Rothstein 
1998; Cerami 2008; Chavance 2008). The approach of institutional analysis in 
the field of social policy often emphasises the significance of state intervention 
in maximising social welfare to meet growing social needs (Midgley 2000). 
It is also equally important to mention that social policy-making and 
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implementation can to a certain extent be regarded as an outcome of value 
realisation in the context of specific ideologies and socio-economic situations. 
In the past decade, a variety of studies on social policy analysis relating to 
historical institutionalism have appeared (Steinmo et al. 1992; Skocpol & 
Campbell 1995; Campbell 2002; Linder & Rittberger 2003; Pierson 1996; 2004; 
Béland 2005; 2007; Béland & Cox 2011). In China, only a limited number of 
researchers have attempted to conduct institutional analyses of social policy 
in a few different fields (Shi 2006; Xiong 2009; 2011).
But, people may ask: Why does ‘historical institutionalism’ matter for 
understanding Chinese social policy and the Chinese welfare regime? As 
policy is a political practice, time, contexts and configurations are significant 
in understanding the institutions surrounding the policy arena. Moreover, 
acknowledging the fact that social policy has undergone a long period of 
gradual formation in the period of economic reform in China, path dependence 
as a temporal process has created a self-reinforcement of policy effects that are 
embedded in a given institutional context. Therefore, as Hacker (2009) argues, 
the timing and sequence of policy interventions usually plays a crucial role in 
how specific social policies shape and reshape themselves. Sociologically, path 
dependence can refer to the actors’ habitus of developing coping strategies 
based on the past experience of doing. According to Pierson’s (2004) approach 
to social analysis as articulated in his seminal book, critical conjuncture is 
another crucial component of historical institutionalism. ‘Critical conjuncture’ 
refers to the decisively significant event(s) that occur during the process 
of socio-economic and political change. In the social policy arena, both 
significant events and previous experience can profoundly influence the 
trajectory and pattern of policy development.
In this paper, the author attempts to develop an analytical framework 
of social policy development in China in the past ten years (2003–2012). 
Figure 2.1 below indicates that the trajectories of social policy development 
in China after 2003 highlight certain crucial concrete periods of change in 
policy formulation and implementation in the Chinese socio-economic and 
political context. The author uses P, E and S to represent different types of 
event occurring in China that profoundly shaped social policy after 2001. 
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P stands for political events, E for economic events and S for social events. 
During the period 2003–2012, the crucial events occurring at national level 
are considered to be critical conjunctures of social policy development.
Figure 2.1. The analytical framework of social policy in China (2001–2013).
It is well known that political events tend to influence Chinese policy-making 
and implementation in a paramount way, especially the Party Congress held 
every five years. Thus, significant attention has been paid to the impact of 
the 16th Party Congress, the 17th Party Congress and the recent 18th Party 
Congress on the onward process of social policy-making and implementation. 
In this analytical framework, the author also pays particular attention to 
the impact of economic events on social policy change in China. Over the 
past decade, one can see how a series of key economic events has brought 
about a far-reaching impact on social policy formulation and implementation, 
for instance, China’s successful entry into the World Trade Organization 
(WTO), launching the Five-Year Plan of National Economic and Social 
Development and the financial crisis that emerged in 2008. It is equally 
important to note the role of social events in creating an incredible impact 
on social policy process, particularly the SARS outbreak of spring 2003, the 
P 1 P 2 P 3 P 4 P 5 P 6
E 1 E 2 E 3 E 4 E 5 E 6
S 1 S 2 S 3 S 4 S 5 S 6
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Critical conjuncture
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Olympic Games and the Wenchuan Earthquake in 2008 and social turmoil 
emerging at a local level.
Lustick (2011) thoroughly discusses the connection between evolutionary 
theory and historical institutionalism by suggesting that social science 
researchers should be more meticulous when carrying out theoretical and 
empirical analysis. Here, the author is looking at historical institutionalism as 
a theoretical configuration to interpret Chinese welfare regime in the context 
of history, culture and socio-economic dynamics. It is understandable that the 
depth, richness and abstractedness of this theoretical tool can sometimes even 
trap the researcher when they attempt to put the ideas and values of order, 
relations and needs into the complex mixture of Chinese culture and polity. 
In Chinese society, ‘historical’ has a rich meaning in social policy analysis 
when adopting the theories of historical institutionalism, which implies that 
some historical periods have been crucial in the creation of social welfare 
provisions or social policy making (for example, the period of the mid-1990s 
to early 21st century, the period of 2003–2010, and the period of 2011–2015 in 
China). In addition, it also emphasises the fact that the national social welfare 
systems have evolved through different historical periods. To analyse the 
process of social policy evolution in Chinese society in the past decade, the 
researchers anticipate reaching a deep understanding that the major actors of 
social policy (state, social organisations and individuals) have formulated their 
own strategies for dealing with the emerging needs, mainly from their previous 
interactive experiences. Consequently, the past experience of both success 
and failure generated by government policy-making and implementation 
has conveyed a message to and influences current government policy-makers. 
Strikingly, the Communist Party of China (CCP), as a core player in social 
policy-making, heavily sticks to its ethos of revolution, anti-capitalism and 
loyalty to the country.
To summarise, historical institutionalism can work to interpret the 
Chinese welfare regime in many aspects as follows: First, Confucian norms and 
values, such as filial piety, family loyalty, order, obedience, relations (Guanxi) 
and closeness of social network; Second, beliefs about state intervention, 
economic planning, regulated market and priority of efficiency; Third, political 
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preferences for centralised power, social control, social stability and limited 
citizen participation within the fabric of the Party-state. For a long time, in 
Chinese society, the connotation of residual social welfare has represented 
the governmental ethos of social assistance, in which individual self-reliance 
and mutual-aid within the family have been centred as a thread of social 
solidarity. The extensively-established and functional network of the social 
relief system run by government focused on state-building and maintaining 
social order through a top-down model of policy implementation. During 
the market economy period, with its split urban-rural social security system 
and increasing pace of social mobility caused by urbanisation and migration, 
the old welfare system serving work-unit employees and targeting a fixed 
vulnerable population failed to maintain social order and achieve the goal 
of a social justice based welfare system. Particularly, in the process of rapid 
globalisation, the Chinese welfare regime has been transformed into a 
combination of cultural traditions, institutional legacies and dynamic social 
changes. The emergence of social policy as a tool for managing new social 
risks reflects the Chinese government’s mentality of handling domestic social 
problems in order to adapt itself to meet international demands (Xiong 2009). 
Meanwhile, the striking difference between the Chinese welfare regime and 
Western welfare states lies in China’s lack of institutional design towards a 
clear social objective, which exhibits an eternal predicament of an imbalance 
between economic growth and social development. However, we must note 
clearly that the built-in mechanism of planned socio-economic development 
and party politics still have a significant influence on social policy-making 
and implementation at present. 
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4. Understanding the recent progress and constraints of the 
social assistance policy in China: the Minimal Living 
Standard Scheme (MLSS) as an example
In the initial stage of the market economy, social policy (or social security 
reform) was used as an instrument to fix the problems caused by the 
restructuring process of SOEs. With the escalating pace of social transition, 
the Chinese government chose to react more actively toward social issues 
generated by economic reform. In addition, in the context of globalisation, 
the Chinese government has been aware that it is important to strengthen 
its social security system to maintain stable economic growth and reduce new 
social risks. According to Esping-Andersen (1999), post-industrial economies 
shift to a series of welfare reforms in response to increasing new social risks 
caused by changes in the labour market and households. 
In China, we also find a series of newly-emerged social risks related to rapid 
social transition and globalisation, namely, increasing income disparity, fragile 
government risk-management mechanisms and depressed forces of social 
movement. Therefore, new social policies need tobe swiftly tailored to growing 
social needs in order to maintain social stability and enhance social justice. In 
recent decades, a few new public concepts, for instance, ‘scientific approach to 
development’, ‘harmonious society’ and ‘China dream’ have been recognised 
in China, and these take a more balanced approach towards socio-economic 
development and social welfare. Currently, the government is emphasising 
its concern about its appropriate role in the use of market principles and in 
developing a well-off society. More policies and measures have been adopted 
in order to narrow income inequality and regional disparity in the context of 
enhancing inclusive growth and building a harmonious society.
In China, besides traditional types of social assistance schemes, the 
emergence of MLSS for Urban Residents has marked a watershed in social 
policy development in China in the context of social transition. As a pilot 
scheme of local policy implementation, the Shanghai municipal government 
initially invented this social assistance programme in June 1993 with the 
aim of strengthening its impact on economic progress on poverty reduction 
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and social stability. Compared to traditional and administrative measures 
of social assistance in old days, the MLSS highlights some new ideas and 
values as follows: First, the main responsibility for assistance rests with state 
and society and a universalist principle of assistance has been adopted in 
policy implementation all over the country; Second, the emergence and 
universal implementation of the MLSS indicates a substantial development 
in citizenship right in reform-era China, with an annual adjustment 
of benefit and expansion of assistance programmes; Third, a number of 
political principles, such as a people-centred approach, government for 
people and power shared by people in the process of social assistance policy 
implementation; Fourth, the Chinese government stresses a core principle of 
realising transparency, justice and efficiency in the process of social assistance 
policy implementation. In order to tailor the programme to local needs, the 
concrete institutional arrangement and policy implementation structure at 
local level reflect certain degrees of difference. 
From the twenty-year experience of policy implementation, the 
institutional setting, expansion and universal coverage of the MLSS fully 
reflect the growing social impact of economic reform and the government’s 
learning about policy intervention on societal problems, especially poverty 
reduction and improving people’s livelihood. As Hammond (2011) observes, 
the development of the MLSS in urban China is attributed to resources, 
actors’ agency and historical context at local level. In addition, the emergence 
of the MLSS’ universal coverage based on local policy implementation can 
be characterised by top-down institutional design, local innovative operation 
mechanism and decentralised resource allocation pattern. In China, the 
development trajectories of the MLSS can be roughly divided into three 
phases: Phase One, the period of pilot scheme and initial policy response 
(1993–1998); Phase Two, the period of policy expansion and broad institutional 
coverage (1999–2005); Phase Three, the period of universal institutional 
coverage (after 2006). During Phase One, while the Chinese market economy 
was still in the initial stages of development, the government’s main concern 
was to absorb the negative consequences caused by process of restructuring 
the SOEs.
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With the increasing progress in economic reform and social transition, the 
Chinese government has realised that it is too inefficient to passively respond 
to growing social needs and to deal with the social turbulence caused by the 
huge number of lay-offs and increase the deprived groups through temporary 
policy measures. Rather, both central and local government have recognised 
that it is necessary to establish a safety net based on the MLSS so as to 
rebuild trust between the government and the people. During Phase One, 
the main task was to implement the Minimal Living Standard Scheme at 
local level and modify the system based on the practice of local pilot schemes, 
causing little radical change. The real institutional change occurred during 
Phase Two, when the State Council issued the Circular on Establishing the 
Minimal Living Standard Scheme (MLSS) in Urban China, suggesting that 
the government was considering comprehensively implementing the MLSS 
across the entire country at the end of 1997. Almost after two years of policy 
implementation, the Ministry of Civil Affairs (MOCA) proudly declared in 
October 1999 that Chinese government had established the MLSS in urban 
areas covering 668 cities and 1648 townships in the counties. In the same year, 
the State Council issued the Regulations of the Minimal Living Standard Scheme 
for Urban Residents, which set out this formal social assistance programme 
as a long-term fundamental policy founded at a national level. In 2000, the 
State Council made the significant decision to double the fiscal expenditure 
of the MLSS from 2001 to 2003.
From 2003, the Chinese government shifted its emphasis of social 
assistance around urban poverty from broadening institutional coverage to 
supporting measures and categorising assistance programmes based on the 
different vulnerable groups. The aim of the supporting measures is to help the 
recipients of the MLSS solve the problems facing them in terms of medical 
care, children’s education, housing and heating in winter. The categorised 
assistance programmes involve a series of specific assistance measures taken 
by the government to meet the needs of the vulnerable elderly, children, 
disabled people and the chronically ill (Zhang 2009). After a breakthrough 
point of policy expansion in 2003, the number of recipients of the MLSS has 
remained over 22 million, with a stable fiscal expenditure at national level. 
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During the period of economic restructuring in the late 1990s, the main 
purpose of the MLSS for urban residents was to guarantee the basic needs 
of the laid-off and unemployed in the cities for the sake of social stability. 
As the safety net had now been set up to present a relatively solid dam 
preventing this flood, the Chinese government took immediate measures to 
tackle poverty in rural areas.
During the period of policy expansion of the MLSS, the level of cash 
benefit for the poor rose from 152  Yuan per head each month in 2004 to 
251.20 Yuan per head each month in 2010 in urban areas. In rural areas, however, 
the level increased from 70 Yuan per head each month in 2004 to 177 Yuan 
per head each month, meaning that the level of cash benefit doubled over a 
short period. Thus, as a key area of social policy, the MLSS has experienced 
a significant institutional change in the past decade, which can be inferred 
from the expansion of pilot schemes and programme contents, but also the 
obvious improvement of institutional design from the top down. 
To look back over the decade-long development of the MLSS, the most 
important achievement in the field of social policy in China is the universal 
coverage of a basic social safety net where all poor people are covered by a 
social assistance scheme based on the policy objective of guaranteeing it to 
all eligible residents. However, researchers cannot exaggerate the advantages 
of the Minimal Living Standard Scheme because this policy is implemented 
at local level and thus relies on local fiscal expenditure. From a long-term 
perspective, the implementation of the MLSS still confronts some unavoidable 
institutional constraints and policy limitations as follows: First, the success of 
policy implementation of the MLSS is not only influenced by local officials’ 
political will and incentives, but is also confined by local budgetary capacity. 
When economic growth slows down in a new wave of economic restructuring 
and cooling-down of the land economy, local government will face difficulties 
in meeting social goals by limited revenues. Second, the level of cash benefit of 
the MLSS is too low to raise the poorest out of the poverty trap, which means 
that local government and related social organisations (for example, charity 
foundations or organisations) must work together to find other measures and 
make new institutional changes to help the poor to live better and to build 
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their capacities to be self-dependent by working or augmenting household 
assets through a planned asset-building policy. Third, the existence of low 
efficiency and wrong targeting of policy implementation at local level has been 
influenced by a flexible culture of human connection (Guanxi) and technical 
flaws in the means-testing procedure in Chinese society; the low degree of 
integration between the MLSS and other social policy schemes is obvious for 
certain type of social assistance in China. For instance, local government still 
lacks clear guidance and sufficient resources to protect orphans when they 
become homeless and least supported, which implies that a more efficient 
policy scheme should be designed to solve the problem.
During the planned economy period, poverty as a social problem was 
denied by socialist ideology, while the social assistance scheme was mainly 
designed to help only the mostly vulnerable people without family, income 
or job. The collectivism-orientated work units in urban areas and communes 
in rural areas played a fundamental role in providing basic welfare provisions 
for those in need. The new era of economic reform and particularly the rapid 
process of the market economy since the mid-1990s has dramatically changed 
the scenario of social structure and social welfare provision, which created an 
opportunity for the Chinese government to reshape its social policy to respond 
to emerging societal problems such as urban poverty, unemployment and the 
increasing number of migrant workers from rural areas. The launch of the 
pilot scheme of the MLSS in the early 1990s and its overall establishment as 
a universal scheme across the country around 2008 should be interpreted as 
a gradual and persistent policy implementation of social policy intervention 
amidst the changing socio-economic context in China. Nevertheless, one may 
not ignore the impact of the astonishing phenomenon of increasing income 
disparity and rampant corruption on escalating the social expectations of 
the public, while social policy as a supportive tool of promoting economic 
development in China will find its own way to proceed in the future.
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5. Conclusion and discussion
During the past decade, growing interest in the East Asian welfare systems and 
East Asian welfare model were initially generated by researchers in the West, 
followed by scholars in the Asian region. The main discourses on the East 
Asian welfare systems and welfare model can be summarised as discussions 
of Confucian welfare states ( Jones 1993), East Asian welfare systems (Kwon 
1997), the Oriental welfare model (Goodman et al. 1998), productivist welfare 
states (Holliday 2000), developmental welfare states (Kwon 2005) and the 
East Asian welfare regimes (Walker & Wong 2005). In conducting cross-
national studies on the welfare systems in the East Asian region, especially 
when China is included, researchers will encounter challenges thanks to the 
inadequacy of systematic data, differences in basic concepts and unparalleled 
country size differences between China and other Asian countries.
Like other East Asian countries, the Chinese welfare system or regime 
was not only inherited from the legacies of Confucianism and the planned 
economy, but also absorbed experience and lessons from advanced industrialised 
nations. However, compared to the European welfare states and other East 
Asian welfare systems, China has a unique welfare regime embedded in its 
coherence and self-adjustment in a changing context (Xiong 2008; 2009). In 
recent years, China has moved rapidly toward building a harmonious society 
by maintaining a balance between economic growth and social development 
through implementing a wide range of social policy schemes to reduce the side 
effects of social instability (Xiong 2012). The ongoing reform of social security 
and social welfare systems in China cannot only be regarded as an outcome 
of three decades of economic growth, but also a delayed policy response to 
emerging societal problems. During the rapid process of urbanisation and 
industrialisation, the Chinese government has focused on strengthening the 
role of social policy to provide more room for economic development, as a 
part of which, integrating the social security system between urban and rural 
areas has become a daunting challenge. Contrary to the divergent forces of 
party politics and turbulent social movements occurring in Western societies, 
social policy-making and implementation is more or less bound within the 
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structure of the Party-State regime and the qualities and incentives of political 
elites. In the new era of Chinese leadership, will China move towards a 
welfare state in future or will it develop a new type of social welfare system? 
Considering the overarching regional income disparity, a persistent urban-
rural fragmented social security system and complex social fabric embedded 
in a long tradition of Confucian culture, it is fairly safe to say that it will take 
time for China to create an integrative and universal social welfare system 
based on needs, equality and justice.
In China, dealing with social problems has been a persistent task of 
the government-led social administration, and political ideologies and 
principles heavily determine its path of social policy development. The 
Chinese government has implemented a series of social policies based on 
the Scientific Concept of Development and the People-centred Approach 
since 2003, reflecting a top-level concern about social development strategy 
in the context of a growing social tension between dream-like political ideals 
and cruelly-naked social realities. As a facet of social engineering, social 
policy has, in fact, been strongly influenced by political institutions, socio-
economic situations and the degree of conflict of interest between different 
social groups. It can often be identified that policy response may fail to tackle 
rapid social change and emerging social problems because of bureaucratic 
inertia and institutional limits (Navarro 2003). In contemporary China, the 
progress of social policy implementation, however, is closely related to local 
officials’ incentive structures, individual efforts and institutional recognition. 
Moreover, the big picture linking the international political and economic 
context, domestic social atmosphere and other strategies of social reform will 
create a noticeable impact on the agenda of social policy in this transitional 
economy. With the smooth transition of the Chinese leadership and a gradual 
approach to surfacing new development strategies in the new era of the Xi-
Li administration, China is making a determined effort to deepen its market 
economy and to reform its political and social institutions in a context of 
rapid transition and globalisation. As economic growth slows down and 
more social risks emerge in a turbulent world, social policy in China still 
confronts a dilemma between persistent old institutions and new problems. 
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It is anticipated that in the foreseeable future, the Chinese government will 
reshape its social welfare system and social policy approaches by strengthening 
the party’s leadership role, promoting citizen participation and augmenting 
non-profit organisations’ involvement in the process of realising the Chinese 
dream and building a modernised socialist county by the mid-21st century.
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Chapter 3
Basic elements of China’s welfare system1
Yi Pan
1. Development context of China’s social welfare system 
China’s social welfare system has gone through three rough stages: creation; 
destruction and adjustment; and structural reform.
1.1. Creation of China’s social welfare system (1949)
At the initial stage of construction of China’s social economy, under the 
context of planned economic guidance, the social welfare system was built 
under the structure of a dual urban and rural social economy, which developed 
completely different welfare policies for the city and the countryside. 
China’s social welfare system under the urban and rural dual structure 
represented the construction of welfare mandated by the state, and was 
specifically provided for and organised by workplaces in the city. The Chinese 
welfare system under the dual social and economic institutions was as follows: 
in urban areas, it set up state responsibility for policies and budgets, as well 
as work unit operated welfare benefits and services. Social welfare provision, 
based on work unit management and financial support mandated by the state, 
included health care, retirement, work related injury and other benefit systems, 
1 This is a revised version of a paper published in Chinese, in the Journal of Social Welfare 1 ( Jan.) 2012, 
Beijing.
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based on the ‘small community unit’. It comprehensively covered pensions, 
medical services and housing policy, even including heating subsidies and a 
transportation allowance. Social welfare was based on the state’s responsibility, 
and each work unit managed, provided and took on all responsibilities, based 
on the concept, “the work unit is a small society”.
In rural areas, based on land guarantees, the state carried out basic 
compulsory education, established a social assistance system (natural disaster 
and poverty relief ), the five guarantee system, cooperative medical service, 
and collective support under the collective economic system. The populations 
of the countryside were guaranteed land, plus social assistance (including 
natural disaster and poverty relief ). On the basis of the collective economy, 
the policy for the elderly allowed them to enjoy the five guarantees, that is, 
childless and infirm old persons were guaranteed food, clothing, medical care, 
housing and burial expenses. In addition, a rural cooperative medical care 
system was established, which continued for more than 20 years.
1.2. Damage and adjustment to social welfare system after the 
economic market reform (after the 1970s)
In the 1970s, the state began the reform towards a market-orientated economy, 
and collapsed the previous social welfare system. In the city, the work unit 
became a pure enterprise production unit, namely, an independent economic 
corporation. The state transferred welfare functions to society, in other words, 
engaging in the socialisation of social welfare, and launched various social 
insurances with endowment insurance as the core. In rural areas, the collective 
economy was replaced by the household contract responsibility system, and 
collective welfare declined with the dissolution of the collective economy. 
The Minister of Labour and Social Security, and Ministry of Civil Affairs 
and other agencies explored how to adapt the social welfare system to a 
market economy system, by looking into the process of community building 
in the city. At one point, economists and policy makers questioned the idea 
of having, and at one point suspended, a rural area social security system.
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1.3. Restructuring of the social welfare system (after 2003)
The reforms brought about an increased gap between the rich and poor, as well 
as imbalanced regional development, coupled with growing social problems. 
In 2003, at the Third Plenary Session of the Sixteenth Central Committee 
of the Communist Party of China, a scientific development ideology, calling 
for “people-orientated, comprehensive and sustainable development”, was 
proposed. In 2004, at the Fourth Plenary Session of the Sixteenth CPC 
Central Committee, the concept of “building a socialist harmonious society” 
was clearly put forward. In October  2007, the Seventeenth CPC Central 
Committee clearly proposed “speeding up social construction that focused on 
the people’s living standards”. The key issue of “building a socialist harmonious 
society” is that “all people have rights to education, a living wage, employment, 
medical care, and housing” (The Central Committee of the Community Party 
of China 2007). This actually makes up the precise content of China’s social 
welfare system. China has begun to move from economic development to 
social development and social construction. The state has started to become 
concerned with people’s livelihoods, and is exploring social welfare systems 
such as endowment insurance, a new rural cooperative medical care system, 
and other social services. The social welfare system tends to be covered by 
the state, society and individuals, covering more areas and populations from 
economic security to service benefits. Some new problems in the current 
situation, for instance, migrant populations and workers, abandoned old 
people and children left behind in homes in rural areas, have started to 
attract attention, and topics such as public services have come into view. 
Even though the government is concerned with people’s well-being, many 
problems have arisen because of the differences between the rich and poor, 
in the areas of people’s housing, education and medical care, during the past 
three decades under the sole drive towards economic development. 
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1.4. The current social welfare system in China
After about six decades of development, the context of China’s social welfare 
system includes social insurance, social assistance, welfare service, a special 
care and placement system and social aid and charity. 
Social insurance systems have been explored very quickly in recent years. 
There are four main areas of concern: medical insurance, pension insurance, 
work related injury insurance, and unemployment insurance.
Except for the basic medical insurance for public institutions, basic medical 
insurance for urban employment was set up in 2005, basic medical insurance 
for urban citizens in 2007, and rural cooperative medical services in 2006, 
and an urban and rural serious illness insurance system was installed in 2012.
Looking at the basic pension insurance, basic pension insurance for urban 
employees was issued in 2005, rural social pension insurance in 2009 and social 
pension insurance for urban citizens in 2011. The regulation for work related 
insurance was set up in 2003. The regulation for unemployment insurance 
was published in 1999. Maternity insurance was issued in 1994.
The social assistance system mainly covers calamity relief and poverty 
relief. It includes the establishment of the minimum living security system for 
urban residents in 1999, minimum living security system for rural residents in 
2007, natural disaster emergency rescue system in 2004, rural five guarantee 
system initially established in 1956, and revised in 2006, social assistance for 
rural poor households in 2003, rural medical help system in 2003, urban 
medical help system in 2005, relief system for urban vagrants and beggars 
in 2003, assistance for education in 2004, assistance for housing in 2004 and 
judicial assistance system in 2003. 
Social insurance has grown and its coverage expanded in recent years. 
According to the Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security of China, 
basic pension insurance covered 82 million people in 2002 and 305.52 million 
in 2013, multiplying by 3.7 times in 10 years. Basic medical insurance covered 
100 million people in 2002 and 552.77 million in 2013, multiplying by 5.5 times 
in 10  years. Unemployment insurance covered 4.4  million people in 2002 
and 157.35 million in 2013, multiplying by 36  times in 10 years. There were 
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45.75  million people joined up to work-related injury insurance in 2002 
and 188.24 million in 2013: this multiplied 3.94 times in 10 years. Maternity 
insurance cover has increased from 35 million in 2002 to 154.45 million in 
2013, multiplying by 4.4  times. In 2002, 55  million people had joined the 
rural pension scheme, and this was 320 million in 2011, multiplying 6 times 
in 10 years. 
Public expenditure on social welfare was growing at the same time. 
Education represented 2.9% of GDP in 2007, and 4% in 2012. Public 
expenditure on medical services was 0.8% in 2007 and 1.4% in 2011. Public 
expenditure on social security and employment was 0.2% in 2007 and 2.4% 
in 2011. Public service represented 2.3% and housing 0.8% in 2011. All public 
expenditure on social welfare was 7.4% in 2007, and 10.4% in 2011. It is growing 
fast but is still very low compared with European countries, especially the 
Nordic countries.
2. The background of China’s social welfare and its impact 
on the restructuring of the current social welfare 
programme
2.1. From planned economy to market economy
As mentioned above, during the process of transformation from planned 
economy to market economy, the structures of urban and rural social welfare 
faced a process of collapse. At this point, in the process of transition to a market 
economy, personal responsibility was emphasised. In the cities, workplace or 
work unit managed social welfare was changed to social responsibility, which 
meant that individuals received benefits and services from different providers, 
such as social insurance, market purchases and family support. In rural areas, 
the collective economy was dismissed under the contract responsibility system. 
As a result, personal income grew, and the state allowed the substantial 
interference of market mechanisms in all areas, such as education, health care, 
pensions, housing and social services. On the one hand, the state released 
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responsibility to market and individual choices; on the other hand, the state 
welfare structure was dismembered and destroyed, which led to intensified 
polarisation between the rich and the poor and an increased urban-rural 
gap. At this point, the Ministry of Civil Affairs tried certain community 
development and service approaches, and the community would replace the 
work unit to offer welfare services.
2.2. From closed production to economic globalisation
Globalisation has brought China into the international environment for 
economic development, accelerating the speed of the country’s economic 
development. As China heads towards a market economy, social security 
is required to accompany it, i.e., the construction of a social welfare system 
adaptable to the new situation, which is already the experience of developed 
countries. When the Western countries encountered globalisation, their 
market economy was mature and their social welfare system was relatively 
sound. However, since China’s market economy was only in its infancy, social 
protection was seriously needed to protect people suffering from the market 
economy. But then, when economic globalisation hit China, a new liberalism 
was also introduced into China. Globalisation demands the creation of a so-
called friendly investment environment, to protect the interests of investors, 
resulting in denationalising industries and reducing insurance costs to a 
minimum. When the old social welfare system collapsed and the new one had 
not yet been established in China, the ideology of ‘de-welfare’ impacted and 
hindered the establishment and development of China’s social welfare system.
2.3. From shortage economy to a certain material basis
After three decades of reform and opening up, China has created economic 
conditions and a certain material basis for reconstructing the social welfare 
system. In the Eleventh Five Year Plan, China’s GNI per capita rose quickly, to 
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$3,650 in 2009, 1.1 times that of 2005, ranked 125th in the world, and advanced 
3 places compared with 128th in 2005. Although the ranking of Chinese 
people’s GNI per capita is essentially the same as that in the developing 
world, China’s economic status was ranked third in 2005 and in second 
place in 2010. China’s GDP reached 39.7983 trillion Yuan in 2010, increasing 
69.9% compared with 2005 (National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2011). The 
accumulation of material is not commensurate with the establishment of a 
social welfare system. At present, high income is accompanied by a widened 
national gap between the rich and the poor, and wealth is concentrated on 
a few people. Therefore, the construction or reconstruction of China’s social 
welfare system based on redistribution is imperative. 
3. Core principle of re-structuring China’s social welfare 
system
3.1. Universal principle
According to the message from the Ministry of Civil Affairs, in 2007, the 
Chinese government proposed the transformation of social welfare from 
basic, limited welfare to a moderate universal type, to serve all populations, 
including not only the elderly or disabled, but also other people in difficulty; 
furthermore, service projects would be expanded to medical treatment, health 
care, rehabilitation, sports and entertainment, comfort and support, and so on 
(Dou 2007). Its core idea is to widen services to the population and create 
service projects. According to the reality in China’s, moderate universalism 
contains two meanings, population and content. For example, the current 
urban and rural social endowment insurance system does not cover all of 
the people. In 57.5% of larger urban areas, retired citizens receive pensions, 
but in small towns, this number is 24.8 %, and only 4.6% of rural old people 
were involved in pension schemes in 2005 (National Bureau of Statistics of 
China 2005). Universalism means that all of the elderly will be covered by 
a social endowment insurance system. There are many shortfalls in China’s 
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social welfare system, and it does not meet people’s basic needs. Thus, many 
new social policies should be laid down. 
3.2. Integration
The principle of moderate universalism shall be achieved by integration 
measures. Integration consists of two points, and also contains welfare content 
and population. The former means integrating different fragmented social 
welfare programmes; the latter means integrating the urban and rural area 
populations into a whole. The goal is the integration of the social welfare 
system, so that urban and rural residents can receive equal benefit. This will 
follow concepts based on human-orientation, building a harmonious society.
At present, for instance, just talking about social insurance clearly shows 
a lot of fragmentation. Citizens cannot have the same levels of insurance 
coverage, and there are many kinds of insurance for different kinds of people, 
including medical insurance for urban workers, and rural cooperative medical 
insurance. Pension insurances are of four kinds, basic pension insurance, 
basic pension insurance for enterprise employees, rural old-age insurance 
and residential urban old-age insurance. At present, various incomplete old-
age insurance systems have tended towards urban and rural integration. For 
example, recent news claims that many provinces and cities realise that overall 
urban-rural development for endowment insurance should cover all people, 
so that the endowment insurance between urban, rural area and counties 
can be chosen and transferred (Li 2013). Income security will develop along 
principles of fairness and balance.
3.3. Establish and improve a new social welfare system
The establishment and improvement of the social service system in China at 
this stage includes developing social construction, providing social services, 
promoting social work, supporting social organisation, establishing rules and 
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regulations, etc. It represents a transformation from income support security 
to a modern social administration and social welfare system.
Social engineering and construction
Social engineering can optimise the social structure, explore proper 
management measures and proper relationships between government, 
society and citizens, and lay a solid foundation for the development of social 
undertakings. A good social structure can protect a good basic economic 
and social life for citizens, integrate citizens into society, empower citizens, 
increase the degree of citizen participation in social and political life and 
comprehensively enhance their well-being.
Social service 
As regards improvement from economic benefit to welfare services, over the 
past three decades, more attention has been paid to income security, social 
assistance, disaster relief and different social insurances, but from now on 
there will be an expansion of service guarantees. With the growth of the 
elderly population, the phenomenon of migrant workers and changes in 
family structure, more people and their families need social service support. 
However, social service is still in its initial stage. A community network 
platform of social services for residents provided in the community and by 
the community is required.
Social work
Social work specifically undertakes the implementation of social policies 
related to specific operations, playing a professional function in social 
construction and the social welfare system, especially social services. In the 
reconstruction of the social welfare system, the professional role of social 
work is emphasised and highlighted, and the development of social work 
is truly implemented in all aspects of social work, including the training of 
social work professionals.
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Social organisation
Non-governmental and non-profit social organisations will be vigorously 
developed, social enterprises and social production promoted, and many 
factors mobilised in the cause of social service. However, in view of the 
shortage of civic organisations that can provide a particular level of service and 
qualifications, cultivating, building and reforming social organisations will be 
an important task in order to provide more appropriate and effective services. 
Currently there are incubators for civil society organisations in Shanghai, 
Beijing and other cities.
Rules and regulations
All rules and regulations on social welfare must be improved, especially the 
proportion set aside for providing social welfare, service standards, testing 
and oversight systems. 
4. Positive factors of restructure of China’s social welfare 
system
Some people question the possibility of universalism in China, if even Western 
developed countries cannot maintain their current systems. We are talking 
about ‘moderate universalism’, so, how should this be explained? First we 
should examine the universalism of the Western countries. Its design is for 
the purpose of satisfying people’s basic needs and reflecting just and relative 
fairness and equality, instead of meeting the final average result. Firstly, the 
universalist welfare model is designed to satisfy everyone’s basic needs, so 
that each member of society is able to access basic life support. Secondly, 
instead of completely filling in differences, it recognises that people have 
different capacities, and gives such difference the chance for free development 
opportunities and a fair return. Thirdly, it creates opportunities, so that each 
person’s potential can be fully developed, which is the basic principle of the 
moderate universalism that we are discussing here.
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4.1. Socialist principles and institutions
The country plays an irreplaceable role in the development of social welfare. 
The core issue is whether the state proceeds from the common interests of 
people, and adheres to the principle of social justice.
Principle of socialism: common prosperity
China’s national system is publicly claimed to be based on common prosperity. 
Deng Xiaoping said: “The key difference characterising socialism vs. capitalism 
is common prosperity. Polarisation is not allowed” (Deng 1993). In addition, 
“Common prosperity is an important essence of socialism, which shows the 
different characteristics of socialism and capitalism, and the basic principle 
that cannot be shaken off by a socialist system” (Wang 2012). As well as the 
elimination of the basic contradiction of capitalism, there are other more 
obvious factors.
Overall planning and macro-control of central government
A socialist system is not only based on a principled and secure system for 
constructing a social welfare system, but also includes national integrated 
planning. The centre deploys funds to support the poor and lagging areas, 
specifically strengthening central financial regulation and redistribution for 
social endowment insurance. The centre gives 80% of basic pension subsidy 
to the western area, 60% to the middle area and 20% to the eastern area. The 
transfer of central subsidies does not only involve the tilt from east to west, 
but also the transfer from city to rural areas. Another activity of the macro 
control of the socialist system is scheduled mutual support between regions. 
The function of welfare features regional and urban-rural pairing. For example, 
in the construction of rural communities, urban and rural communities in 
many provinces and cities are paired up, to be built by counterparts. This 
approach was also very significant after the Sichuan earthquake. Major cities 
help disaster areas in pairs.
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Economic base
The public ownership dominated position of a socialist society aims to achieve 
the economic base of common prosperity, which addresses the contradiction of 
capitalism’s privatisation versus the welfare of all citizens. “Implementing public 
ownership on an economic basis, or with public ownership playing the dominant 
role is the fundamental economic system and important symbol of socialism” 
(Wang 2012). Ownership and property relations determine distribution relations, 
which is the root cause of the widened gap between the rich and the poor. This 
public ownership will also provide the basis for improvement of national welfare. 
For example, in some places, 30% of the income of state-owned enterprises is 
directly invested into people’s livelihoods or careers.
4.2. Traditional heritage 
China’s traditional culture has the following characteristics:
Culture: collectivism
Chinese culture is characterised by collectivism. Chinese traditional culture 
emphasises groups rather than individuals, so welfare often appears in the 
form of collective institutions, such as the family, community and the state, 
that demonstrate a collective welfare function. Collectivism, as previously 
mentioned, is the basic factor of welfare. The emergence of the modern welfare 
state arose from each class forming alliances and the collective facing crisis 
and risk. The socialist system is a new choice for a country, and a cultural 
carryover of a traditional collectivist culture. For example, before the reform 
and opening up, China’s rural areas were very poor, but the state spent less 
money on establishing common rural cooperative medical systems by relying 
on collective power.
Administration: state intervention
Historically, China emphasised the function of state intervention to take 
responsibility for people’s welfare. In ancient times, there was a statement 
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of benevolent government. In practice, state intervention first appeared in 
the Han Dynasty with features such as the Normal Granary, and there was 
state relief long ago. In Chinese history, measures of state intervention in 
welfare and disaster relief came much earlier than the earliest representative 
of intervention in the Western countries – such as the English Poor Laws.
Philosophy: great harmony
The idea of great harmony expresses a longing for an ideal society, which is 
a combination of harmony, peace, and coordination, demonstrating harmony 
between people, and between man and nature. The harmonious community 
includes the whole world as one community, respecting the old and cherishing 
the young, filial piety and equality, the core spiritual values constituting welfare.
These cultural factors represent soft powers whose role cannot be 
underestimated. Stressing the impact of traditional culture, advocating 
harmonious family relationships and welfare, and the welfare effects of the 
social network can reduce the country’s welfare spending. For example, in 
the field of social policy, the Chinese cultural factor is applied: family is 
emphasised as an economic unit, and family is regarded as the smallest unit 
for formulating family policy. In this way, family cohesion will be increased 
and government spending reduced. The soft power should be transferred 
as a system-based benefit design. For example, the phenomenon of older 
people’s collective culture and entertainment appears in many places around 
the country, which, in fact, manifests in health savings and the tendency 
towards longer, happier ageing.
4.3. Social organisation and social networks
Traditional social organisations and networks have played a significant role 
influencing and changing the restructuring of the Chinese social welfare 
system. At the same time, since the establishment of the People’s Republic 
of China, some community groups and grassroots organisations established 
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or promoted by the government are or will also become both promoters and 
platforms of the social welfare system.
People’s organisations
Chinese people’s organisations include the Communist Youth League, the 
Women’s Federation, the Association for Science and Technology and trade 
unions, etc., which are also facing reform in the new period. Some of them 
are exploring new ways to provide social services. For example, the Women’s 
Federation is looking into the welfare of abandoned women and children. 
The Communist Youth League is exploring work for volunteers. These 
organisations provide a very good agency and organisational frameworks for 
establishing the social welfare system in the future. However, a new change in 
their exploratory function is needed to play a special and indispensable role.
Community-based organisations
There are about 589,000 rural community village committees and 754,897 urban 
community village committees, which are resident (villager) autonomous 
organisations, in China. While mobilising community capital to protect 
the welfare of local residents, they also play a role in transferring the 
government’s social welfare. Those local autonomous organisations supported 
by the government are strong organisational networks used for the Chinese 
community’s welfare. They build a platform and organisational mechanism 
for community service.
Neighbourhood, community, and society of acquaintance
Different from Western countries, China’s neighbourhood relations are very 
close, relatively speaking, especially in rural areas. Some neighbourhoods are 
there for simple mutual support and help, and some have extended to become 
community-based mutual organisations, such as The Senior Committee 
in Jiangxi Province, Mutual Aid Associations in some areas and Elderly 
Associations everywhere. China has a cultural intellectual tradition of  ‘united 
construction of the family and the state’. These harmonious institutions expand 
welfare culture and provide a welfare function.
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Family
The inner family relationship of China is close. The family rather than the 
individual is the minimum social unit. Although currently China’s nuclear 
families are increasing in number, we can see that each small nuclear family 
is closely linked. Therefore, some scholars have said that the Chinese family is 
an extended family, and can be referred to as the ‘friendly relationship of the 
extended family’. Family cohesion is a source of well-being. Such relationships 
can only be strengthened and not weakened. For example, when the elderly 
social service system is not perfect, and service staff are insufficient, an elderly 
family policy can be considered, which involves the issuing of an old-age 
allowance with the family as a unit to support a jobless family member to 
undertake the work taking care of the elderly. At the same time, the recurrent 
population of migrant workers can be considered to be supported within the 
family rather than as individuals. Social policies need to explore family policy 
to strengthen families and social services, so as to reduce state spending and 
combine welfare with family roles and function.
These benefit factors have been confirmed in the course of the development 
of social welfare services. Therefore, we have reason to believe that China will 
explore its own way in the restructuring of its social welfare system, create a 
harmonious society and provide well-being for the Chinese people. At the 
same time, it will enrich the theory and practice of social policy through its 
own unique exploration.
5. Challenge of China’s welfare factors
During the reform and opening up, thanks to the influence of diversified 
thought and new liberal ideological trends, China’s social welfare thinking 
has become less rigid than in the past, being challenged from many aspects. 
Under the strength of the market economy, socialist principles make way 
for the market economy in some respects. Vested interest groups occupy 
strong, powerful economic positions and the right to speak, steering national 
social welfare together with domestic and international forces. Following 
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three decades of Chinese economic reform and opening up, and adhering to 
the view of Deng Xiaoping of moving steadily without controversy, a clear 
opposition has emerged to the welfare ideology in current classes. Current 
class stratification strains the value orientation of the government and the 
nature of the national welfare system.
Despite unprecedented challenges and difficulties, we are convinced 
of China’s choices for a few reasons. Firstly, China’s national condition 
is socialist, and China’s socialist nature is written in the Constitution, 
which is indisputable. Secondly, social welfare policy emphasises moderate 
universalism. Thirdly, the strong Chinese culture has continued for thousands 
of years. Fourthly, China’s historical path of development cannot be reversed. 
The current confusion and problems demand a new way of thinking. In 
2002, after three decades of economic reform, the idea of social development 
fitting economic development was proposed. And now, it is time to think 
of welfare ideology. Therefore, political reform is required. The two strands 
of welfare and democracy have mutually reinforced each other in Western 
countries. China’s economy and liberalism have been integrated for many 
years. However, development of social welfare needs to focus on people’s 
livelihoods and basic needs, which reflect people’s social rights. The voice of 
social rights calls for political rights.
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Chapter 4
Historical development and  
new characteristics of China’s social welfare
A comparative study with South Korea under  
the framework of the East Asian welfare regime
Keqing Han and Byung-Cheol Kim
1. Introduction 
The concept of the ‘welfare state regime’, including social democratic regimes, 
liberal regimes and conservative regimes, was first put forward in 1990 by 
Gøsta Esping-Andersen in his book, The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism. 
Since then the research of welfare state regime has attracted strong interest 
from academia. Later, in his book, Welfare States in Transition: National 
Adaptations in Global Economies (1996), Esping-Andersen points out that 
social welfare development in the East Asian countries and regions can be 
defined as the main goal of their national construction of an extended adaptive 
learning and development strategy. A welfare system can be considered to 
be a joint action as a result of the internal and external pressure. Compared 
to Western experiences, East Asia’s social welfare development model is not 
consistent (Esping-Andersen 1996). In recent years, the East Asia welfare 
regime has become the research object of many scholars, who have attempted 
to find a new welfare model that is different from those regimes mentioned 
in The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism. After twenty years of examination, 
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the question as to whether the so-called ‘East Asian welfare regime’ exists 
in the East Asian regions is still controversial.
The research proposition regarding to whether or not the East Asian 
welfare regime exists is very complicated. It initially involves working on a 
standard classification of welfare regimes. Undoubtedly, Esping-Andersen’s 
work is ground-breaking. However, there are limitations in his research. 
Thus, the key to confirming the existence of the East Asian welfare regime 
is to find the core discipline of its features, ensuring that this discipline is 
totally different from the other three types of welfare regime. Only through 
this process can the task of examining the East Asian welfare regime be 
accomplished.
2. Introduction and characteristics of the East Asia welfare 
regime
Since the second half of the 20th century, the East Asian countries, represented 
by Japan, South Korea (hereafter Korea), Singapore, Taiwan and Hong 
Kong, have produced great economic miracles. Meanwhile, social welfare 
policies have played a main role of serving economic development rather 
than social solidarity. To certain extent of economic development, the East 
Asian countries are prepared to take measures to expand national welfare. 
Currently, the majority of developed countries in the West are showing a 
trend of reducing national welfare. How have the economic miracles of East 
Asia been created? How can the combination of a welfare regime and an 
economic system be realised?
The issues related to East Asian welfare have aroused the extensive concern 
of researchers. The study of the East Asian welfare regime opened its door 
to the West in the 1980s. Dixon and Kim (1985) paid great attention to the 
institutional characteristics of welfare systems in Asia. Rose and Shiratori 
(1986) showed the differences in welfare systems between the East and West, 
which went beyond the scope of national research in welfare systems. But the 
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examination of East Asian welfare was still minor before the 1990s, compared 
to studies on European welfare. 
A remarkable growth of studies related to East Asian welfare has been 
witnessed since the beginning of the 1990s. Some scholars have proposed 
the concept of an ‘East Asian welfare model’ or ‘East Asian welfare regime’ 
in order to identify certain similarities that emerged in the development 
of social welfare in the rising economies of East Asia, as differentiated 
from Western welfare states ( Jones 1993, 198–217; Goodman et al. 1998; Lin 
1999). However, the East Asian countries still have significant differences 
in their historical development, basic national conditions, population, level 
of economic development and welfare systems despite their similarities in 
terms of geographical location, cultural traditions, development strategies, 
political environment and so forth. Therefore, it is a controversial issue in the 
academic field as to whether the East Asian welfare regime exists.
3. Similarities in the East Asia welfare model 
Firstly, the level of national welfare is low, as is the proportion of welfare 
expenditure in most Asian countries or regions (White & Goodman 1998, 
1–22). Holliday & Wilding (2003) systematically point out nine common 
features in the social policies of East Asian social welfare regimes: (1)  low 
government expenditure on welfare; (2) positive welfare policies with a focus 
on economic growth; (3) government hostility toward welfare; (4)  residual 
models; (5) family-centred nature; (6) government has a role in normalising 
and encouraging; (7)  fragmentary schemes of welfare development; 
(8)  maintenance of the stability and legality of political power by means 
of welfare; (9)  limited commitment to welfare entitlement. According to 
the Social Protection Index report issued by the Asia Development Bank on 
14 May 2008, the average expenditure on social welfare in Asia was less than 
5% of GDP and the average level of financial support to the unemployed, the 
aged, the poor and disabled only reached 35% of the level set by the United 
Nations (Zheng 2009).
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Secondly, the coverage of social insurance in most of Asian countries 
is very low, except in Japan and Korea. Taking China as an example, the 
actual number of people participating in pension insurance only accounts 
for 20% of those who should have such insurance, and the same proportion 
of people in the relevant cohort receive a pension. Only about 5% of the 
population have benefited directly from the minimum livelihood guarantee 
system. Although the rate of health insurance coverage has accelerated, around 
300 million urban and rural people are not insured by medical security. In 
the countryside, the actual medical insurance benefits that rural residents 
obtain from the cooperative medical system represent less than one third of 
their medical expenses. Similar situations can be found in India, Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines, Pakistan, Mongolia and other 
countries (Zheng 2009).
Thirdly, elitism is an obvious feature of social welfare in East Asia. The 
loyalty of regional elites and significant state functionaries is ensured by the 
necessary welfare policies. In this area, civil servants, soldiers and staff from 
key public sectors are usually given more generous welfare packages, while 
vulnerable groups are often excluded from such welfare packages (Lin 2008). 
Thus, the social welfare system of East Asia does not fully play the role of 
promoting social justice.
Fourthly, the reform and development of social welfare shows a trend 
which is distinct from current models in Europe and America because of the 
specific social, economic and cultural backgrounds found in East Asia. It is a 
diversified development pattern (Lin 2000). Japan is an Asiatic welfare state, 
whereas Singapore chooses the unique accumulation fund model. The mixed 
welfare system of China is taking shape, and welfare system arrangements 
in each country also vary significantly (Zheng 2009).
Last but not least, Confucianism emphasises familial responsibility and 
obligation, which induces people to reduce their expectations from national 
welfare and rely more on the family (Park & Gao 2007). Research indicates 
that the family structure of East Asian countries and regions has suffered 
an unprecedented impact under the influence of industrialisation. The 
downsizing of the family structure or increase of nuclear family types has 
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been accompanied by the process of urbanisation. The family structure, as 
well as close relationship through kinship is still very strong, which is quite 
different from the situation in Europe and America. Familial responsibility 
still plays an extremely important role in social security in East Asia (Lin 
2000).
4. Arguments about East Asian welfare regime
The concept of traditional ‘Welfare Orientalism’ has led some researchers to 
regard East Asian societies as homogeneous, which in turn has led to the 
image of an egalitarian society. However, in a real sense, they are quite different 
from each other in terms of their historical trajectory of modernisation in a 
real sense (Takegawa 2007). Significant differences can be found across the 
East Asian region in the aspects of historical background, national conditions, 
population density, political system, social structure, level of industrialisation, 
life style and values. These different factors correspondingly lead to unique 
social welfare regimes with their own characteristics.
Although social welfare in the East Asia region has shown some common 
features, it is still controversial to agree upon the possibility of an ‘East Asian 
welfare regime’ because of these differences. Thus, it is difficult to boil them 
down into a homogeneous and unified East Asian welfare regime (Walker 
& Wong 2005, 216).
Some scholars consider the so-called ‘East Asian welfare regime’ to be 
invalid. Lin and Zhao (2010) argue that “what standard welfare type or 
regime is established” is a key question that cannot be avoided in East Asian 
welfare studies, while the geographical area cannot be taken as a whole for 
classification basis. Even though we may to some extent confirm the existence 
of an East Asian regime in geographical way, the key foundation of the 
East Asian welfare regime is definitely not the geographical scope of these 
countries and regions. There is also insufficient research that is supportive 
of the so-called ‘East Asian regime’ and ‘East Asian Regionalism’. Ramesh 
(2004, 16) argues that the concept of the East Asian welfare regime is useless, 
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because of certain differences among East Asia countries, which have been 
more obvious since the late 1990s. Xiong (2007; 2008) points out that the 
unified East Asian welfare regime does not exist, by demonstrating the obvious 
diversity rather than a single form of social welfare system in the region.
Throughout the social welfare practices of East Asian countries, we can 
find that the regime choices are different. Japan established a universal social 
insurance system in the late 1950s and early 1960s by choosing the strategy 
of paying equal attention to income distribution and economic growth. 
In 1955, Singapore established the Central Provident Fund System with 
compulsory saving. Initially independent, this system was continued by the 
government and made further achievements in its coverage and function. Now 
it has evolved into social insurance system providing pension, health care, 
housing and other related programmes for all citizens, and the beneficiaries 
covered by security programmes have been expanded from employees of 
the public and private sectors to the self-employed. The Taiwanese social 
welfare system, including labour rights and interest protection, health 
insurance and occupational security, has taken a basic form in the 1990s. In 
regard to programme development, insured levels and the degree of system 
sustainability, army personnel and civil servants still obviously enjoy more 
benefits than labourers, farmers and other professionals. In Hong Kong, a 
‘no intervention policy’, which tries to reduce government intervention and 
increase the self-reliance of citizens, has had a prominent impact on social 
welfare.
5. The historical development of social welfare in Korea
Factors such as social, economic and political elements in a country or society 
are closely related to the development of social welfare. Understanding these 
factors can help us to identify the major features of social welfare in a particular 
country or society (Kim et al. 2009). The development of social welfare 
in Korea could roughly be divided into two phases. The first phase is the 
formation period of social welfare system, which covers the period from the 
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U.S. government’s military intervention after liberation (1945–1948) and Chun 
Doo-hwan’s government (1980–1987). The second phase ranges from Roh Tae-
woo’s government (1988–1992) to Lee Myung-bak’s government (2007–2013).
The first phase is the formation period of social welfare in Korea, which 
ranges roughly from the military intervention of the U.S. government after 
the liberation (1945–1948) to the eve of Chun Doo-hwan’s government (1980–
1987). The national policy of the U.S. government was keen on maintaining the 
status quo. At that time, the U.S. government introduced various forms of aid 
in order to solve economic chaos throughout the country. The measures that 
the U.S. government took featured extremely restrictive and selective objects 
for welfare provision, such as facility supplies, public aid, emergency, disaster 
relief and other general assistance, as well as aid in sheltering, unemployment 
and housing for victims who returned after the war (Lee 2004). During 
the period of the Rhee Syng-man and Zhang Myon governments (1948–
1961), social welfare at the national level was supportive of certain groups of 
people, such as civil servants, school teachers and soldiers who could display 
strong support for the political ruling party and its leaders. Social welfare 
at civil society level was concentrated on facility-based protection, and was 
highly dependent on foreign emergency aid. During this period, the Korean 
government formulated a series of laws, including the national meritorious 
staff compensation, Sergeant Aid (1950), the Labour Standard Act (1953), the 
Civil Servants Pension Law Related to Social Insurance (1960), and so on. 
The state-dominated economic development policy of Park Chung-
hee’s government (1961–1979) placed economic development as the priority. 
Park Chung-hee’s government continued to maintain ‘distribution after 
development’ political domination with the formulation of over ten social 
welfare Acts (Choi 2001). The authoritarian Chun Doo-hwan government 
(1980–1987) featured a stabilising politics and resistance to social movements 
to some extent, and still served to ensure the legitimacy of political power 
( Jung 2003; Park 1995). In short, the first stage, from the U.S. government’s 
military intervention to Chun Doo-hwan’s government could be regarded 
as the formation period of social welfare in Korea, in which social welfare 
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was transformed from an assistance-orientated welfare system into a modern 
institutionalised welfare system.
The second stage is the developing period of social welfare, beginning 
from the struggle for democratisation and labourers’ movements during Roh 
Tae-woo’s government (1988–1992) up until Lee Myung-bak’s government 
(2007–2013). Roh Tae-woo’s government (1988–1992) set up a series of 
social welfare programmes in order to satisfy the constantly emerging need 
of democratisation and workers’ welfare. These programmes were based 
on universalism, which gradually expanded their coverage. It is not only 
inclusive of a specific social class, but also covers ordinary people. During this 
period, the basic structure of social welfare was established. The Minimum 
Wage Law and National Pension Act were implemented on1 January 1988. 
Kim Young-sam’s government (1993–1997) established a system of political 
democracy and instituted standards of living through means such as the 
minimum livelihood guarantee system. The social security system in Korea 
was enlarging gradually. The economic crisis after 1997 resulted in extensive 
bankruptcy and unemployment, which in turn resulted in a ripple effect 
of social problems including interruption of income, family disintegration, 
increase in homelessness, an increased suicide rate and so forth. Kim Dae-
jung’s government (1998–2002) proposed to provide the able-bodied with 
decent protection based on basic human rights. Social welfare during this 
period was based on productive welfare that dealt with the economic crisis. 
In particular, the nation’s loose social safety net was tightened by expanding 
the coverage and the benefits of the four major state-administrated social 
insurance schemes and by thoroughly overhauling the public assistance 
program (Yang 2000). During this period, consolidated social insurance 
brought all citizens into the coverage, but informal employed labourers such 
as temporary workers were still excluded from the formal coverage of the 
social insurance system. Besides this, the National Minimum Livelihood 
Guarantee System was promulgated in 1999. In order to prevent family discord 
and breakdown due to massive unemployment and the ensuing poverty, a 
series of acts, including the Domestic Violence Prevention Act (1998), Parents’ 
Welfare Act (2002), Children’s Welfare Act (1999),and the Disabled Welfare Act 
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(1999) were enacted and revised. Roh Moo-hyun’s government (2003–2007) 
set ‘participation’ and ‘authoritarianism absent’ as the political orientation in 
its initial stage. The notion of participative welfare reflected the new welfare 
demand and the positive meaning of the maturity of civil society in a changing 
society (Ministry of Health and Welfare 2006). Social welfare in this period 
was based on participative welfare theory and inherited and developed the 
productive welfare of Kim Dae-jung’s government. 
Lee Myung-bak’s government was centred around Neo-liberalism, which 
mainly consists of growth theory and exploitationism represented by the 
‘747’ pledge  – 7% annual GDP growth, an annual per capita income of 
40,000 USD, and making Korea the seventh-largest economy in the world – 
and ‘the Grand Canal Project’ – the 500-kilometre waterway project. But these 
measures accelerated social polarisation. As Lee Myung-bak’s government 
came with a message of small government, less regulation and lower taxes, 
it weakened investment in social welfare. It further advocated an ‘active 
welfare’ policy, introduced on the basis of the market function and offering a 
door-to-door service for beneficiaries without waiting. The One-stop welfare 
delivery structure has been constructed in all welfare systems, providing 
welfare services from children to the elderly. It also includes policy measures 
that prevent the appearance of vulnerable groups instead of investing in 
welfare once they have arisen. There are four strategies to bring about active 
welfare: (1) providing basic livelihoods based on the life cycle; (2) preventive, 
targeted and comprehensive welfare programmes; (3) stabilising the national 
economy through the market function; (4) safe society breaking away from 
social danger (Kim et al. 2009). Superficially, the social welfare policy of 
Lee Myung-bak’s government was regarded as similar to those of previous 
governments. However, in relation to welfare, it is rather different from 
Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun’s governments. From the perspective of 
the tax reduction policy implemented by Lee Myung-bak’s government in 
September 2009, we should say that it was far from the goal of “expanding 
welfare for citizens” (Kim 2009). The 0.7% cut in inheritance tax and reduction 
on income tax on duty-free shopping instituted by this policy has nothing 
to do with the low-income class. The policy rather ease the tax burden of 
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the cooperate class. In particular, 80% of it was applied to large enterprises. 
Policies to increase the property of the upper classes and large enterprises 
come into opposition to the expansion of social welfare that is beneficial to 
most citizens. Looking at the share of the total welfare spending in GDP 
between 1999 and 2001, the trend in welfare expenditure displays a dramatic 
decrease. Korea’s welfare budget of 129.6 trillion won was equivalent to just 
over 12% of the entire gross domestic product (GDP) in 1999 and the country’s 
proportion of welfare spending dropped to 9% GDP in 2001.  Thus, we may 
say that the social welfare of Lee Myung-bak’s government is quite robust. 
But it still follows the path of decreasing social welfare. Thus, the expansion 
of social inequality will become a stumbling block for the lower classes to 
fulfil their potential and restrain people’s freedom to act, which, in return, 
can cause social unrest in Korea.
6. The characteristics of social welfare development in  
South Korea
Before the 1990s, Korea paid great attention to economic growth aiming 
at eliminating absolute poverty instead of consideration for decent 
livelihoods and support for disadvantaged groups of people. Therefore, the 
institutional framework for dealing with the social risk that has resulted 
from unemployment, ageing and diseases is not sound and perfect. However, 
in the 1990s, the government started to recognise the necessity of social 
welfare, with expanded investment in this area under the new paradigm of 
‘balance between economic growth and social development’. There existed 
a unique background from Kim Dae-jung’s government to Lee Myung-
bak’s government. In politics, the outbreak of the national requirement for 
democratisation and the labourers’ movement established the foundation of 
the transition from a formal democracy to a substantial democracy. In terms 
of the economy, the influence of globalisation and Korea’s unique economic 
system brought about a serious economic crisis in late 1997. During this period, 
social and economic problems, including increasing rates of unemployment, 
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poverty and informal employment as well as family disintegration resulted 
in social polarisation to various degrees. In addition, the low birth rate and 
ageing population made the situation worse. Regional decentralisation and 
welfare circumstances also changed alongside these issues. 
The characteristics of Korean social welfare in the first phase could be 
summarised as follows (Kim et al. 2009). Firstly, social welfare under the 
Japanese colonial period was instantly transplanted after liberation, and then 
institutionalised. Regarding social assistance, the rescuing order of Japan’s rule 
was changed into rescue principles in the period of the U.S. government’s 
military intervention; it then became known as the life protection system 
during Park Chung-hee’s government. This represented a sort of renaming 
process, without key programmes being changed and with no differences 
between them.
Secondly, social welfare is regarded as a tool for maintaining ruling power 
and social stability. In spite of a number of pieces of social welfare legislation 
being implemented, social welfare was merely nominal, not applied in a real 
sense universally to ordinary people. The Park Chung-hee and Chun Doo-
hwan’s governments made flexible use of social welfare as a political means 
by which to maintain their authority. 
Thirdly, economic development always took precedence over social 
development. The welfare system was supposed to serve economic development 
along with the national strategy as the goal. It was often thoroughly suppressed 
by the labourers’ movement and students’ movement. This relationship blocked 
the development of social welfare guaranteeing people’s basic rights. 
Fourthly, welfare provision by the private sector was more prevalent than 
state welfare. Under the circumstances of the ‘Korean War’ and absolute 
poverty, various forms of aids from private foreign aid agencies strongly 
featured, involving dispensation-orientated assistance. In terms of scale, the 
for-profit sector that was dependent on foreign aid occupied more of a share 
than social welfare. As foreign aid gradually retreated, social welfare had to 
take over its responsibility in a passive way. At that time, the poverty issues 
and health problems of ordinary people were buried under the priority of 
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economic development, and most responsibility for poverty and health was 
borne by individuals and families.
The establishment of social welfare in Korea has gradually taken effect with 
the following characteristics (Kim et al. 2009). Firstly, there is a continued 
expansion of the universal welfare system. On one hand, this has been a result 
of democratisation and the labour movement. On the other hand, it has been 
a policy adjustment to deal with economic crisis. Through democratisation, 
the needs of the citizens emerged. The president elected by the hands of 
the citizens was committed to provide social welfare to meet the demand 
of the citizens. If the labour movement was recognised as the driving force 
for welfare development, the series of labour movements had a tremendous 
effect on the development of the universal welfare system. Moreover, the rapid 
growth of civil organisations also had a certain impact on the establishment 
of universal social welfare during this period. 
Secondly, the responsibility of the government in social welfare was 
suppressed compared with the grater expansion of the private sector. The 
level of social welfare expenditure in Korea has been one of the lowest 
compared to the OECD countries. This reflects the huge influence of neo-
liberalism on its social welfare, which emphasised the establishment of a 
social welfare system, while enhancing the benefit level of social welfare was 
faced with many challenges. 
Thirdly, the governments in the second phase carried out specific plans 
for welfare development according to their own welfare ideology, except 
Roh Tae-woo’s government. Each government needed to make strategic 
adjustment at the national level in order to eliminate negative influences 
such as globalisation, economic crisis, social polarisation, low birth rate and 
population ageing. For example, Kim Young-Sam’s government put forward 
the Korean type of social welfare model represented by the national minimum 
livelihood guarantee system, Kim Dae-jung’s government proposed productive 
welfare represented by labour-linked social policies, and Roh Moo-hyun’s 
government brought in participative welfare. These strategic adjustments made 
development and distribution possible in order to reach a benign interactive 
equilibrium and various social welfare schemes.
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7. The historical development of social welfare in China
The historical development of Chinese social welfare has undergone two 
major institutional changes since its foundation in 1949. The first phase 
was the period of the gradual establishment of social welfare, including a 
national insurance system, work-unit welfare and collective security, adapted 
to the socialist planned economy system. The second phase was the period of 
system transformation since the reform and opening up policy in 1978. The 
Chinese economy has gradually been shifted from the planned economy to 
the market economic system. In this major process of system transformation, 
the development of social welfare has moved on to the third stage.
The first phase was mainly about the establishment and stabilisation 
of social policies under the planned economic system. It started with the 
foundation of PRC in 1949 and ended on the eve of the policy of reform 
and opening up in 1978. During these years, the Chinese government 
established the labour insurance system for urban enterprise employees, the 
socialised medical care system, the enterprise collective welfare system, and 
the retirement system of organisations and institutions in urban areas, while 
establishing the Five Guarantees supporting system and the rural cooperative 
medical system in rural areas. Thus, the model of national social welfare under 
an urban-rural partition was gradually formed. 
The policy under the planned economic system was generally characterised 
by this dual policy system with urban-rural partition. In the urban areas, the 
national insurance system as a main provision was designed for the workers, 
work-unit welfare was considered a supplement, and social relief was only for 
the small number of poor people (for example, people without a job, income 
or alimony). In rural areas, people belonged to collective welfare based on 
the three-tier system: people’s commune, production brigade and production 
team. At that time, Chinese social welfare featured universal forms of welfare 
provision through the state and the enterprises.
The second phase happened between the transition and convergence period 
from the planned economic system to the market economic system, roughly 
between 1979 and 1997. During this period, land reform in rural areas started, 
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followed by the reform of state-owned enterprises and collective enterprises 
in urban areas with the planned economy being comprehensively replaced 
by the market economy. In the field of social welfare, the all-encompassing 
welfare burden of economic organisations and enterprises under the planned 
economic system were fully eliminated. In 1993, the CPC Central Committee 
decision on establishing a socialist market economic system clearly aimed at 
building personal income distribution and social security systems by building 
a multi-level social security system, providing social security compatible with 
China’s national conditions for urban and rural residents, and promoting 
economic development and social stability. It focused on improving the 
corporate pension and unemployment insurance system, and strengthening 
the function of social services to reduce the burden on enterprises, to promote 
the adjustment of enterprises’ organisational structure and improve economic 
efficiency and competitiveness (Ministry of Labour and Social Security 2002). 
During this process, the social welfare established and perfected during the 
planned economy faced problems including the gradual disintegration of the 
policy basis, significant reduction of effectiveness, and even the absence of 
specific policies in some areas. Welfare housing and publicly funded education 
began to move in the direction of market, commercialisation, privatisation 
and industrialisation. 
With the gradual deepening of reform and opening up policy, new 
economic problems and social contradictions became increasingly prominent. 
The adaptation of social welfare to the socialist market economic system also 
became an inevitable requirement of economic development. Against this 
background, many areas carried out old age insurance, medical insurance and 
other social insurance system reform pilots, and preliminarily established a 
combination of social pooling and individual accounts for the social insurance 
system. Regarding the social assistance system, Shanghai was the first city to 
explore the implementation of the minimum livelihood guarantee security 
system for laid-off workers in urban areas. The social welfare of this period 
embodied the transition from universal forms of welfare system to a selectively 
based liberal welfare system.
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The third phase covers the establishment and improvement of the new 
social welfare system, roughly starting in 1998. The first characteristic of this 
period is the frequent adjustment of the social welfare management system. 
In 1998, the National Labour Personnel Ministry, renamed the Ministry of 
Labour and Social Security, helped to reinforce the managerial function for 
affairs of social insurance in management systems. In 2008, the Ministry of 
Labour and Social Security was combined with the Ministry of Personnel 
to form the new Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security. The 
second characteristic is the intensive release of various welfare policies. 
Here, the Chinese government prioritised the gradual establishment and 
perfection of the social insurance system such as urban employees’ pension 
insurance and basic medical insurance, unemployment insurance, industrial 
injury insurance, urban residents medical insurance, the new rural cooperative 
medical system, the new rural pension insurance system etc. On 28 October 
2010,? the institution of the Social Insurance Law of the People’s Republic of 
China demonstrated that the basic design of the social insurance system in 
Chinas had been finalised. At the same time, various social assistance, social 
welfare services, education and housing welfare and so forth policies came on 
in succession, such as the Regulations of Minimum Livelihood Guarantee System 
for Urban Residents, Regulations for Housing Accumulation Fund Management, 
Law of Donations for Public Welfare, Regulations on Assistance and Management 
for City Homeless and Beggars, Rules of Rural Five Guarantees Support, Minimum 
Livelihood Guarantee System in Rural Areas, Measures for Low-Rent Housing, 
Law of Protection for the Disabled and so forth. The third characteristic is the 
fundamental shift of value orientation for social welfare. Fairness and justice 
have gradually replaced the concept of efficiency and temporary-aid-centred 
welfare. During this period, social welfare in China began to transform from 
the selective welfare of liberalism to the institutional welfare of universalism.
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8. Characteristics of social welfare since market-orientated 
reform in China 
First of all, the modern social welfare system bears certain liberal 
characteristics. As is commonly known, Chinese social welfare has been 
established to concentrate on the socialist market economy since the reform 
and opening up policy. There are two important positions here. One is that 
market-orientated reform is a fundamental condition for the construction of 
China’s social welfare, while the other claims that China’s social welfare is 
also part of the marketisation reform. The liberal market-orientated reform 
is the basic platform for the establishment of social welfare, which features 
a strong sense of neo-liberalism (Han 2008; 2010). According to Esping-
Andersen, the minimised laissez-faire policy is obvious in liberal thought. 
When liberal universalism and the reality of social dualism and social stigma 
brought by it are in conflict, liberal countries try to cope with market failure 
through the establishment of poverty relief in a punitive and stigmatised 
way. The poverty relief gradually becomes a modern type of social assistance 
with means testing (Esping-Andersen 1990, 62). Since the market-orientated 
reform, the inherent dual separation of the Chinese society, the gap between 
rich and poor and the social exclusion brought by stigma all comply with 
Esping-Andersen’s view of the dilemma faced by liberal social welfare. If 
what Esping-Andersen describes about the liberal social welfare and system 
arrangement is a kind of universal law of welfare policy, the priority of current 
Chinese societal construction must be the establishment and perfection of 
poverty relief and social assistance system using means testing.
Secondly, policy reform is driven mainly by economic development. The 
changes in Chinese reform have been dominated and driven by the government 
since China’s market-orientated reform policy. From the perspective of 
structural-functionalism theory, changes in the political system are affected 
by the economic system. Both tend to undertake the same process from 
differentiation to adjustment. Although the development of China’s social 
welfare has been initiated by economic reform or changes in the economic 
system in some ways, current social welfare in China has become a very 
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important part of China’s political reform or political system changes. This 
will become more clear when the economic and political systems are gradually 
separated. Considering China’s current political system, the single goal of 
economic development is leading (or has led) to multiple goals of political 
democracy and social construction. The function of social welfare is changing 
(or has changed) from the single goal of supporting market economy reform 
to multiple goals of dealing with social problems, tackling the gap between 
rich and poor and promoting social justice. 
Thirdly, the social welfare system has expanded rapidly. The new century has 
seen the rapid development of China’s social welfare and policy measures. From 
the perspective of social assistance systems, the government has established 
the minimum livelihood guarantee system for urban residents, assistance 
and management for city beggars, low-rent housing for poor urban families, 
medical assistance, education aid and other forms of social assistance, and 
correspondingly adjusted management systems. On 10 July 2008, the General 
Office of the State Council issued the Regulation on the Main Responsibility, 
Internal Institutions and Staffing of the Ministry of Personnel. It reformed the 
ministry’s internal institutions, adjusted its responsibilities, strengthened the 
social assistance function, established the internal organisation and changed 
its name from the Minimum Livelihood Guarantee Department to the Social 
Assistance Department. In terms of the social insurance system, the Social 
Insurance Law of the People’s Republic of China, promulgated on 28 October 
2010, further integrates pension, medical, industrial injury, unemployment 
and birth insurance. It also confirms that old-age insurance will gradually 
realise national co-ordination; other insurances extend to the provincial plan. 
It also enlarges the coverage of the system to benefit labourers and citizens 
and further clarifies the government’s responsibility, which sets the tone 
of the social welfare system which is marked with Chinese characteristics 
since the reform and opening-up policy. A series of systems such as the new 
rural pension insurance system, the new rural cooperative medical insurance 
system, the minimum livelihood guarantee for rural residents, and the rural 
five guarantee system form the basic system framework of the rural social 
welfare system in establishing social welfare in rural areas. Social welfare for 
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immigrant workers has been improved and the household registration system 
reform has developed rapidly. What is more, the integration of the urban and 
rural areas of the social welfare system has started to take shape. At present, 
the social policies of China are beginning to transform from being a selective 
liberal welfare regime to becoming an institutional universal welfare regime.
9. Conclusions and discussion
As China and Korea have similarities in terms of their history, culture, 
social traditions and economic development, social welfare in two counties 
correspondingly has much in common. To some extent, this may lead to 
theoretical basis of the East Asia welfare model. Looking at its background, 
the common characteristics mainly include the following aspects:
Firstly, social welfare in China and Korea are deeply influenced by the 
liberal welfare regime. Democratisation, marketisation and neo-liberalism are 
obviously identified in the development process of social welfare in Korea. 
The ‘democratic market economy’ is fundamental in differentiating societal 
welfare development in Korea. As for China, neo-liberalism has had a great 
impact on the establishment of social welfare since the market-orientated 
reform. A series of welfare reforms have been made with an emphasis on 
‘de-nationalisation or growing out of work-unit protection system’ such 
as ‘marketisation of education’ and commercialising housing’. In addition, 
the construction of a social insurance system, with its emphasis on shared 
responsibility among state, society and individuals, has become the major 
element of welfare reform in China. On the other hand, social assistance 
has played an important role in providing effective supplements to welfare 
deficiency during the process of marketisation.
Secondly, the establishment of national welfare is another noticeable 
dimension of social welfare development in China and Korea. Looking at 
the historical and cultural traditions, the two countries have traditions of 
national welfare emphasising collectivism in spite of deep influence by the 
liberal welfare regime. Looking at the development process of social welfare in 
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Korea, it is not difficult to find that social welfare achieved rapid development 
and expansion under the premise that basic social insurance systems and 
social assistance systems are established. It is the same in China. With a 
basic social insurance system established and the social assistance system 
continuously improving, there is obviously an increasing trend in sustainable 
development and the rapid expansion of demand for national welfare and 
public services in China. 
Thirdly, China and Korea have lagged far behind the Western developed 
countries in the process of modernisation, because of social historical 
conditions. Therefore, both countries have adopted a ‘catching-up and 
surpassing’ strategy. In the realm of social welfare, this shows evident features 
of developmental welfare. Through social investment and productivist, 
developmental welfare attempts to promote social development, to increase 
opportunities of employment and self-employment for low-income and 
special groups, and to promote human capital flow and social capital 
formation (Midgley 1999; Midgley & Sherraden 2000). Therefore, whether 
the productive welfare driven by Kim Dae-jung’s government in Korea or 
the social welfare system promoting economic development in China, both 
reflect not only the profound influence of economic growth on social welfare, 
but also the goal of social welfare development to promote economic growth 
and social development.
Fourthly, the development of social welfare in China and Korea is based 
on experience and lessons from the Western developed countries. In the 
course of learning about these experiences, the two countries constantly 
make adjustments in order to cope with social problems and to ease social 
conflicts that emerge in the process of rapid economic development. At the 
very beginning, social welfare in Korea was based on the selective aid system 
of the U.S. government. Then the Korean government has constantly taken 
policy design from the European countries as a reference in the process of 
democratisation and industrialisation. In the early days, China firstly took the 
national insurance system from the former Soviet Union. Since the market-
orientated reform, the Chinese government has taken elements of policy 
design from Germany, Japan and other developed countries. 
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Of course, the two countries have different historical experiences and 
circumstances in development of social welfare. This has led to obvious 
distinctions in ideology, political system and the decision-making process 
between the two countries. As the two countries have experienced rapid 
changes in social welfare, the distinction can be mitigated or transformed 
to a great degree. To draw a more solid line about this issue, we should 
wait until the on-going transformation of two countries, particularly China, 
reaches its end.
Meanwhile, we could ideally produce the so-called ‘East Asian welfare 
model’ or regime. But it is too naïve to simply classify social welfare in 
China and Korea as liberal welfare regime or another category. Whether 
in China or Korea, it is a very complicated process to form social welfare, 
because social welfare combined with their own characteristics of economic 
and political system should be able to solve social problems and to realise the 
social justice that really matters for the national development, social progress 
and well-being of humanity.
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Chapter 5
Conflicts and compromises in the 
Nordic pattern of social regulation
Pauli Kettunen
1. Introduction
The strong state is conventionally regarded as a major characteristic of the 
Nordic model of social regulation. Whether it is seen as guaranteeing social 
rights, promoting gender equality, or patronising people, the strong state 
is also a central figure in discussions on the current challenges facing the 
Nordic-type societal pattern. Some debaters, seeking for effective responses to 
the challenges of globalised economic competition, cross-national migration, 
or the ageing population, have pinned their hopes on actors and modes of 
action that they find to be opposite or alternative to the strong state: market 
competition, civil society or local community.
I will argue, however, that the strong state contrasting with market 
competition, civil society and local community is a stereotypical image of the 
Nordic welfare states. Any relevant analysis of current transformations should 
include a historical deconstruction of common stereotypes. Stereotypes, or 
taken-for-granted beliefs, are not just something to be proved false. One 
should ask how they are embedded in social reality. The image of the strong 
state is ‘real’ in the sense that it is effective in political debates, and it is 
also easy to show norms and institutions that can be plausibly interpreted 
this way. Comparative classifications of different welfare models or regimes 
are often based on defining one dominant actor or action field of welfare 
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provision (the state, market, civil society, local community or family), and in 
such comparisons it is quite natural to point out the strength of the state 
in the Nordic model. 
Yet one should move beyond this image. Different directions for such a 
critical elaboration can be recognised. One might start from the observation 
that, even in the Nordic countries, a wide array of actors appears as a 
somewhat permanent phenomenon in the production of welfare. There have 
been religious and secular, national and local, public and private, official and 
unofficial, obligatory and voluntary welfare providers, and a plenty of mixtures 
of various elements. Instead of classifying welfare models or regimes according 
to one dominant actor or field of welfare provision, and instead of greeting 
the emergence of non-state actors and activities as a great novelty, the varying 
and changing relationships between different actors appear to be crucial for 
a historical understanding of the Nordic pattern of social regulation. 
However, I will question the conventional image of the strong state from 
a slightly different perspective. I focus on the role of conflicting interests, 
especially those associated with the labour market and working life. This 
topic not only brings actors other than the state into the arena (trade unions, 
employer organisations and companies), but it also helps to deconstruct the 
figure of the unified agency of the state, and to question the view of the 
state as an external regulator of the economy and other fields of social life. 
Thus, the topic of different interests concerns both the politics by which the 
system of welfare is (re)shaped and the policy practices through which the 
system of welfare functions. But it also concerns the outcomes of policies in 
people’s life world. I will argue that the recognition of different and conflicting 
interests within the framework of a national society was an important aspect 
of the making of the Nordic pattern of social regulation, in the practical 
functioning of this pattern, and in the notion of social citizenship that has 
been associated with the outcomes of this pattern. I will approach the complex 
of these three levels from the point of view of the last-mentioned notion 
of social citizenship. 
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2. Interest-orientated social citizenship
The British sociologist, T. H. Marshall (1950), famously distinguished between 
three stages and aspects of citizenship, each of them associated with the 
rights that the state guaranteed to individuals: civil rights, political rights 
and social rights. In the Marshallian theory, the focus is on the evolution and 
dimensions of the relationship between the state and individual. However, 
focusing on state-individual relations is not enough, especially not in the 
case of Nordic countries. The notion of social citizenship was developed 
in the Nordic countries through policies and collective actions, in which 
people were defined and defined themselves as parties within asymmetrical 
social relationships. Through these policies and collective actions, they were 
empowered to articulate their interests within the framework of national 
society. Such an interest-orientated social citizenship was different from the 
idea of social citizenship based on individual social rights. 
In order to clarify and motivate this argument, a critique of two influential 
scholarly accounts of the Nordic model is helpful. One is the analysis of the 
Danish sociologist Gøsta Esping-Andersen (1985; 1990) on how ‘politics 
against markets’ in the Nordic countries resulted in a high degree of 
‘decommodification’. The other is the thesis of the Swedish historian Lars 
Trägårdh (1997; Berggren & Trägårdh 2006) on ‘statist individualism’ as the 
main characteristic of the Nordic model. Both accounts are opposite to any 
simple view that associates the strong state with the patronising of people. 
‘Decommodification’ à la Esping-Andersen owes much to Karl Polanyi’s 
([1944] 2001) historical analysis of the commodification of labour. The concept 
refers to policies that liberate people from the uncertainties of living associated 
with the character of labour as a commodity. Social security is provided in 
case people cannot participate in labour markets. Responding to feminist 
critique, Esping-Andersen (1999) completed his analysis by concluding that a 
high degree of ‘defamilialisation’ is another major characteristic of the ‘Social 
Democratic welfare regime’. Both ‘decommodification’ and ‘defamilialisation’ 
implicate the empowerment of the individual by the state, be it against the 
markets or against the family.
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In a still more programmatic way, the idea of a strong state promoting 
individualism appears in Trägårdh’s thesis on ‘statist individualism’. While 
Esping-Andersen focuses on the relationships between the state and the 
market, Trägårdh’s point of departure lies in discussion of the relationships 
between the state and civil society. In the 1980s and 1990s, Swedish right-wing 
critics of what they found to be a patronising Social Democratic welfare state 
wished to create or revitalise an autonomous civil society, which they claimed 
to be non-existent in Sweden. Trägårdh agreed that the idea of a civil society 
confronting the state had not developed in the Nordic countries, yet he did 
not agree with the critique of the patronising state. On the contrary, the strong 
state, when developing into the welfare state, had orientated itself towards 
securing individual autonomy and individual resources. Social solidarity was 
realised through high taxes, public systems of social security and vast public 
services for health, care and education that helped to liberate people from the 
personal relations of subordination, especially those within the family, and, as 
a part of efforts towards full employment, made women doubly dependent on 
the welfare state, both on public sector jobs and the services that facilitated 
combining motherhood and employment outside the home. Social security 
became based on the ‘individual-state social contract’.
Neither Esping-Andersen nor Trägårdh can be criticised for reducing 
social policies to any inherent non-political agency of the state. In their 
works, the state is strong by virtue of its being a target, an arena and a tool 
of politics. Both of them talk about the ‘Social Democratic’ welfare state, 
but they see it – and also the ‘Social Democratic road to power’ (Esping-
Andersen 1985) – as an outcome of compromises between different class 
interests. In accordance with the long tradition of Nordic historical research 
and historically orientated social science, the class of freeholder peasants and 
farmers appears as an important political force in their interpretations of the 
origins of the Nordic welfare state.
However, both ‘decommodification’ and ‘statist individualism’ seem to 
bypass something important. The policies to which these concepts refer 
have not just protected individuals from the imperatives and arbitrariness 
of markets nor just liberated them from subordinating social relationships 
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in family and working life. ‘Politics against markets’ actually promoted the 
development of labour market rationalities, not least by reinforcing workers’ 
position as parties in individual and collective contracts with employers. And 
getting rid of paternalist ties of social subordination did not mean that only 
the individuals and the state would have remained as the parties to the ‘social 
contract’, as the thesis on ‘statist individualism’ seems to argue. The individual 
as a party in social relationships has been a major concern in Nordic social 
and labour market policies. The transformation called ‘decommodification’ 
could be, rather, conceived of as a process in which the normalcy of waged 
and salaried work was reinforced at the same time as it was adjusted towards 
a universalistic principle of social citizenship. 
In the post-World-War-II decades, the goal of full employment, with its 
different normative notions of work, came to be one of the ways in which 
the normalcy of wage work and the principle of social citizenship emerged 
in parallel and intertwined. The simultaneous reinforcement of these two 
principles also became characteristic of social policies. In the field of social 
security, the adjustment of the normalcy of wage work and social citizenship 
was associated with the ways in which social insurance policies contributed to 
the development and functioning of labour markets. In particular, in pension 
policies, by diminishing their dependence on single employers, transportable 
social benefits strengthened workers’ positions as sellers of their labour 
power. This was also promoted by the work-performance and income-related 
definitions of these benefits. True, work-performance and income-related 
benefits did not in any self-evident way fit into the universalistic idea of 
social citizenship (Edling 2006; Petersen & Åmark 2006). However, through 
the power of strong trade unions, the secured continuity of income actually 
became interpreted as a right associated with citizenship, or as an aspect of 
social citizenship. 
The normalcy of wage work and the notion of social citizenship were 
also reinforced by the construction of extensive public services. These 
services, defining and meeting the needs of health, care and education, bore 
the character of universal social rights at the same time as they created 
preconditions for the generalising of wage work as the norm. A transformation 
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of the gender division of labour was crucial here, associated with redefined 
relationships between family and society. A particular complex of welfare 
state, labour market regime and gender system was formed, one crucial aspect 
being the strong gender segregation of the Nordic labour markets (Borchorst 
& Siim 2008, 207–224).
However, still another way of combining wage work and social citizenship 
can be recognised in Nordic countries. This might be characterised as a 
Utopian vision of equality within the relationships between workers and 
employers. In terms of my argument here, this vision deserves special attention. 
In his Great Transformation, Karl Polanyi concluded that the making of 
labour into a commodity was a necessary precondition of modern capitalism, 
yet labour was a ‘fictitious commodity’, since labour, and the production, 
selling and consumption of labour, were inseparable from the life of the wage 
workers themselves (Polanyi [1944] 2001, 71–80). Polanyi preceded Esping-
Andersen in arguing that social policies and trade unions are forces for the 
removal of human labour “from the orbit of the market” (ibid., 186). They 
were, for him, forces of the historical counter-movement against the markets 
for rescuing society. However, one can ask whether social policies and trade 
unions, notably in the Nordic countries, were actually orientated towards 
abolishing the character of labour as a commodity. Arguably, they were, 
rather, orientated towards abolishing the constraints and coercions stemming 
from the fictitious character of this commodity. Social and labour market 
policies, while creating non-market supportive institutions for preserving 
labour power when it is not traded in the labour market (cf. Offe 1984, 263), 
were liberating people’s life courses from the necessities of selling labour 
power at any condition and, thus, making labour more like a real commodity.
In the Nordic countries, this kind of orientation towards the social 
citizenship of the sellers of labour power seems to have played an important 
role. It may not be accidental that the term ‘market’ is frequently used in 
the Nordic conceptualisation of employment and working life issues. The 
communitarian concept of ‘social partners’, stemming from the tradition of 
social Catholicism and adopted in the language of the European Union and 
many international organisations such as the ILO and the OECD, has not 
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become popular in the Nordic countries. For example, the Danish, Finnish 
and Swedish official translations of the constitutional Lisbon Treaty of the 
European Union talk about ‘labour market parties’ instead of ‘social partners’. 
Stubbornly sticking to this concept also seems to be at odds with the first 
principle of the Philadelphia Declaration of 1944, annex to the constitution 
of the ILO: “labour is not a commodity”.1 The labour-market language in the 
Nordic countries is, however, certainly not a language of unregulated market 
or a language of market-based harmony, but instead a language of collective 
regulation and of recognised conflicts between divergent interests – ‘parties’ 
instead of ‘partners’ (Kettunen 2012). 
3. Symmetry between labour market parties
The idea of symmetry between labour market parties is, as such, far from 
exclusively Nordic. The ‘ideology of parity’ (Bruun 1979) was adopted as a 
crucial point of departure for the development of European labour law in 
the 19th and 20th centuries. The social liberals as well as the Marxists of 
the late 19th century shared the idea that the labour market is a particular 
kind of market and labour is a particular commodity. The social liberals 
concluded that the worker was the weaker party in the individual worker-
employer relationship and consequently needed protection. At the collective 
level, however, parity would be realised through organisation and collective 
agreements. In the 20th century, reformist trade unions widely adopted this 
mode of thought. 
In the Nordic countries, this mode of thought was modified by influential 
trade unions associated with reformist Socialist movements. As early as 
the 1930s, Denmark, Sweden and Norway led the international statistics 
on unionisation. In Finland, the degree of unionisation was much lower. 
This reflected the heritage of the class-based Civil War of 1918 and the 
still predominantly rural and agrarian structure of Finnish society. Finnish 
1  Declaration concerning the aims and purposes of the International Labour Organisation (Declaration 
of Philadelphia). www.ilo.org/ilolex/english/constq.htm.
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employers, especially in the manufacturing industries, were until World War II 
able to adhere to a policy of refusing collective agreements with trade unions. 
In Denmark, Sweden and Norway, the principle of collective agreements 
had achieved a recognised status and practical significance long before the 
1930s. The so-called September Agreement of 1899 between the Danish peak 
organisations of workers and employers provided a model. The phenomenon 
of Denmark the forerunner and Finland the latecomer also appears in the 
fact that Denmark has been in the long term been the most consequent, and 
Finland the least consequent, as regards the ‘Nordic’ principle that collective 
agreements are the primary, and legislation only the secondary, means of the 
social regulation of labour (Bruun 1990).
In the 1930s, trade unions and employer organisations, urged on by 
experiences of widespread and harsh industrial conflicts, were ready to further 
specify the rules of the game and to consolidate the system of negotiations 
and agreements. This was manifested in the Norwegian hovedavtal (basic 
agreement) in 1935 and the Swedish Saltsjöbaden Agreement in 1938 between 
the peak organisations of trade unions and employer associations. In Finland 
the corresponding national-level basic agreements between the organised 
workers and employers were achieved in 1944 and 1946. The logics of these 
national agreements included the idea that labour market parties reciprocally 
recognised the particular – and not the universal – and therefore legitimate 
nature of their interests. They committed themselves to taking into account 
through their mutual compromises the universal interest that was assigned to 
‘society’, and included objectives such as the prevention of damaging conflicts, 
the promotion of industrial efficiency and the increase of purchasing power.2
Three principles came to be combined in Nordic working-life institutions: 
the regulation of labour market conflicts through parity-based collective 
agreements; the direction rights of employers, associated with different 
arrangements for employee participation; and the joint acceptance of 
2  This mode of thought was formulated, e.g. in a Swedish governmental committee report that paved 
the way for the Saltsjöbaden Agreement of 1938, by proposing that the labour market parties should 
‘depoliticise’ their mutual relationships in order to be able to realise, through their compromises, the 
interest of ‘society’ (SOU 1935:65, 129).
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rationalisation in production and work processes (Kettunen 1998). This 
combination might be seen as an institutional reproduction and regulation 
of the tensions between three different rationalities which mediate between 
workers’ life-worlds and the systemic conditions of their living. Two 
rationalities are inherent in living by wage work: that of the seller of labour 
power and that of the subject of labour process (Kern & Schumann 1984). The 
third significant rationality here is that of citizenship. 
Obviously, it has been difficult to adjust the rationality of an equal 
citizenship into the context of wage work relations and hierarchical work 
organisations. One can also argue that the system of collective bargaining, 
as it follows the logic of the selling and buying of labour power, including 
trade union strategies for limiting competition between individual workers, 
tends to reduce qualitative issues of working life into issues concerning the 
price of labour power and the quantity of labour exploited. However, in the 
Nordic countries, the symmetry of party relations came to include something 
more than just an idea of regulating labour market conflicts or an ideological 
disguise of the basic asymmetry of capital and labour (cf. Offe & Wiesenthal 
1980). The widening of symmetrical party relations became crucial for the 
Nordic model of working-life reform. It was a vision in which the compromises 
of conflicting labour market interests would include the promotion of both 
democracy and cooperation between the groups fulfilling different functions 
in a company or in society. 
In the 1930s, collective agreements were included in the concept of 
democracy, in particular, by the Nordic Social Democratic parties and 
trade union movements. The strong trade unions were supposed to extend 
democracy in two senses, both as a popular movement and as one of the two 
‘labour market parties’ making parity-based agreements.
Trade unions became orientated towards extending the field of parity-
based relations, that is, the range of issues to be included in collective 
agreements. This did not only strengthen the role of trade unions in industrial 
relations. A still more fundamental aspect was that business companies, and 
somewhat later even the state and municipalities in their role as employers, 
were defined and organised as a ‘party’ representing (no more than) particular 
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interests, and that they had to recognise this not only in the setting of wages 
but also in many other issues of working life and management. Collective 
and public regulation of labour relations would empower the weaker party 
(workers) to take care of their interests and constrain the stronger party 
(employers) from presenting their interests as universal. This idea appeared 
at the ‘macro’ level of the national economy and society, but also at the 
‘micro’ level of the business economy and enterprise. One can found a more 
or less explicit distinction between ‘enterprise’ and ‘employer’, in which the 
general interest of the enterprise was not just identified with the action 
of management but rather conceived as an outcome of the parity-based 
agreements and negotiations between employees and employer, with their 
particular interests (Kettunen 1998). 
In this way, ‘industrial democracy’ in the Nordic countries was strongly 
associated with the widening and deepening of the system of collective 
agreements and the associated workplace level system of shop stewards, rather 
than referring to separate parallel institutions of personnel participation such 
as the German works councils, Betriebsräte (Knudsen 1995; Kettunen 1998). 
With their considerable power to set the agenda on working life issues, 
trade unions began to draw management issues into the sphere of collective 
agreements. In the Nordic discourse on working life reform, especially in the 
Swedish and Norwegian debates in the 1960s and 1970s, we can recognise 
a politically effective Utopian idea according to which the collective-level 
parity between the labour market parties has to be extended and woven into 
individual employer-worker relationships (Winner 1995; Claussen 2000). It 
was a vision of an interest-orientated social citizenship within wage-work 
relationships, different from Marshall’s concept of social citizenship as an 
extension of citizenship through more extensive individual rights. 
4. Divergent interests and virtuous circles
The interest-orientated form of social citizenship, based on the empowerment 
of the seller of labour power, was developed in the framework of a particular 
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notion of national society. International dependencies provided preconditions 
for strong notions of national economy and national society. Europe’s 
Northern peripheries were integrated into the expanding spread of capitalism 
in nationally varying ways, yet, in general, the Nordic countries developed 
into small, relatively open economies that were, for each country in its specific 
way, highly dependent on exports and exposed to the cycles and crises of 
world economy (Senghaas 1985; Katzenstein 1985). In connection with the 
Great Depression of the 1930s, class compromises brought new ingredients 
to ways of conceiving society and economy. Reflecting class structures and 
conclusions from the economic crisis and the rise of Fascism in Europe, the 
Nordic class compromises of the 1930s included political coalitions of ‘workers 
and farmers’, or Social Democrat and Agrarian parties, and the consolidation 
of national systems of collective labour market negotiations and agreements 
(only the former applied to Finland before the Second World War). 
The concept of ‘Nordic democracy’ emerged in this political context, 
especially through the established Nordic cooperation of Social Democratic 
labour movements (Kurunmäki & Strang 2010). In the historical references of 
this concept, various ‘sub-state’ principles were actually put into the centre. The 
oldest reference for Nordic democracy was to be found in the idealised figure 
of the free Nordic peasant and the heritage of local rural self-government. 
This ideological element of the ‘Nordic’ was developed in the 19th century, 
partly by the rising popular movements, which, themselves, were later in the 
20th century referred to as another aspect of a particular Nordic democracy. 
A further ‘sub-state’ element is worth noting. The regulation of employment 
relations through parity-based negotiations and agreements of the voluntary 
organisations of workers and employers was, from the 1930s, widely included 
in the concept of Nordic democracy. 
One may argue that the heritage of the local self-government of 
independent peasants, the tradition of strong popular movements, and the 
institution of collective labour market agreements have contributed to the 
development of, and been integrated into, the strong state. Nevertheless, 
these integrative processes can also be conceived as a ‘societalisation’ of the 
state (which is indeed often called ‘society’ in Nordic political discourse). 
107
CONFLICTS AND COMPROMISES IN THE NORDIC PATTERN OF SOCIAL REGULATION
This included a wide acceptance of the idea that social solidarity is fulfilled 
through the public power (the state and municipalities) and high taxes, and 
the recognised and institutionalised role of interest representation in political 
processes (often called corporatism). The associated concepts of ‘Nordic 
democracy’ and ‘Nordic society’ also included a widely shared confidence 
in virtuous circles between divergent interests, values and objectives, to be 
achieved by means of compromise between interest organisations and political 
parties.
Indeed, in conclusions drawn from the Great Depression of the 
1930s, the notion of national economy began to be based on new ideas of 
cumulative economic success. Virtuous circles would connect the interests 
of worker-consumers and farmer-producers as well as those of workers and 
employers. Confidence in the positive-sum game was institutionalised in 
class compromises, which initiated the period of Social Democracy in the 
Scandinavian countries, especially in Sweden. The practical significance of 
the new employment and economic policies before World War II has been 
debated. On the level of political discourse, however, the new Scandinavian 
ideas of a virtuous circle indicated important changes in the 1930s. 
The idea of virtuous circles should not be reduced to the vulgarised 
Keynesian description of the virtuous circle between growing consumption 
and growing production, with the emphasis on the side of demand. As early 
as the 1930s there was considerable ‘productivistic’ supply-side interest in the 
political orientation of the Scandinavian Social Democrats (Kulawik 2002; 
Andersson 2006). The promotion of social equality was held to be the means 
of releasing human productive capacities and, thus, the means of promoting 
economic effectiveness, which, in turn, was seen as a fundamental precondition 
for achieving social equality.
Any compromises reached between the conflicting interests remained a 
question of power, and the mutual recognition that the interests of different 
groups were indeed divergent was a central feature of the Nordic class 
compromises. However, new forms of systemic integration also appeared. 
Thus, the labour movement adopted the view that economic competitiveness, 
and thus the rationalisation of production, was necessary in order to create 
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resources for social welfare and equality. At the same time, bourgeois groups 
and employers admitted that the collective organisation of labour and the 
widening of workers’ social rights could bring economically positive outcomes, 
not least with respect to industrial peace. Somewhat paradoxically, the needs 
and interests of capital, or employers, were provided with a new moral and 
political legitimacy, and the needs and interests of the working class achieved 
a new national economic legitimacy. 
The virtuous circle included something more than just positive-sum 
compromises between conflicting economic interests. It was also a virtuous 
circle between equality, efficiency and solidarity, which, in a sense, can be seen 
as being based on three different ideological strains of Nordic modernisation 
processes: the idealised heritage of the free peasant, the spirit of capitalism 
and the utopia of socialism. In terms of political objectives, and of future 
expectations, the virtuous circle came to connect social equalisation, economic 
growth and widening democracy. Different ways of interpreting these 
objectives and expectations appeared, yet in the post-World War II period, 
they came to play a hegemonic role, in the sense that political conflicts tended 
to be struggles around the right way to represent and promote these objectives 
and expectations and to conceive the interconnectedness between them. 
The trust in a virtuous circle between economic growth, widening 
democracy and increased equality was not, as such, a Nordic specificity in 
the post-war decades. During World War II, it had become a more or less 
explicit part of the so-called post-war planning in Western countries. At 
the international level, it was manifested, for example, in the Philadelphia 
Declaration of the ILO in 1944 which came to form part of the constitution 
of the organisation. Among the main principles of the Declaration were the 
participation of workers’ and employers’ representatives in social policies, 
collective bargaining, full employment, and the linkage between social equality, 
elimination of poverty and economic growth (Kettunen 2009). The post-war 
development in Scandinavia, especially Sweden, was perceived by both Nordic 
citizens and many others outside the Nordic region as featuring uniquely 
consistent steps along such a universally applicable road to progress. No 
doubt, in the Cold War world, more than one candidate for the universally 
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applicable road existed. The notion of the ‘third way’ or the ‘middle way’, as it 
was associated with Sweden and sometimes with the whole Norden, included 
a particular claim of universality, expressed, for example, by maintaining that 
‘freedom and welfare’ was the guiding principle of Nordic social political 
cooperation (Nelson 1953; Salvesen 1956).
5. The ambiguous Nordic model
The terms ‘Nordic society’, ‘Nordic democracy’, ‘Nordic welfare state’ and 
‘Nordic model’ all refer to separate clusters of national institutions. There 
are significant differences between Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and 
Sweden and important similarities with societies outside the Nordic region, 
in particular with those other small European countries to which terms such 
as ‘democratic corporatism’ (Katzenstein 1985) can be applied. Nevertheless, 
the differences between the Nordic countries and similarities with non-
Nordic countries in no way preclude the existence of a Nordic transnational 
framework of many-layered ideological, practical and institutional linkages, 
within which national identities and institutions have been shaped by constant 
intra-Nordic comparisons and the transfer of ideas and knowledge, and the 
Nordicness has been adopted as an inherent element within the diverging 
national identities and institutions (Kettunen 2006; Petersen 2006). 
In the 1970s, it was easier than before – or later – to recognise common 
Nordic characteristics in national institutions, policies and future prospects. 
These included many work-related features:
 · strong dominance of wage work/salaried work as a social form of 
work
 · active policies for full employment: everyone should have the right 
to fulfil his or her moral duty to work 
 · high degree of female employment outside the home: the central 
role of paid work in views on gender equality
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 · two-fold dependence of women on the welfare state: social political 
preconditions for employment outside the home; jobs in the labour 
market with a strong gender segregation
 · the principle of universalism (rights and benefits associated with 
citizenship) in the organisation of welfare and education
 · high rate of unionisation among employees (men as well as women, 
blue-collar as well as white-collar workers, public as well as private 
sector employees )
 · high rate of organisation among employers (and other interest 
groups), as well
 · strong national hierarchical system of collective bargaining
 · priority of collective agreements to direct statutory norms in the 
regulation of working life
 · tripartite cooperation between employees and employers 
organisations and the government on issues of economic and social 
policies (‘neo-corporatism’)
 · thus a close connection between the formation of the welfare state 
and industrial relations.
The Nordic model was a pattern of constructing a modern nation-state society, 
in which institutions are based on waged and salaried work and support its 
expansion and normalcy, including the paid work of women outside the home. 
In the Nordic countries, waged and salaried work became the predominant 
social form of work even more overwhelmingly than elsewhere in the so-called 
developed countries. By comparison to the rest of Europe and the OECD, 
the Nordic countries belong to those with the lowest share of entrepreneurs 
in the economically active population (van Stel 2008, 79–82). The far from 
self-evident and certainly not tensionless combination of wage work and 
social citizenship became, in the process of the making of the welfare state, 
crucial for Nordic notions of society and the ‘social’.
It is important to note that the Nordic model did not just encompass 
existing institutions but was rather a model of change and reform. It consisted 
of principles and practices that defined ways of dealing with social change and 
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making reforms, that is, of setting the political agenda of the welfare state. 
The combination of the normalcy of wage work and the principle of social 
citizenship was reinforced in the post-World War II Norden through the 
policies of full employment, through the construction of social security systems 
and public services that came to manifest citizenship-based universalism at 
the same time as they followed and supported labour-market rationalities, and 
through the regulation of industrial relations by agreements between highly 
organised labour and capital, orientated towards a symmetry between the 
parties of employment relationships. These policies and processes were shaped 
within the framework of a widely shared confidence in virtuous circles that 
could be achieved through compromises between interests in the context of 
a national society. However, even before the end of the expansive phase of 
the welfare state by the early 1990s, this kind of agenda setting was losing 
some of its future-orientated power.
From the 1980s onwards, crucial aspects of the notion of national society 
that were associated with the vision of an expanding welfare state and collective 
party relations in the labour market have been severely challenged in the 
Nordic countries and elsewhere. The transformations that have been called 
globalisation have led to increasing social asymmetries concerning the role of 
spatial ties. The opportunities enjoyed by different actors to choose between 
alternative forms of relating themselves to their environment – between 
the three options of what Albert O. Hirschman (1970) called exit, voice and 
loyalty – have been increasingly differentiated. The exit option is in a new 
way available to transnational economic actors and, as a structural mode 
of exerting influence in national contexts, it tends to make obsolete the 
previous national forms of using voice and loosen the previous loyalties to 
national rules of game. Solidarity through shared national links has become 
more problematic, and any ‘concrete utopia’ (Bloch 1959) based on an idea 
of parity between labour and capital within a national society seems to have 
been dissolved. 
The project for extending widening symmetrical party relations lost its 
political momentum. The premises for the ‘Nordic’ image of symmetry between 
labour market parties have been weakened by a variety of developments: 
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the multi- and transnational character of companies in the global economy, 
including their dependence on calculations in the global finance markets; the 
constant restructuring of production processes in accordance with the network 
principle, including varying forms of outsourcing and sub-contracting; the 
corresponding transformations in the public sector in the spirit of New 
Public Management, including the blurring of boundaries between public 
and private, obligatory and voluntary, and official and unofficial;  the increase 
in so-called ‘atypical’ (short-time and part-time) employment relationships; 
and the growing practical and ideological fluidity of the boundary between 
wage work and entrepreneurship. 
For their part, the management lessons and practices aiming to promote 
both flexibility and commitment in work organisations blur the difference 
between wage work and entrepreneurship. This implies, among other things, 
that the idea of the worker as the weaker part of the worker-employer 
relationship has tended to be pushed to the margin through the ethos of 
entrepreneurship at the same time as, on the other hand, the asymmetry 
between capital and labour has increased because of the dramatic growth of 
the mobility of financial capital. In any case, it has become ever more difficult 
to identify, organise, bring together and centralise the ‘labour market parties’ 
within a national society. 
A crucial part of the Nordic model used to be the widening of the scope 
of issues in which business companies as well as public-sector organisations 
had to recognise the particular instead of the universal character of their 
employer interests. In this respect, the direction changed in the 1980s. A 
company-level and workplace-level sign of this change is that ‘industrial 
relations’, that is, the institution of collective negotiation and agreement based 
on interest conflicts and compromises, have been in various ways subordinated 
to the company interest aims of ‘human resource management’ (Looise & 
van Riemsdijk 2001). On the national level, the same change is reflected, 
for example, in the fact that in many European countries, including the 
Nordic countries, separate employer organisations have been abolished and 
the representation of companies’ employer interests has been integrated as 
just one part of the business interest organisations that articulate business 
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interests in relation to many different ‘stakeholders’, including trade unions. 
The idea of representing the universal interest of the ‘economy’ in relation 
to the particular and biased interests of workers and governments is evident 
in the statements of business interest organisations.
However, the Nordic countries still top the international statistics of 
trade union membership, and no drastic decline has occurred. The majority of 
waged and salaried workers in the Nordic countries are union members, and 
in this sense the picture differs from the general trends in Western countries. 
In connection with the rise of neo-liberalism in the 1980s, arguments for 
radical social-political deregulation emerged. However, they seem later to have 
been pushed into the margin, and the welfare state is highly popular among 
ordinary people in the Nordic countries. No political party can currently expect 
to gain large electoral support by opposing the welfare state. Nevertheless, 
ways of discussing and contextualising the welfare state have changed, and 
discursive changes have been associated with institutional ones. 
Interesting paradoxes appear in Nordic debates on the future of the 
welfare state and collective agreements. Practitioners and researchers in 
social policy tend to make pessimistic accounts of the present and the future 
of the welfare state. They have paid attention to the erosion of so-called 
universalism in connection with the projects of knowledge-based competitive 
society (e.g. Kildal & Kuhnle 2005; Kuivalainen & Niemelä 2010; Anttonen, 
Häikiö & Stefansson 2012) or with the ideas of ‘workfare’ in activation and 
immigration policies (e.g. Keskitalo 2008; Blomberg & Kildal 2010). At 
the same time, representatives of business life and many economists have 
expressed optimistic views on the crucial role of the Nordic model of societal 
risk sharing for economic performance and competitiveness (e.g. Andersen 
et al. 2007). A slightly different paradoxical turnaround of positions can 
be found if we look at the arguments for the defence of the welfare state 
and the arguments for the significance of economic competitiveness. Those 
defending the welfare state and the system of collective agreements against 
the pressures of globalised capitalism argue that the welfare state actually 
generates competitive advantages, whereas those concerned about economic 
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competitiveness or government budget discipline motivate these concerns 
with the necessity to create or rescue resources for the welfare state.
An interesting ambiguity also appears in the current usage of the concept 
of the ‘model’. It may refer to a structure that has become threatened through 
globalisation, or it may refer to a way of responding to the challenge. The 
former meaning is obvious in the discussion around the threats against the 
‘Nordic welfare state model’. The latter, in turn, is manifested in the – currently 
somewhat receded –  praise of ‘the Danish model’ of ‘flexicurity’ (Madsen 
2004), ‘the Finnish model’ as a paragon of consensual competitiveness in a 
new knowledge-based society (Castells & Himanen 2002), or ‘the Nordic 
model’ in general, assessed to be capable of embracing globalisation by means 
of risk sharing (Andersen et al. 2007).  The ambiguity of the concept of ‘model’ 
indicates the changing role of the nation state, which can be characterised 
using the concepts of ‘welfare state’ and ‘competition state’ (Cerny 1990; 
Streeck 1998; Palan et al. 1999). One may not talk about a shift from the 
welfare state to a competition state but, rather, conclude that an ambiguity 
of the welfare state and the competition state is characteristic of what is 
currently called ‘the Nordic model’ (Kettunen 2011).
6. Institutional continuity and the ideology of competitive 
consensus
The change may take place within a remarkable institutional continuity, 
through an ‘institutional conversion’ (Thelen 2003). Old institutions of the 
welfare state and industrial relations can be and have been modified to serve 
new functions of the competitive community. 
The distinction between compromise and consensus, elaborated by the Dutch 
historian Frank Ankersmit (2002, 193–213), seems useful for interpreting this 
change. Compromise is based on the mutual recognition of the particular’ 
instead of the universal’ nature of the interests in question, and the political 
process does not aim to remove this state of affairs. Consensus, in turn, 
presupposes a commitment to a common interest that has been defined 
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beforehand, and in the political process, only those aspects of the particular 
interests of the participants are recognised which bear elements of the given 
common interest. In nation state societies, decisions that are not just made 
by the coercive power of the strongest forces often include elements of both 
consensus and compromise, and in conflicts, both of these ideals may be 
recognised. The relationship between these two principles, however, varies 
and changes.
The making of the Nordic welfares states and industrial relations systems 
included the strengthening and institutionalisation of compromises between 
divergent particular interests, and this was legitimised by the confidence in the 
virtuous circle of social equality, economic growth and widening democracy. 
The logics of the competition state – the imperatives of making the national 
society competitive in globalised economic competition between different 
business environments – reinforces consensus and weakens compromise. 
Consensus as an ideal may exclude the interests and ideas of those actors 
who do not wish to commit themselves to the common interest. Furthermore, 
putting national competitiveness into the centre of this ideal also means 
that those interests and needs that cannot be associated with the project of 
competitive community tend to be ignored. One must admit that in Nordic 
political debates and practices, a vast range of social and educational policy 
objectives are proved to be compatible with national competitiveness and 
included in the competitiveness-orientated consensus. However, legitimate 
interests and needs tend to be redefined when welfare policies are motivated 
by their compatibility with the consensual project of competitive national 
community.
Concerning working life, collective interest representation and even 
high social norms are considered not only as ‘rigidities’ but, rather widely, 
as competitive advantages, as factors that promote the commitment of 
workers and the innovativeness of firms and their managements. The neo-
Schumpeterian emphasis on innovation and the institutional preconditions of 
innovation has been easily adopted in this context. Such tones have particularly 
appeared in the discussion on education and training. Much of the ideological 
power of knowledge, education and innovation in the Nordic countries stems 
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from the promise that competitiveness and its preconditions in the global 
economy can – or even must – be seen from a wider perspective than that 
of neo-liberalist deregulation. 
In the shaping of the social policies of European Union (EU), it has been 
easy for those coming from the Nordic countries to develop and support the 
principle of “social policy as a productive factor”. This slogan was introduced 
into EU debates in the late 1990s (Beck et al. 2001), and confirmed in 
connection with the so-called Lisbon Strategy of the EU, 2000–2010, aimed 
at making Europe by 2010 “the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-
based economy in the world capable of sustainable economic growth with 
more and better jobs and greater social cohesion”. The Social Policy Agenda 
2000–2005, implementing the Lisbon Strategy, advocated a virtuous circle 
between social policy, economic policy and employment policy and aimed 
“to reinforce social policy as a productive factor” (COM 2000:279).  This 
argument includes an economisation of social policy in two different senses: 
as an argument for the recognition of the economic importance of social 
policy, but also as an argument for reforming social policy in such a way that 
it could meet the demand of being a productive factor in global competition. 
Be it implicitly or explicitly, the argument means that the role and meaning 
of equality is redefined, something that some social policy researchers have 
also argued for since the 1990s: “the maximization of human capital must 
take priority over egalitarianism ‘here and now’” (Esping-Andersen 1996, 264).
It makes a difference whether or not an individual’s opportunities to 
make themselves competitive are shaped by more or less egalitarian systems 
of education and training, and it also makes a difference whether or not the 
encouragement of knowledge-based competition in working life is connected 
with collective institutions of social regulation. Nevertheless, a tension appears 
in Nordic discussions between what are presented as institutional preconditions 
of competitiveness and how the contents of competitiveness are conceived. 
At the same time as egalitarian institutions and participatory practices 
can be defended as preconditions for knowledge-based competitiveness, 
true membership in a competitive community is a matter of individual 
competitiveness. This consists of communicative and innovative skills and 
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talents and reflexive capabilities of monitoring oneself from the point of view 
of competitiveness. In the orientation towards these objectives, the principles 
of social equality and collective interests hardly play any role. One may ask 
where the limits of competitiveness-orientated national consensus lie. Failing 
to recognise those interests and needs that cannot be associated with the 
project of competitive community implies risks concerning the democratic 
legitimacy of the ‘model’.  
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Chapter 6
The principle of universalism challenged
Towards an ideational shift in the Norwegian welfare state? 1
Nanna Kildal and Stein Kuhnle
1. Introduction
The Nordic countries have developed many institutions and cultural patterns 
of their own, and have in recent decades attracted particular attention 
world-wide for the kind of welfare state that they have developed since the 
Second World War (see e.g. Kildal & Kuhnle 2005; Alestalo et al. 2009). 
One core feature of their type or ‘model’ of welfare states is summed up in 
this formulation: “Universal solutions are one of the characteristics of the 
Nordic welfare model, which means comprehensive public responsibility 
and social rights which cover everybody. This has also been a good strategy 
economically” (Nordens Välfärdscenter 2012, 7).2
One primary function of welfare states is to protect citizens against social 
risks. Obviously, this protection varies in scope and generosity over time 
and according to political constellations and national institutional traditions. 
Nonetheless, welfare states may be clustered into distinct types based on 
1  This is a revised version of a paper published in Chinese and English in the Journal of Zhejiang 
University (Humanities and Social Sciences), 42 (2), (March) 2012, pp. 50–67. Title in English: ‘Welfare 
principles and reform trends in Norway: Towards more conditional social rights?’
2  Original text: “Universelle løsninger er et av den nordiske velferdsmodellens kjennetegn, det vil si et 
stort offentlig ansvar og omfattende sosiale rettigheter som gjelder alle. Dette har vist seg å være en god 
strategi, også økonomisk.”
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similarities in their institutional designs. The Nordic countries make up one 
such cluster in most academic research on welfare state typologies, subsumed 
under the label ‘the Nordic welfare model’.
This model is characterised by five essential features:
 · social policy is comprehensive in terms of needs covered
 · there is high legitimacy for public welfare provision
 · social rights are of a universal nature, based on residence in the 
nation
 · redistribution makes for relatively equal income distribution
 · work orientation is strong
During the last hundred years, an increasing number of risks such as sickness, 
unemployment, disabilities, old age, etc., have been recognised as being matters 
of public responsibility and individual rights. Some social risks, though, such 
as loss or lack of income caused by diverse reasons, have never been granted 
this recognition as a right in the same sense - they are subsumed under 
residual social assistance acts that provide benefits only after a means test, 
benefits which are far less generous than those offered through the general 
social security system for the risks mentioned above. A common policy shift 
in all Nordic countries, and in Western welfare states in general, during 
approximately the last 20 years, has been a stronger emphasis on the so-called 
‘work-line’ (arbeidslinjen), which has also had implications for conditions, for 
example work-related conditions, for obtaining social assistance benefits, and 
for sanctions on behaviour.
Not only do the Nordic welfare states form a distinct type of welfare 
state in terms of their institutional characteristics, but they also frequently 
appear to serve as a positive model for reforms and developments in other 
countries. The reason seems to be that this model places more emphasis on 
certain political values and welfare principles that are highly regarded by 
many, such as a generally high level of well-being, social equality and social 
peace, and have clearly, in comparison with most other countries of the 
world, been quite successful in these respects (see, for example, comparative 
overviews based on the OECD Social Expenditure Database). A high degree 
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of egalitarian outcomes such as limited poverty, income equality and social 
stability are achieved inter alia through the inclusiveness of social policies 
and the universal allocation of public welfare benefits. Studies show that the 
design of the welfare policy institutions and the outcomes of policies enjoy 
high legitimacy in the population, i.e. both in terms of procedural legitimacy 
(how decisions are made) and outcome legitimacy (results of those decisions 
and their implementation). Comparative research has shown relatively high 
citizen trust in government and political institutions and also high levels 
of trust between citizens in the Nordic countries (Wollebæk & Seegaard 
2011; Skirbekk & Grimen 2012). Thus, both ‘input’ and ‘output’ legitimacy 
appear to be high, and can be considered vital to the stability of the Nordic 
democratic systems.
Although we claim that a notion of a distinct Nordic welfare model can 
be argued for, we should also be aware that it is not static. In fact, a number 
of researchers have started to question its uniqueness, for example, Greve 
(2011, 111) states that “The Nordic welfare state has now been changed in 
such a way that it raises the question whether a distinct Nordic model is still 
in play”; Haynes (2011, 114) questions whether Scandinavian countries are 
‘different’: “Recent research has cast some doubt on the consistency of models 
that isolate Scandinavian countries as different to other nations in terms of 
egalitarian welfare states”; and Kvist and Greve (2011, 146) sweepingly claim 
that, “The Nordic welfare model is undergoing a fundamental transformation. 
Using Denmark we show how a universal welfare state model is gradually 
being transformed into an emergent multi-tiered welfare state”.
As with other welfare states, advanced as well as emerging, the Nordic 
welfare states are faced with a number of more or less common challenges, 
such as the ageing of the population, (im)migration, the internationalisation 
or globalisation of the economy, and – during the last four years – financial 
and debt crisis. It can be argued that the Nordic welfare states have so far 
weathered these challenges better than most Western countries, and research 
has also shown that welfare states in rich democracies “have not converged 
around an Anglo-liberal model of modest benefits, extensive means-testing, 
and significant private insurance and services; welfare state trajectories in 
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developing political economies also exhibit substantial variety” (Swank 
2010, 318). However, welfare states, including the Nordic ones, have been 
subject to market-orientated reforms in the field of social insurance and 
service provision, and to new policy initiatives for labour market activation, 
‘flexicurity’ (a concept said to have been invented in Denmark), and variants 
of ‘workfare’. We shall not analyse the challenges to Nordic welfare states 
or the extent to which these are conditioned mostly by domestic (especially 
demographic) factors or external (European or global) factors, but will limit 
ourselves to discussing whether the highly praised and characteristic principle 
of universalism is currently under threat in one of the Nordic welfare states, 
Norway.
2. Research question: Is the principle of universalism 
threatened?
All welfare states are expressions of norms, values and principles, which are 
more or less explicitly articulated, and which appear more or less ambiguous, 
mixed and even contradictory. However, three welfare principles which are 
less complicated to identify have been matters of discussion since the first 
development of social security and welfare policies in Europe from the end of 
the 19th century. They have come to be attributed to three central welfare state 
models, described by Titmuss (1974) as institutional, achievement-orientated 
and residual, based on the way in which the citizen gains entitlements to state 
social security and thus on the way in which the state distributes or allocates 
welfare benefits. The dividing lines between them are inter alia determined by 
membership in the welfare state. Fundamentally, the question is whether all 
members of society are beneficiaries, whether welfare provisions only cover 
those who have made a contribution to society in the form of paying income 
taxes and contributions to social security, or whether welfare provisions only 
cover the poor. The normative principles expressed in these three types of 
allocation of benefits may be described as universalism, reciprocity and targeting, 
respectively. Even if they exist next to each other within the same welfare 
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state, they represent competing principles of allocation that, in their own 
way, based on the relative emphasis on each, has contributed to the design 
of welfare states. Accordingly, these principles throw light on the normative 
logic of various states, and on the values and interests that are given priority.
No welfare state has implemented any of these principles in a pure form. 
Nevertheless, many researchers seem to agree on the characterisation of the 
Nordic welfare states as first and foremost universalistic. Almost 70  years 
after the implementation of the first universal benefit in Norway, the child 
allowance scheme in 1946, the ideas of reciprocity and targeting seem to have 
increasingly received a far more essential position in the discussion and 
implementation of social policy reforms, not only in Norway, but across the 
Western world. After a review of the three key principles, we shall give an 
account of recent social policy reforms, primarily in Norway, and thereafter 
throw light on the arguments that once were used to justify universalism. 
These will be compared with today’s arguments for implementing means-
testing and achievement-orientated social policies.
3. Welfare principles
3.1. Universalism
The principle of universalism ideally distributes welfare benefits to all members 
of a society; they are all, as a matter of right, beneficiaries of the same benefits 
and services, rich as well as poor, and no matter how they live their lives. The 
term ‘all members’ is vague, though, in the sense that it refers both to ‘all 
citizens’ and to ‘all residents’. In the Nordic countries, benefits and services 
are often described as ‘citizenship-based’, but are in fact based on residence 
in the nation. Residence is obviously more comprehensive than citizenship, 
and also the most generous to immigrants, guest-workers, etc.3 The principle 
of universalism is, however, restricted in all known welfare states:
3  To qualify for citizenship, a person must have resided in Norway for a total of seven years during the 
last ten years. A ‘resident’ is in Norway a person who has resided in the country for 12 months or more.
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1. Firstly, benefits and services are categorical and related to certain 
politically defined need situations, such as old age, sickness, 
unemployment, etc.
2. Secondly, most benefits are related to work achievements.
Child allowances, health care and basic old age and disability pensions are 
the most universal schemes in the Nordic countries. Many other countries 
have universal schemes within one or several of these policy areas. These 
are examples of benefits that are distributed equally to all members of the 
welfare state that belong to a certain group of the population. Until 2004, 
everyone in Norway was entitled to a ‘funeral allowance’ – a more universal 
scheme can hardly be imagined.
Other income-securing schemes are less universal. For instance, 
unemployment benefits are not distributed to every unemployed person, 
but only to those who have been gainfully employed for a certain period and 
with a defined minimum income, and who, as of recent years, are actively 
seeking work and can document that activity. Others can apply for means-
tested social assistance. With increasing and high levels of employment, one 
might say that income-related unemployment benefits have become more 
universal, in the sense that the large majority of the working-age population 
will be covered.
Clearly, the idea of universalism is closely related to that of egalitarianism 
(Kildal & Kuhnle 2005). Egalitarian doctrines tend to express the idea that 
all human persons are equal in worth or moral status. People should get 
the same, or be treated the same, or be treated as equals, in some respect 
(cf. Dworkin 2000). There are, of course, several types of equality, or ways 
in which people might be treated equally and enjoy equal opportunities. In 
modern democratic societies, however, the term ‘egalitarian’ is generally used 
to refer to a position that favours a greater degree of equality of income and 
wealth across persons.
In terms of income security, the ideal typical universal allocation is an 
unconditional, flat-rate ‘basic income’ that is unconditionally paid to every 
member of society – a benefit which no country has yet introduced. Although 
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no country has yet implemented a fully developed basic income grant, Alaska 
has established The Alaska Permanent Fund Program (1982), which on an 
annual basis distributes a share of investment earnings from inter alia the 
oil industry, to every Alaskan resident.4  Recent years have seen growing 
public debate on the desirability and feasibility of such a ‘citizen’s income’ 
or ‘solidarity grant’ in countries like South Africa, Namibia and Brazil, as a 
benefit without a means test will more readily reach the poorest population 
of all ages.
3.2. Reciprocity
The principle of reciprocity is poles apart from the principle of universalism, 
and is based on the normative expectation of ‘mutuality’. Reciprocity signifies 
a relationship of exchange with the necessary moral element of duty; the duty 
of repayment. This principle is said to capture a deep intuition of distributive 
justice: In order to receive something, you have to give, or, as some writers 
have put it in today’s debates on social policy: “it is unfair for the able-bodied 
to live off the labour of others” (Elster 1987; White 1999, 170).
Reciprocity is the normative basis for the achievement-related principle of 
social insurance, which means that you receive in proportion to what you have 
paid in (Esping-Andersen 1999, 32). This was first implemented in Germany, 
by Bismarck in the Old Age and Disability Pension Programme in 1889. 
Continental welfare systems still mainly consist of insurance schemes. This 
principle of allocation was introduced in the universal Nordic model in the 
late 1950s and 1960s (e.g. in the old age pension schemes in Sweden, Finland, 
and Norway), and has in recent years received increasingly more attention in 
other schemes, and also in the so-called residual Anglo-American welfare 
model. In fact, the Anglo-American welfare states have contributed to this 
development internationally through their ‘welfare-for-work’ and ‘workfare’ 
programmes. But in the Nordic welfare states the principle of strict reciprocity 
4  The dividend is paid to every resident who indicates an intention to remain in the state, regardless of 
age. In 2010, the Dividend was $1,281 (ca. 10,000 NOK or 10,000 CNY).
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has also gained a more prominent position through various so-called welfare 
contracts that oblige beneficiaries to contribute something in return:  basically, 
work. We shall return to this below.
3.3. Targeting 5
Targeting policies, which imply the allocation of benefits primarily based on 
means testing of one sort or other, aim at transferring benefits to those most 
in need and have also gained a growing influence outside the residual welfare 
states where they have been more prevalent. Although these policies are of 
various kinds, the term is usually taken to mean means testing, i.e. a testing 
of the individual’s – or household’s – ability to pay for their living, a testing 
of economic needs, in contrast to non-economic needs (Rothstein 1998, 19). 
Another targeting policy involves more individualised evaluations of need 
situations, often called tailoring. And a third involves the targeting of groups 
with special needs. Current discussions on poverty and social inclusion have 
in particular actualised targeting policies – all around the world (Sen 1999, 
134), including the Nordic countries. Instead of choosing or maintaining 
universal benefit schemes that include everyone, governments implement 
selective programmes that are adapted to each applicant, especially the long-
term unemployed, immigrants and youth. Targeting is assumed to increase 
the accuracy of social policy and thus its effectiveness.
4. Current challenges and reforms
It can be argued that universalism has been conducive to equality and security. 
And, if the values of relatively egalitarian income distributions, low poverty 
rates, high levels of employment, political stability and steady economic 
5 It is not always clear what is meant by the concept of ‘targeting’. In the World Bank report, Targeting 
of Transfers in Developing Countries (Coady et al. 2004), the term ‘categorical targeting’ is used of 
benefits that the research literature generally labels as ‘categorical universal’ benefits.
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growth or development are set high on the political agenda, the Nordic 
welfare states have been successful, comparatively speaking. Nevertheless the 
question has been raised as to whether comprehensive welfare states have 
evolved at the price of weaker economic development than could otherwise 
have been expected. Are these welfare states – and the principles upon which 
they are built – being seriously challenged at the present time?
Since the 1990s, one of the main social policy discourses in the Western 
world has been on the financial sustainability of the welfare state (Ervik et al. 
2009). High unemployment rates, population ageing and globalisation, with its 
increased immigration and economic competition, are conceived to be major 
challenges that represent serious threats to welfare state institutions. One of the 
main strategies in meeting these challenges has been to tighten the connection 
between social policy, employment policy and general economic policy, by 
introducing programmes that combine social benefits with work. In Norway 
a so-called ‘renewed work approach’ was announced which emphasised active 
measures rather than so-called passive benefits, as well as citizens’ obligations 
rather than rights. During the 1990s, similar work-orientated policies in the 
form of ‘welfare-to-work’ and ‘workfare’ programmes were implemented in 
welfare states with quite different institutional traditions. Economic activity 
became a main goal of social policy, and the means introduced to achieve 
this were obligations to be active and work.
In Norway, the ‘renewed work approach’ introduced in a White Paper in 
1991 resulted in comprehensive labour and welfare administration reforms 
(NAV in Norwegian) in 2006. This involved the merging of three huge 
administrations: national insurance, the national employment service and the 
municipal social welfare administration. The objectives of the reform were 
threefold: To get more people to work and in activity and fewer on benefits, 
to form a user-friendly system, and to construct an efficient employment and 
welfare administration. One of the main goals was to strengthen the bond 
between employment and social policies in order to support the battle against 
poverty and social exclusion.
One of the main instruments was the so-called Qualification Programme, 
with a related qualification benefit for a targeted group of long-termed 
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unemployed and long-term recipients of social assistance (St.meld. Nr. 9 
(2006–2007), 16). In order to concretise mutual expectations, demands and 
obligations between the welfare administration and the recipients, this White 
Paper applies the concept of a ‘welfare contract’ throughout the paper. This 
is used as a pedagogical tool in order to underline the connection that exists 
between individual rights and duties; as a common and systematic principle in 
order to concretise mutual expectations, demands and obligations between the 
welfare administration and the recipients (St.meld. Nr. 9 (2006–2007), 15–17; 
Nilssen & Kildal 2009). It articulates a close connection between the right 
to welfare benefits and the duty to work.
This contractual linking of rights to duties implies that violation of the 
duty to work or to be active may be financially sanctioned. Those who drop 
out from the Qualification Programme may get their qualification benefit 
reduced to pure Emergency help, which takes the form of a small amount 
of cash to pay for food (NOK70 per day; or ca. EUR9).
As a part of the NAV reform’s aim of narrowing the gap between social 
policy and labour market policy, three of the traditional benefits – medical 
rehabilitation allowance, vocational rehabilitation allowance and time-limited 
disability benefit – founded in the Social Security Act were unified in one 
common measure: The Work Assessment Allowance (ArbeidsAvklaringsPenger 
= AAP). The aim of the AAP is to arrange for more people to participate in 
work or work-related activities. Thus, while the Qualification Programme is 
directed towards long-term recipients of social assistance, the AAP covers 
people with problems in relation to the labour market who have a right to one 
of the three integrated benefits (administered by the old governmental social 
insurance and labour market services) (Kildal & Nilssen 2011). Entitlement 
to AAP is assessed by the NAV office on the basis of the claimant’s need of 
support to enter the labour market. If the allowance is granted, the recipient 
has a right to an activity plan worked out on the grounds of their individual 
needs. This right correlates with the duty to participate in the preparation 
and following up of the same plan. Violation of this duty of activity may be 
financially sanctioned.
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As a point of departure every violation of the claim that the recipient 
shall actively contribute in the process of getting work, will imply that 
the benefit is suspended until the beneficiary again fulfils the demand. 
Concerning momentary violations the main question is whether the 
recipient has a good reason to break the activity duty (Ot.prp. Nr. 4 
(2008–2009), 10).
An Active Labour Market Policy (ALMP) and an emphasis on work has 
been a cornerstone of Nordic welfare policy since the Second World War. The 
particularly striking aspect of the ‘new work approach’ is the new contractual 
thinking on which it is based, which must be said to imply a normative 
change in Norwegian social policy.
All in all, Norwegian social insurance benefits have increasingly been tied 
to requirements of activation and work, for example, the recent (2011) old 
age pension reform in Norway has established a much stronger link between 
contributions over one’s entire period as gainfully employed and pension benefits. 
And the single parent’s benefit, which is intended to ensure income for those 
caring for children of their own, originally continued until the youngest 
child reached the age of 10, now ends when the youngest child is 3. In 2011, 
a publicly appointed committee suggested that a work duty for single parents 
should be introduced as early as the point at which the youngest child reaches 
the age of one year old (NOU 2011:7, 345).
The new obligations in the field of labour market and social policy are 
primarily targeted at the poorest, most vulnerable groups in society, who in 
addition receive benefits on the basis of discretionary assessments of their 
needs. Both targeting and discretion are far from the principle of universalism.
This example from a core area of Norwegian social policy – policies 
against poverty and social exclusion – illustrates the challenges to which 
the moral logic of the welfare state is exposed. The principle of universalism 
is threatened by both the principles of targeting and reciprocity, or by the 
residual and achievement-orientated welfare state principles.
Finally in this section we will briefly examine  another policy area in 
Norway that has come under constant attack for the last 15–20 years. This is 
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the universal Child Allowance, which is the most universal of cash benefit 
schemes, as it is independent of any work record or income.
The arguments against universal child allowances are basically that such 
benefits are too low to reduce poverty and improve the living conditions of 
young families, and that many affluent families who do not need financial 
support for their children receive these benefits. The benefits should therefore 
be targeted at those who need them most. However, child benefits were never 
meant to eliminate or reduce poverty, but to equalise the differences between 
families with and without children. It is primarily a contribution from society 
to those who take on responsibility for bringing up the new generation. 
Nevertheless, the criticism that universal schemes are too costly has been 
opposed by several counter-arguments, some of which will be discussed below.
5. Historical justifications for, and current arguments 
against, universalism 
It is instructive to study the arguments that were once used in favour of 
universal programmes and compare them with current arguments against 
universal schemes. When the first real universal scheme, the Child Allowance 
Scheme, was introduced in 1946, and the old age pension scheme was reformed 
from being means-tested to being universal in 1957, the main arguments were 
dignity, economic efficiency and community building. The two last arguments 
about efficiency and community building, understood as social inclusion, are 
often heard today, although they have changed sides in the argumentative 
battle – now they are used to support targeting and social insurance-thinking. 
The core normative argument concerning human dignity currently receives 
less attention.
Today the language of contracts and the closely related concept of incentives 
pervade a whole string of policy discourses. While a key manifestation of the 
use of welfare contracts is the slogan “no rights without responsibilities”, one 
key manifestation of today’s incentive thinking is the famous slogan “make 
work pay” – the transition from benefit to work must pay economically. This 
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implies, according to Norwegian White Paper (St.meld. Nr. 9 (2006–2007)), 
that the compensation level of most temporary benefits should be substantially 
lower than the previously earned income. This will give the recipients of 
benefits an incentive to evade the ‘poverty trap’ and enter the workforce, if 
this is a possible choice, and thus the goals of efficiency and social inclusion 
will be supported. This is because social inclusion is currently perceived as 
labour market participation. In the construction phase of the universal welfare 
state, it was rather equal political and social rights that were perceived to be 
the basis for social inclusion.
The economic calculation is, however, more complicated than is often 
portrayed in today’s discourse. This can be illustrated by referring to the 
arguments from the 1940s and 1950s. When, for instance universal old-
age pensions were discussed, and implemented, it was argued that to make 
pensions universal would save huge amounts of administrative costs that were 
used to control and check up on information on individual (or household) 
income and means. This ‘game of control’ is always put into action when groups 
are separated into members and non-members, the worthy and unworthy. 
Furthermore, while means-testing penalises the will to work and save, universal 
basic pensions avoid these effects (Sen 1999, 135; Kildal & Kuhnle 2008). This 
idea is supported by researchers today, who stress that the prospects of losing 
welfare benefits will prevent those welfare recipients with least resources from 
entering a risky labour market.
Furthermore, it is a question as to whether means testing and need 
targeting are effective for poverty reduction in the longer term. A welfare 
state that only supports the poor will presumably not be politically sustainable. 
Since the welfare budget is never settled once and for all, but is rather decided 
through elections, political representation and annual parliamentary budget 
decisions, it is not likely that those who are not included in the system – the 
well-off – will be prepared to argue strongly for very generous benefit levels. 
And since benefit recipients tend to be relatively weak, politically, socially and 
economically speaking, they are hardly capable of successfully defending the 
quality of the programs. A means-testing system for the poor may therefore after 
a while easily ends up as a poor system. Korpi and Palme have characterised 
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this phenomenon as ‘the paradox of redistribution’, an insight that has been 
confirmed in several empirical studies (Korpi & Palme 1998; Sen 1999, 136; 
Moene & Wallerstein 2001). By comparing residual and universal welfare 
states, it is found that poverty rates are far higher in the former, although 
this may not be due solely to the different welfare state arrangements.
Another important consideration is that a system of support that requires 
a person to be identified as poor will have some effects on the self-respect of 
the beneficiaries and for the respect they are accorded by others (Sen 1999). 
These are aspects of societal costs of social policy or welfare schemes which 
cannot so easily be quantified in budget terms, and are therefore normally 
excluded from the calculations of those preparing annual state budgets in 
the ministries of finance. Still, the normative logic of a welfare state must 
be expected to have an indirect effect on the productivity of the economy, 
and it is far from given, as some seem to think, that a move away from 
the principle of universalism will save public expenditure in the long run 
or generally favour a more productive population. The social, political and 
economic cost of the social divisions and inequality that tend to go with 
welfare states relying extensively on means testing and targeting can easily 
outweigh the (economic) cost of universal and more egalitarian policies.
6. Are welfare principles on the move?
There are still strong universalistic elements in the Nordic welfare states in 
the sense that, for example, all residents are guaranteed an old age pension, 
health care and education. In addition, we shall not argue that the Norwegian 
or Nordic welfare state(s) must exclusively consist of universal social security 
schemes, such as is currently the case with child allowances or, as is discussed 
in some countries, in the form of a basic income, i.e. a system with flat-rate 
benefits paid to everyone. A welfare state cannot only secure basic security 
for all, but should also compensate for social and natural inequalities; welfare 
states should probably include both universal and selective schemes, for 
people with special needs, and in some areas also allow the principle of 
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reciprocity. Nevertheless, a change in social policies from universal social 
rights to targeting, contracts, duties and incentives in the policy areas we have 
highlighted, has important political and social implications and indicates a 
move away from universalism as an important normative principle and as a 
basis for egalitarian policies and outcomes.
In particular, the new contractualism with its duties and sanctions, 
represents a clear retreat from a main idea of welfare states, that no citizen 
shall be denied the basic goods needed to live a decent life. Although the 
definition of the adequate level of these goods, like health, education, pensions, 
income and security, has been a controversial issue, this discussion has become 
overshadowed by the contract-based discussion around “what should count 
as an adequate reason to deny citizens such a good, at whatever level it is 
provided” (Gutmann & Thompson 1996, 274, our italics). The central issue 
in current welfare debates has become “what obligations society may impose 
on citizens as a condition of their receiving basic opportunity goods” (ibid.). 
The new contractualism may thus be interpreted as representing a shift in 
the basic aims of welfare policy. The aim of protecting citizens against social 
risks may seem to be less of a central issue than the aim of changing people’s 
behaviour in a way that can make individuals help themselves. Social rights 
have been weakened by linking them to certain behavioural conditions.
It is somewhat paradoxical that at a time when much of the world looks 
to the Nordic countries and their seemingly successful model of welfare 
combined with world-class competitiveness, one recent example being the 
attention paid to them at the World Economic Forum (WEF) in Davos 
in 2011, dominant political actors seem prepared to throw core normative 
elements of the model overboard. As we have indicated, moving away from 
a core normative principle such as universalism can ignite a political dynamic 
which in the longer run can affect other aspects which have made the model 
successful, also in an economic sense, up until now, and incur higher social, 
political and, in the end, economic, costs. Current political discourse neglects 
these possible long-term effects which may be very difficult to correct, even 
if a new political will to do that should manifest itself ten, twenty or thirty 
years down the road.
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Chapter 7
Family duties in the history of poor relief and 
social legislation in Finland
Pirjo Markkola
1. Introduction
The past organisation of welfare provision in the Nordic countries is often 
told as the story of the Poor Laws, supplemented by some charity. The 
Poor Law arrangements were certainly based upon a long tradition of local 
administration and local funding, but it must be emphasised that throughout 
the centuries the primary provider of welfare was the family unit or the 
household. Poor Law arrangements were meant for those paupers who did 
not have a family to support them. Only when the household was so poor that 
it failed to take care of its members, or the family of the poor was missing, 
did the state, the Lutheran church and private charities, among others, offer 
their helping hand (Satka 1995; Rahikainen 1993; Pulma 1985). Thus, if we 
look at the past organisation of welfare provision as an implementation of 
the Poor Law, enacted by the state, we may gain a biased image of the ways 
in which welfare and solidarity were constituted historically. We also need 
to look at the formal role of families and households vis-à-vis the state in 
welfare provision.
Typically, historians and other scholars of the welfare state have been 
interested in the role of the state, and more precisely in the strengthening 
role of the central state in welfare policies. In the Nordic context, welfare 
policies and the organisation of social solidarity are often associated with 
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a strong state and the labour movement. This scholarly attention shifted in 
the 1980s and 1990s, when politicians and scholars started to pay growing 
attention to the role of civil society in welfare provision. Moreover, in the 
1990s, a rhetorical turn to welfare society emphasised the role of the ‘third 
sector’ of voluntary organisations and social enterprises. For example, a state 
committee report on voluntary social work was published in Sweden in 
1993 (SOU 1993:82). Since the 1990s, European researchers have increasingly 
been examining the ‘mixed economy of welfare’ that existed during the past 
centuries. Studies on the mixed economy of welfare distinguish state, market, 
civil society and informal (family) as four components of welfare. These 
components interact, coincide and change over time. The phrase was first 
used to refer to the changing welfare policies of the 1980s, but soon historians 
applied and further developed the concept in their work, too. The mixed 
economy of welfare has been examined in particular by British historians. 
One useful conceptualisation is the notion of a ‘moving frontier’ introduced 
by Geoffrey Finlayson in his analysis of the relationship between voluntarism 
and the state (Finlayson 1994, 6–18; Grell et al. 2002; Lewis 2000, 221–225; 
Powell 2007; see also Daunton 1996). Moving frontiers refer to shifting and 
overlapping boundaries in welfare provision. In this theoretical framework, 
the role of the family in Nordic welfare provision deserves more attention.
It is not without problems to apply the concept of the ‘mixed economy 
of welfare’ to the historical organisation of welfare provision in any national, 
regional or local context. Some historians find it an appropriate concept to 
use to discuss the division between voluntary and state assistance in various 
historical periods, whereas others argue that the idea of the mixed economy 
is ‘too neat’.1 Moreover, as the British historian of medicine, John Stewart, 
notes, the components of the mixed economy of welfare change over time. 
Thus, the relationship between the state, the family, the market and civil 
society also changes according to particular circumstances (Stewart 2007, 
1  Anne Crowther calls the concept ‘too neat’, because it seems to suggest elements of planned strategy 
in usually chaotic circumstances (Crowther 2002, 2006). Joanna Innes, for instance, analyses the ways 
in which the ‘mixed economy’ was conceptualised and addressed in the English past (Innes 1996). 
Dorothy Porter examines ideological changes within the mixed economies of welfare in northern 
Europe in the 18th and 19th centuries (Porter 2002).
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37). In fact, Finland, as well as the other Nordic countries, has a long, yet 
shifting, tradition of organising networks of solidarity not only on a formal 
but also on an informal, voluntary and market basis.
Over time, the moving frontiers of welfare provision in Finland have been 
negotiated between the state, the Lutheran church, municipalities, private 
charities, mutual societies, cooperatives, philanthropic organisations and the 
family.2 Poor relief was a parish responsibility administered by local pastors 
until the 1860s, when local administration was re-organised and new secular 
municipalities assumed the responsibility for poor relief. The old paternalistic 
Poor Laws were replaced by a liberal legislation. Simultaneously, new providers 
of welfare emerged. Extensive networks of charitable associations, local poor 
relief, Lutheran parishes and social institutions, among others, contributed 
to welfare policies and knowledge production concerning social problems. 
In the 1920s and 1930s, modest welfare reforms gradually initiated a new era; 
however, a decisive turn towards a comprehensive welfare state can only be 
found after the Second World War, when new universalistic schemes for 
child allowance, people’s pension and sickness insurance were introduced 
(Satka 1995; Rahikainen 1993; Markkola 2011, 102–118). These reforms had 
an impact on the role of family in poverty policies.
In this chapter, my aim is to analyse the role assigned to family and 
household in the history of poor relief and poverty policies in Finland. In 
terms of the mixed economy of welfare, I will pay particular attention to 
one moving frontier, that between public poor relief, later social policy, and 
the family. However, changes in family and household are also taken into 
consideration. The old Poor Law arrangements emphasised the responsibilities 
of household and family, whereas modern social policies gave the family unit 
new responsibilities in respect of moral values and material well-being. Over 
the course of the 20th century, while social legislation was being reformed, 
the ways in which families were conceptualised was also shifting.
During the period discussed here, roughly from the 18th century to the 
20th century, the political existence of Finland changed remarkably. Until the 
2  On various providers of welfare in Finland, see Markkola 2007, 207–230.
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beginning of the 19th century, Finland was an eastern part of Sweden, and 
as such subject to the Swedish legal and institutional system. In 1809, as a 
result of the Napoleonic wars, Finland was attached to the Russian empire 
as an autonomous Grand Duchy. However, the Swedish legal system and 
the law code of 1734 still applied in Finland, and the Lutheran church was 
upheld as the established church. Consequently, the country retained the 
institutional structure of its Swedish period. In 1917, in the aftermath of the 
Russian Revolution, Finland gained independence and continued to build 
its social institutions on its Nordic heritage, however, assuming a republican 
constitution.3 So the geographical and political area currently known as the 
Republic of Finland has been in the past an integral part of the kingdom 
of Sweden and a Grand Duchy under the rule of the Russian Emperor. 
Amidst the political changes, turning points in the provision of welfare did 
not always follow the history of state formation; moreover, the history of 
social structures and social institutions also involve much continuity, often 
present in the everyday life of the people, not least in the organisation of 
poverty policies.
2. The church in local poor relief
After the Reformation in the early 16th century, the Nordic Lutheran churches 
were state churches and played an active role in the field of welfare. The 
governing of the churches was gradually integrated into the governing of 
the state, and the local clergy represented the state as well as the church 
(Thorkildsen 1997, 138–141; Stenius 1997, 161–171; Knudsen 2000, 20–61). Poor 
relief was organised by the parishes which, in fact, were often the smallest 
local administrative bodies in rural areas. The Swedish Church Law of 1686 
further specified social responsibilities on a local level. For example, the 
law required that every parish should build a poorhouse and support those 
poor living within the boundaries of the parish (Church Law 1686, Chapter 
3  On the history of Finland, see e.g. Jussila (1999); Kirby (2006); Lavery (2006); Meinander (2011).
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XXVIII). It was the duty of the local community to take care of its own poor 
who did not have a family to lean on. However, the Swedish state dictated 
how the local poor relief should be organised.
Nevertheless, the parishes enjoyed a great deal of autonomy vis-à-vis 
the state (Soikkanen 1966, 92–93; Pulma 1994, 32–33; on the English system, 
cf. Innes 1996; Crowther 2002, 209–211). While hospitals and workhouses 
were state institutions, many forms of poverty policy were based on local 
arrangements. For example, the 1763 legislation concerning poor relief, 
hospitals and orphanages demanded that the parishes should fund their 
poor relief through local taxation. Thus, a principled division of labour 
between the state, the local authorities and the household developed in the 
18th century. The household was definitely the primary provider of care, but 
in the absence of the household, the care of the incurable sick, the control 
of the able-bodied poor and the punishment of vagrants were regarded as 
matters for the state, whereas poor relief, child care and moral education 
belonged to the responsibilities of the parishes, and to some extent to the 
individual charity (Pulma 1985, 80–89; Satka 1995, 20–21). A certain level of 
uniformity had been created by the end of the 18th century.
In the 18th  century, concern about population decline, and, more 
importantly, anxiety about the shortage of the labour force were topical in 
Sweden. As a consequence, landless people were subjected to the landowners; 
furthermore, vagrancy and beggary were explicitly forbidden and punished. 
Fearing the lack of a labour force, the state introduced new restrictions such 
as limitations on migration and the introduction of compulsory service for the 
landless population. The system of compulsory service divided the population 
into two major categories. The families of the nobility, the clergy, civil servants, 
urban burghers and freeholders (peasants on their own farm) belonged to 
the independent population. All others were categorised as dependent people 
who needed to be protected by the independents. In practice, the protection 
was realised in the form of compulsory service. Those adult men and women 
who did not belong to the families of the independent population and who 
were not employed by them were treated as vagrants. Male vagrants were 
ordered to undertake military service or forced labour in workhouses; female 
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vagrants were placed in workhouses. Some exemptions were ruled, but in 
general the position of the poor was very vulnerable (Pulma 1985, 45–46; 
Markkola 1994, 17–21, 25–26; on restrictions in Prussia and Bavaria, see Dross 
2002, 72–76; Stolberg 2002, 118–122).
The landless population lived under many restrictions. Legislation 
constrained migration and parishes had a right to forbid the poor or even 
potential recipients of poor relief to settle within their borders. Not only 
freeholders but also other independent people were occasionally prohibited 
from recruiting servants from other parishes because outsiders were seen as 
an economic risk or a potential future burden. The poor only had the right 
of domicile if they were born in a parish or if they, as young and fit, could be 
expected to contribute to the prosperity of the parish.4 Local responsibility was 
part and parcel of the Poor Laws until the 19th century, and some continuity 
could be found in the strong role of municipalities in the 20th century, as well.
As the number of paupers increased in the early 19th century, poor men 
and women faced growing difficulties in finding employment. Consequently, 
the current legislation demanding compulsory service, i.e. employment, made 
the situation of the poor extremely paradoxical. The old paternalistic order in 
which the poor were under the control and protection of their employers or 
former employers was not functioning any longer. In this context, the state 
authorities tried to combat social problems in various ways. The governors were 
demanded to advise parishes, control local poor relief practices and promote 
private charity. Education and child welfare, in particular, were considered to 
suit private charities; in the 1810s, 1820s and 1830s, schools and orphanages 
were founded by benevolent individuals and societies (Piirainen 1958, 40–41).
In the 1840s, the Finnish Senate appointed a committee to prepare an 
administrative reform of poor relief. The committee published its report in 
1843 and made detailed suggestions concerning the organisation of poor relief 
that would further cement its paternalistic principles. Some commentators 
argued that in other countries the comprehensive poor relief proposed by 
the committee had actually increased the number of paupers. Other critics 
4  The same principle of domicile could be found in England and the German states, among others.
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demanded a strict organisation of welfare provision based on an English 
model. The division of labour between the state, the parishes and private 
charities was carefully discussed. Many liberal ideas were expressed in the 
public debate, but the Senate ignored them and followed the committee’s 
recommendations in formulating the new Poor Law in 1852 (Satka 1995, 
20–21; Pulma 1994, 55–59; Piirainen 1958, 67–81).
According to the 1852 Poor Law, the primary obligation to provide 
maintenance lay on the family; besides, the Act on Contracted Service 
required employers to maintain their servants. Mutual responsibilities within 
a family comprised three generations: grandparents, parents and children/
grandchildren were responsible for those family members who could not 
support themselves. In this regard there were no age limits; maintaining the 
members of the family was a lifelong duty. Only the poor who were not able 
to work and whose parents, grandparents, children or grandchildren were 
not able to provide maintenance were entitled to poor relief. Nevertheless, 
the family was not an independent unit and this did not replace the division 
between the independent and dependent population. On the contrary, the 
Poor Law emphasised maintenance according to the existing paternalistic 
responsibilities and social relations. The Poor Law, however, expanded the 
definition of the people who were entitled to public support. In general, those 
eligible for poor relief included children in need of protection, the insane, 
the disabled and the aged infirm. Other categories of the poor were also 
made eligible. Not only the old, sick or disabled people who to some extent 
were able to work, but also the poor in need of temporary support were 
entitled to public support (Poor Law 1852, §1, §20–23; Pulma 1994, 59–60). 
Nevertheless, the able-bodied poor were expected to earn their assistance by 
working for the community.
The major principles of the Poor Law seemed to be generosity and control: 
everyone who really needed help had the right to receive it, but the recipients of 
poor relief were subject to the control of the parish. Therefore, local boards for 
poor relief were established, a coherent system of compulsory local taxation for 
poor relief was created, and much work by the local authorities was demanded. 
The Finnish historian, Panu Pulma, argues that the seeming generosity of 
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the Poor Law cannot be understood without paying due attention to the 
simultaneous Act on Forced Labour and Vagrancy of 1852. The Act restored 
the strict definition of compulsory service, i.e. the division into the dependent 
and the independent population. Both laws attempted to re-establish the 
old paternalistic order in the spirit of the 18th century (Pulma 1994, 59–61). 
By bringing the lower classes under paternalistic control, the state tried to 
resolve the problems of poverty and the threat of social unrest.
Nevertheless, the Poor Law of 1852 was born outdated. The old conception 
of protection had to give way to emerging ideas on the freedom of labour 
and to the belief that a free labour force was the best remedy against poverty. 
The intellectual atmosphere changed after the 1840s, when the principles of 
the English Poor Law of 1834 were deemed too harsh and inappropriate for 
agrarian Finland. Crop failures and the increasing number of paupers in 
the 1850s changed attitudes (Piirainen 1958, 82–83). The English model was 
suddenly considered attractive.
The growing criticism of the Poor Law fostered initiatives to revise 
social legislation. As a result, the new laws of 1865 abolished the connection 
between unemployment and vagrancy, and many restrictions on migration 
were lifted. The more freedom that the working classes were granted, the 
more it was feared that the poor would abuse the law and see poor relief as 
a social right. In an industrialising society, the principles of the paternalistic 
Poor Law were seen as utterly unacceptable, in particular by industrialists 
and entrepreneurs (Markkola 1994, 22–26; Rahikainen 1993, 90; Pulma 1994, 
61–62). The authorities were determined to find new solutions to the problems 
of poverty and the organisation of welfare.
3. Municipal poor relief
While the new local administration was established in 1865, with the separation 
of the church parishes and secular municipalities in rural areas, the central 
role of the family and household in poverty policies continued. In the new 
division of labour, poor relief and basic education, previously organised by the 
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parishes, became the responsibility of the municipalities. The relatively strong 
autonomy of the parishes developed into the basic structure of municipal 
self-government. However, municipalities soon encountered major obstacles 
in organising poor relief. The disastrous crop failures in the 1860s led to 
an unbearable situation in most parts of the country. As a result of the 
famine of 1867–1868, in particular, the number of people in need of poor relief 
exploded. Hospitals and shelters were founded, relief work organised and 
grain distributed, but the catastrophe could not be avoided. Approximately 
270,000 people out of the population of 1.8 million died during these years, 
and the number of orphans, widows and widowers increased dramatically.5 
After the famine, the old Poor Law arrangements could not be continued.
Moreover, it was a common belief in the 1860s and 1870s that the problems 
of poverty had been created by the generous Poor Law of 1852. Subsequent 
studies have shown that the growth of social expenditure was caused by a 
substantive increase of poverty, but the contemporary belief was that the Poor 
Law needed a comprehensive reform. The Senate appointed a committee to 
prepare new legislation on poor relief, vagrancy and migration (Committee 
Report 1872:3; Jaakkola 1994, 111; Pulma 1994, 64–65). Based on the report of 
the committee, a new liberal Poor Law was passed in 1879. The law aimed 
at replacing the old paternalistic order with the social responsibilities of a 
nuclear family. Able-bodied men and women were to maintain themselves 
and their minor children up to the age of 15; moreover, husbands were to 
support their wives. Intergenerational duties continued in the new Poor 
Law, in which grandparents and grandchildren were kept responsible for 
each other’s maintenance.
The categories of people entitled to the poor relief were restricted. 
Furthermore, the recipients of poor relief were subject to the guardianship of 
the municipal authorities. Moreover, the law explicated the division of labour 
between the parishes and the municipalities: the administrative and economic 
responsibility for poor relief clearly rested with the secular authorities. The 
5  As the normal level of mortality was exceeded by over 100,000 people, the Finnish famine ranks 
among the great hunger catastrophes in European history (Pitkänen 1992, 97–116; Pulma 1994, 67–
68).
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municipalities were to build workhouses where the poor should work under 
circumstances of severe discipline (Poor Law 1879, §1–6; Markkola 1994, 
26–28). One of the declared aims of the workhouses was to discourage the 
poor from seeking poor relief.
The Finnish reform was not exceptional in 19th century Europe. The direct 
model for Finland was sought from the Swedish Poor Law of 1871, but the 
Danish and Norwegian Poor Laws of the 1860s had also followed equally harsh 
principles. In fact, the English Poor Law of 1834, with its workhouses, provided 
a common model for the Nordic countries. It represented the new liberal 
idea of economic well-being as an individual’s own concern (Rahikainen 1993, 
90; Jaakkola 1994, 112; Grell & Cunningham 2002, 11–12). The principles that 
had been rejected in Finland around 1850 were now approved as appropriate 
solutions for the problems of poverty.
The most important of the new principles was the division between 
statutory and discretionary assistance. The poor who were unable to work 
and did not have a family to support them were entitled to public aid, but 
the able-bodied poor were to support themselves and their families. If they 
failed, their place was in forced labour at a workhouse (Thane 1993, 51–55). 
In Finland, the statutory municipal poor relief covered minors, the insane, 
the disabled, the chronically sick and the old and infirm poor who did not 
have anybody to turn to. Temporary need was no longer a legitimate reason 
for seeking public assistance. For discretionary relief, the municipalities were 
to found workhouses. Where the earlier legislation ordered the parishes 
or municipalities to take care of their own poor in the case of economic 
hardship, the new law did not include a similar provision (Annola 2011, 
34–36; Jaakkola 1994, 112–113).
The Poor Law of 1879 enacted the local organisation of poor relief; in 
addition to the municipal poor relief boards, municipal regulations were 
made mandatory. The law aimed at educating the poor into decent citizens: 
local arrangements were subject to state control, and the poor were subject 
to local control. On the local level, middle-class family values were being 
introduced to working-class families (Markkola 1994, 27–30). Social legislation 
was used as a tool in the making of a civic society in which citizens were free 
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to support themselves in the free labour market. Legislation on the freedom 
of migration and the freedom of trade was also passed in 1879. When the 
vagrancy legislation was amended in 1883, all earlier restrictions were abolished 
and the free labour market was created.
The free labour market, however, seemed to require some public guidelines. 
The first examples of state intervention in the labour market were the 
Factory Acts regulating industrial child labour (Cunningham 1995, 140–145; 
de Coninck-Smith et al. 1997). In Finland, the Factory Act of 1879 restricted 
the employment of children of less than 12 years of age. In 1883 the Senate 
appointed a committee to study the working conditions in industry; the 
Labour Protection Act of 1889 was based on the committee’s report. Child 
labour was further regulated: those under the age of 12 years were banned 
from factories, and the working hours of other children and young people 
were restricted. The regulation of child labour in 19th  century Sweden was 
related to the making of school legislation. In Finland, too, the Act of 1889 
decreed that minor workers who had not completed primary school education 
had to be provided with a minimum of 12 hours tuition per week (Sandin 
1997, 17–43; Markkola 1997, 85).6 The growing emphasis on the importance 
of education, connected with the concern for public health, put child welfare 
on the agenda of social legislation in northern Europe. Moreover, parents 
could not rely on their children’s contribution to the maintenance of families, 
because children were expected to stay longer in school.
4. Philanthropy and Christian charity
Encouraged by the liberal ideals of the 19th century, new actors entered the 
scene of welfare provision in Finland. While the former legislation had tied 
the working classes to their employers and to the parishes in which they lived, 
the new liberal legislation allowed them to move and seek their livelihood 
wherever they found it possible. Migration between parishes was no longer 
6  Marjatta Rahikainen argues that the low productivity of child labour was a major reason for its decline 
(Rahikainen 2001, 41–62).
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regulated and restricted to certain procedures. The free labour market also 
brought about new tensions. In the spirit of the Poor Law of 1879, emphasising 
the role of the family, the local administration and the state did not assume 
responsibility for everyone in need of care. As poverty and need did not 
disappear, however, the liberal context fostered the demand for voluntary social 
work, philanthropy and political initiatives. Throughout the Nordic countries, 
at the turn of the 20th century, Christian philanthropy played an increasing 
role in the struggle against urban poverty (Qvarsell 1993, 217; Jordansson & 
Vammen 1998; Markkola 2000a). Philanthropic associations emerged from the 
1830s onwards, the first being the Ladies’ Societies inspired by an international 
model. The earliest tasks of the societies were to establish schools for poor 
girls but also to help the lower classes to help themselves. The philanthropic 
principle of self-help was particularly promoted by arranging employment 
for poor women (Ramsay 1993). In this respect, the philanthropic attempts 
to react to poverty were in line with the liberal principles of the Poor Law. 
Poor women were expected to maintain themselves and their children; new 
employment opportunities helped them to meet these expectations.
Gradually, philanthropic associations spread to the major Finnish towns 
in the 1860s, 1870s and 1880s. Many of them worked on a religious basis; 
however, the philanthropic principle of self-help formed a cornerstone of their 
work. Education and employment for the deserving poor were provided for 
the urban population. The City Missions and other religious organisations 
included men in their programmes, whereas the Ladies’ Societies mainly 
chose to help women and the children of the poor. Still, female volunteers 
outnumbered men in the religious charitable organisations (Markkola 2000b, 
118–131). Social work based on voluntarism attempted to solve the problems 
of poor families in urban areas.
Nevertheless, voluntary philanthropy was controlled by the state authorities. 
In 1893, the Chief Inspector of the Poor Law initiated a central association for 
charity organisations to coordinate local practices. Thus, the principles of the 
British Charity Organisation Society were introduced to Finland. Moreover, 
the inspector was given the right to ensure that the charity associations did 
not impede the practising of poor relief. Benevolent women, in particular, were 
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feared to be open-handed in their social work; however, the mixed economy 
of welfare allowed experienced female philanthropists to engage in welfare 
provision. In 1889, women were given the right to be elected to the municipal 
boards for poor relief; moreover, they were recruited to work as voluntary 
Poor Law guardians. These women, who often had long experience in the 
voluntary associations, were thought to represent a gentle approach to poor 
relief (Satka 1995, 23, 40).7 The prevalent conceptions of gender difference 
actually paved the way for women in public decision-making.
5. New social policy in the 1920s and 1930s
In December 1917, in the aftermath of the Russian Revolution, Finland 
gained independence. However, the bitter Civil War broke out at the end 
of January 1918, with a tremendous loss of life. After the war, approximately 
25,000 children needed social policy measures, the majority being the children 
of the Red socialists, who lost the war. The care of the orphans was then 
seen as the most urgent social problem. The families on the White side were 
provided with pensions, but the orphans of the Red soldiers were subjected 
to poor relief. The role given to families was dual and class-based; while 
middle-class and upper-class families were trusted in their ability to raise 
good citizens, working-class families, and mothers in particular, were seen 
as incapable and unreliable educators. Therefore, although the socialisation 
of Red children was regarded as important in avoiding the recurrence of the 
disastrous conflict within the nation, their families were not supported in 
child-minding and upbringing. Instead, several orphanages and a completely 
new educational institute for social work were established; additionally, the 
state recruited voluntary organisations for child care by providing them with 
state subsidies (Kaarninen 2008; Hentilä 1999, 107–112; Satka 1995, 84–87). 
This state intervention in working-class families gave an impetus to the social 
policy of independent Finland.
7  Steven King discusses the role of female Poor Law guardians in England and shows the ways in which 
women managed to reform social care in a local context (King 2004, 27–46).
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The preparation of the new Poor Law started in 1917; in fact, the process was 
a continuation of prolonged committee work since the turn of the century. The 
first committee report from 1907 had emphasised parents’ responsibility for 
their children; moreover, the report suggested that symmetrical responsibilities 
for maintenance should be introduced for spouses. In the same way as husbands 
had a duty to provide for their wives, wives should be made responsible for 
the maintenance of their husbands. Intergenerational duties were discussed 
quite thoroughly by the 1907 committee, which suggested that the obligation 
to maintain should be restricted to children and parents and not extended to 
grandchildren. This would have been in line with the Swedish Poor Law of 
1871 and the Norwegian Poor Law of 1900. The Danish example was even 
more radical in its understanding of intergenerational duties. In Denmark, 
according to the 1891 Poor Law and the simultaneous 1891 Act on Relief in 
Old Age, parents were to provide for their children, but adult children were 
not made responsible for supporting their aging parents. This understanding 
was not acceptable, according to the Finnish committee (Committee Report 
1907:9, 18–22; on the Danish Act on Relief in Old Age, see Petersen & 
Petersen 2007, 149–179).
The Civil War complicated the planning process. Even so, the new Act on 
Poor Relief, based on the report of the committee set up in 1917, was passed 
in 1922 (Satka 1995, 73, 80). The new law attempted to break away from the 
old spirit of the Poor Laws, thus representing the idea of improved social 
security for citizens. Nevertheless, the family remained the major provider of 
welfare. As the principal rule, men and women were to maintain themselves, 
and their responsibility to provide for their minor children lasted until the 
child was 16, i.e. one year longer than in the previous Poor Laws. The earlier 
discussions on married couples’ symmetrical maintenance duties were now 
incorporated into the law and husbands and wives had mutual responsibilities 
to maintain each other. On demand, everyone should also to the best of his 
or her ability support parents, grandparents and children over the age of 16. 
Illegitimate children were not bound to support their fathers unless they had 
been taken care of by him (1922 Act on Poor Relief, §2–3). The earlier, quite 
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categorical, provisions that did not question the expansion of family duties 
over three generations were now mildly mitigated.
In the 1920s in Finland, the harsh principles of the 1879 Poor Law were 
seen as inhuman in modern society. The new law expanded the categories 
entitled to poor relief. If some people were not able to support themselves 
or to receive maintenance from the family, the municipality was responsible 
for helping. Some old forms of poor relief such as the circulation of the 
poor between private homes, auctions in which the poor were passed over 
to a caretaker or provider who accepted the lowest payment and public 
meetings on the maintenance of the poor were forbidden. Outdoor relief, 
i.e. cash payment to the poor, was defined to be the primary mode of relief. 
However, in practice institutional care – indoor aid – continued to be the 
most commonly used form of relief. Moreover, the extensive control practised 
by the social policy authorities was continued (Urponen 1994, 177–180). The 
emphasis on institutional care and the intensive control of recipients of indoor 
aid indicate that the Civil War had put its stamp on the ways in which the 
poor were treated in a young nation.
As regards interwar social work, a striking feature was the crucial role of 
civil society. The Civil War widened the division between the charity practised 
by the winning faction and the self-help of the socialists. On the charitable 
side, numerous national branches of international religious movements, such 
as the Salvation Army, the Settlement Movement and the Young Women’s 
Christian Association (YWCA) engaged in social work; in addition, many 
other associations looked after children, young people and others in need. 
Because of limited resources and political tensions, social work based on the 
self-help of the working classes was less visible; nevertheless, their contribution 
was not insignificant. Additionally, employers provided their employees with 
social services (Satka 1995, 72; Urponen 1994, 184–186). The diversity of the 
welfare mix continued and even strengthened during the interwar period.
The end of the 1930s, with its comprehensive reforms, initiated a new era in 
the field of social legislation. Instead of one act regulating poor relief, a number 
of separate laws were passed in 1936. Child welfare, the care of vagrants and 
the care of alcoholics were separated from poor relief, which continued to be 
154
PIRJO MARKKOLA
based on the Act of 1922. The Act on Child Welfare covered not only orphans, 
abandoned, disabled, sick, neglected and abused children but also ill-mannered 
and criminal children. Parents who neglected their duties towards their 
children could be warned or prosecuted. Statutory guardians for a child under 
public protection were made obligatory. Furthermore, social administration 
and the division of labour between the state and the municipalities were 
redefined. Moreover, the modest 1937 pension reform gradually introduced 
the principle of national insurance to Finnish social legislation. However, 
other forms of social insurance, such as sickness insurance and employment 
pensions, were not included in the social reforms of the 1930s.
6. Towards the welfare state and beyond
In the post-Second World War era, the Finnish government and parliament 
assumed the principles of equality and universalism in social legislation. The 
introduction of child allowances in 1948 was the first universalistic piece 
of social legislation, and the reform of the people’s pension in 1956 was 
based on similar principles. The 1922 Act on Poor Relief was replaced by 
the 1956 Act on Public Welfare. It was very explicit in the ways in which it 
divided the responsibility for maintenance into two categories, unconditional 
and conditional duties. Men and women were still obligated to provide for 
themselves, their spouses and their children, including adopted children, 
until the age of 16. Fathers of illegitimate children, who had confessed their 
fatherhood or were otherwise sentenced to pay maintenance allowance, 
were also mentioned as liable for the maintenance of their minor children. 
These were unconditional duties defined in the law. The impact of divorces 
was particularly mentioned: it was stated clearly that ex-spouses were not 
responsible for each other’s maintenance (1956 Act on Public Welfare).
Conditional duties were wider. Children had a conditional duty to support 
their parents and parents should support their needy children who were older 
than 16 but younger than 21 years of age. Parents were, however, freed from 
any obligations to maintain their adult children. Spouses had a conditional 
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duty to support each other’s children who lived in the same household and 
were born before the actual marriage. Intergenerational duties were further 
narrowed; grandchildren were only responsible for the maintenance of their 
grandparents if they grew up with them at least 15  years. The same rule 
was applied to illegitimate children’s duties to provide for their fathers. The 
conditional duties were limited in other ways, too. For example, children were 
not liable for the maintenance of their parent’s spouse and spouses were not 
liable for the maintenance of each other’s parents (1956 Act on Public Welfare; 
Tarasti 1956, 90–97). Moreover, in the 1960s, adult children’s maintenance 
duties towards their ageing parents were lifted, mainly for practical reasons 
deriving from increasing geographical mobility and migration. Municipalities 
encountered growing difficulties in getting in touch with children who had 
moved to urban centres or migrated to Sweden.
From the first Poor Laws until the 1956 Act on Public Welfare, the 
social responsibilities of families and the internal relationships of family 
members were regulated and the regulations were stated explicitly in social 
legislation. In the 1980s, the Finnish welfare state adopted another perspective 
and concentrated on public responsibilities. The 1982 Act on Social Welfare 
enacts the provision of social welfare, social assistance and social services. It 
places its major emphasis on public duties and responsibilities; consequently, 
it defines what municipalities have to provide for their inhabitants and the 
general responsibilities of municipalities concerning social welfare. The family 
is still mentioned as a unit, and it has its evident obligation to provide 
maintenance, but its duties and responsibilities are not as clearly defined as 
in earlier legislation. While the former legislation made very clear statements 
on individual duties, the latest legislation is very explicit on public duties.
Family duties are, however, present in the current social legislation. Every 
adult is responsible for their own maintenance as well as for the maintenance 
of their spouse and minor children, including adopted children, until the 
age of 18, unless other legislation decrees otherwise. In the face of economic 
hardship, in particular, the crucial role of the family becomes evident. In 
Finland, social assistance is a last resort form of income security, and it is 
based on the applicant’s explicitly defined essential expenses, such as food, 
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clothing and minor health care costs, among others. According to the 1997 Act 
on Social Assistance, “all members of the family are considered recipients of 
social assistance”. This also means that their income is taken into consideration 
when the decision on social assistance is made. The ‘family’, as defined by 
the Act, consists of “parents, a parent’s minor children or adopted children, 
married couples, and men and women living in circumstances similar to 
marriage who live in a common household” (1997 Act on Social Assistance). 
In general, Finnish social legislation treats people as individuals, but the 
poorest of the poor should resort to their families in the first place.
Simultaneous changes in family policy have had an impact on the 
economic conditions of families in Finland. Since the 1970s, the welfare 
state has encouraged women to work, but it has also accommodated the 
maternity of working women. Maternity leave was extended and parental 
leave introduced in the 1970s and 1980s. The introduction of subjective day-
care rights for children in the 1990s strengthened the idea that both parents 
are responsible for the maintenance of their children. It also encouraged 
single mothers and divorced mothers of small children to stay at work. With 
an established position at work, women can better maintain their children. 
However, in the 1980s and 1990s, a cash-for-care alternative to public day-
care also was introduced. Child home-care allowances are paid for children 
under the age of three years who are not in public day-care institutions. 
Parents are entitled to childcare leave with full job security. Since the 1990s, 
the popularity of the child home-care allowance has been related to the 
employment situation: in particular, during times of economic recession, 
an increasing number of children under the age of three are cared for by a 
parent receiving a home-care allowance. Moreover, in most cases the parent 
at home is the mother (Anttonen 1999; Repo 2010). Cash-for-care benefits 
can provide an opportunity for mothers to take better care of their small 
children, but at the same time they can lead to the marginalisation of women 
in the labour market and even poverty among families with children, when 
one parent’s income is missing. The extensive use of the child home-care 
allowances also has an impact on women’s old age pensions.
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7. Concluding remarks
Since the era of the Poor Laws, social legislation has both defined the 
responsibility of family members to provide maintenance and reflected the 
social significance assigned to families under differing social circumstances. 
Until the Poor Law of 1879, the household was a more important provider of 
welfare and social security than the family, if ‘family’ is understood as a nuclear 
family consisting of parents and children, and in some cases grandparents. 
The paternalistic order that the 1852 Poor Law tried to restore was based on 
the division between independent and dependent population in which the 
dependent population was tied to the household of their master, who could 
be a nobleman, pastor, urban burgher, free-holding peasant or other person 
belonging to the so-called independent population. By working for their 
masters, poor people earned both their bread and their social position in 
society. However, this was not an idyllic or ideal state of affairs for anyone. 
It did not guarantee a decent income or social security for the poor, and the 
masters were also tied to their servants; moreover, some free-holding peasants 
could be of rather limited means themselves, thus unable to maintain their 
ageing servants. In the 19th century, it was difficult to adapt the paternalistic 
order to the wide social changes in Finnish society.
The new keywords of the late 19th century were freedom of labour, freedom 
of trade and free mobility. In this context, the family unit was made the core 
unit of society and families were made responsible for their members. Ever 
since the introduction of family responsibilities, instead of a paternalistic 
order based on households, the frontiers were contested. Who belonged to the 
family? My brief survey of Finnish social legislation indicates that generation 
has been one issue in defining boundaries, gender has been another issue and 
biological versus social relations has been a third issue. The relationship of 
a parent and a minor child is obviously the least contested family tie, albeit 
not without nuances, as the case of Red families after the Finnish Civil 
War suggests. As soon as we add a third generation into the picture, we 
enter more complicated terrain. Since the late 19th century, the relationship 
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between grandparents and grandchildren has been under dispute, and has 
been redefined several times in the 20th century.
It is also possible to find an inner circle of the family and an outer circle 
of the family, as the Finnish social legislation has defined them. The inner 
circle consists very clearly of biological parents and their children, but the 
ties between grandparents and grandchildren as well as between adoptive 
parents and adopted children have moved between the inner and the outer 
circle. While intergenerational relationships have been made conditional and 
shifted towards the outer circle, social family ties in the form of adoption 
have become unconditional and entered the inner circle of family relations. 
Illegitimate children and their mothers belong to the inner circle, whereas 
their fathers circulate on the outer circle, entering only slowly the core area 
of families.
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Chapter 8
Work migration and labour market regulations  
in the Nordic countries
Åsmund Arup Seip
1. Introduction
As regards policies on work migration, the Nordic countries, like most 
countries in Europe, face three main political challenges: handling an open 
European labour market; attracting highly skilled workers from third countries 
(i.e. outside the European labour market); and preventing the immigration of 
unskilled workers from the same or other third countries. These challenges 
make legislative regulation an act of balance.
In many cases, the legislation and regulation of migration will have to 
accomplish goals which seem to be conflicting. Migration policy might be 
shaped to prevent the influx of one kind of worker, and, at the same time, 
to stimulate the influx of another kind. For the Nordic countries, it has been 
essential to protect the local labour market from a foreign labour supply that 
could result in increasing unemployment. Another goal has been to protect 
wages and working conditions in the labour market from unfair competition 
caused by cheap foreign labour. High and stable wages, as well as low wage 
dispersion, has in the Nordic countries been seen as a key to economic growth 
and fundamental for social security. The opening of the European market put 
pressure on the prevailing systems of national regulation. However, recent 
migration has proved to be fertile for the economies of the Nordic countries. 
Economic growth has increased the demand for highly skilled workers. This 
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has led to new regulation of the immigration of experts and educated workers 
in order to promote their migration.
We will address three aspects of migration to the Nordic countries in 
the last decade: the opening of the European labour market to the East; the 
policy to attract highly skilled workers; and the closed door meeting unskilled 
labour migrants. In the second part of the chapter, mechanisms of regulating 
the labour market following the consequences of migration will be discussed.
2. Work migration to the Nordic countries 2004–2010
Following the opening of the European labour market to Central and Eastern 
Europe in 2004, the migration of workers to the Nordic countries increased 
significantly. Simultaneously, a boom in the economy made it desirable for 
the Nordic countries to attract highly skilled workers from third countries 
outside the European labour market. In a world of economic competition, 
some countries will suffer a brain drain when the rich countries woo their 
highly skilled workers. At the same time, these countries can be left with 
their unskilled workers being prohibited from entering the prosperous labour 
markets in the industrialised world. In a global perspective, this may be seen 
as an unfair deal.
2.1. Expansion of the European labour market
The enlargement of the European Union (EU) to countries in Central and 
Eastern Europe in 2004 caused a strong outmigration of labour from Poland, 
Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania to Western Europe. By 2007, more than 150,000 
immigrants had been granted first-time work permits in the Nordic countries 
combined, and of these more than half were renewed. This influx of workers 
constituted, especially in Norway and Iceland, a significant part of the labour 
force, in 2007 over 1.5% in Norway and over 2% in Iceland.
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One of the main fears of many of the old EU member states confronting 
an enlarged labour market in Europe was that the supply of cheap labour from 
the new member states would affect the wage level in the receiving country, 
and threaten institutionalised systems of bargaining and wage setting. This 
fear was eased by transitional measures. The treaty concerning enlargement 
of the EU provided opportunities for the member states to apply restrictions 
to workers from the new EU countries through a period of up to 7 years.1 
By using transitional arrangements, the old member states could chose to 
uphold the requirement for a work permit; require a concrete offer of full-time 
employment as a precondition for receiving a permit; claim that payment levels 
should be set according to the nationwide prevailing wage level; and apply a 
labour market test to ensure that equivalent labour was not available in the 
domestic labour market or in the other old EU countries. These transitional 
arrangements could be used by the old member states in order to protect the 
local labour market from low-priced foreign labour, but the arrangements 
were not allowed to restrict the general freedom to travel within the EU.
Sweden did not adopt any transitional agreements. Iceland and Finland 
repealed their transitional arrangements in 2006, while Denmark and Norway 
maintained their regulations until 2009.2 When the regulation was lifted 
by Norway in 2009, the government argued that the migration did not 
cause such serious disturbances in the labour market that it could justify a 
special extension of the transitional arrangements. But both Denmark and 
Norway used the opportunity to apply the same transitional arrangements 
when Romania and Bulgaria became members of the EU in 2007, whereas 
Finland, Iceland and Sweden decided not to adopt temporary transitional 
arrangements with regard to these countries (Dølvik & Eldring 2008, 17).
The transitional arrangements of Denmark and Norway were rather 
liberal, and gave citizens from the new member countries residence for six 
months to seek employment. If they could find a full-time job with payment 
1  The transitional arrangements appear as annexes to the Accession Treaty (EUR-Lex L 236). An equal 
regulation was provided for members of the EEA (European Economic Area), such as Norway.
2  In 2007, Denmark lifted the requirement for a residence permit for persons employed by companies 
covered by collective agreements, as well as highly skilled labour (Dølvik & Eldring 2008, 17).
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according to the usual wage level or a collective agreement, they were given 
a residence permit and access to welfare services. However, there seems to 
be no correlation between the application of a transitional arrangement and 
the number of immigrants per capita. In relation to the number of citizens, 
the influx has been strongest to Norway and Iceland, while Denmark saw an 
increase after the first few years. As Figure 8.1 shows, the number of work 
permits issued in Norway has been very high. The transitional arrangements 
that were applied in Denmark and Norway seem to have had little effect on 
the number of immigrant workers. 
Figure 8.1. Work permits (including renewals) issued to individual job seekers from the 
EU-8 (+2) after May 2004.
*Figure for 2007 is an estimate. Source: Dølvik & Eldring 2008, Table 2.1.
The immigration from Central and Eastern Europe filled a demand for labour 
in the Nordic countries in the years before the financial crisis. Young skilled 
workers moved to take up better paid jobs, although these jobs were often 
intended for the unskilled (Napierala & Trevena 2007, 19). The migration of 
workers within the European labour marked has in general had a positive 
effect on the economies of the Nordic countries. In Norway, where more work 
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permits have been issued than in all of the other Nordic countries combined, 
the supply of labour gave industries such as construction and ship building 
great advantages. Over 50% of industrial companies using foreign labour in 
Norway were recruiting from the EU-8 countries in Central and Eastern 
Europe in late 2006 (Seip 2007, 23).
However, the influx of cheap labour has challenged the bargaining system 
of wage regulation and resulted in cases of wage dumping and illegal working 
conditions. This problem has been most tangible in cases of service mobility, 
where posted workers are employed by a foreign company, but could also occur 
when transitional arrangements were repealed. The transitional arrangements 
applied by the Nordic countries (except Sweden) did not cover service mobility, 
and EU regulations impose strict limitations on the measures that can be 
taken by the recipient country without violating the inner market’s principle 
of free movement. We will return to this problem in the second part of this 
paper, which deals with labour market regulations.
2.2. Attracting highly skilled workers from third countries
The migration of cheap labour from the newly attached EU countries 
was not the only migration of significance to Nordic industry during the 
economic boom before 2008. Technologically advanced industries in the 
Nordic countries were constantly in need of highly educated professionals. 
Many came from labour markets outside the EU, and employers put pressure 
on the Nordic governments to renew the legislation. In Denmark, the 2001 
legislation has allowed the introduction of later adjustments in order to 
meet the employers’ needs. Sweden adopted an amendment in late 2008 and 
Norway passed a new law in 2010. In 2009, Finland undertook the process of 
changing its 2004 legislation. A bill was presented to the Finnish parliament 
in late 2009 (RP 269/2009 rd) but, with reference to the difficult economic 
situation in Finland, the parliament refused to pass the amendment. Since 
then, there have been only minor amendments to the law in order to comply 
with EU regulations.
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All of the Nordic countries are attempting to find the right balance 
between recruiting highly educated foreign workers from third countries 
while at the same time protecting the domestic and European labour market 
from competition. In order to protect the European labour market, all EU 
Member States, as well as Norway and Iceland, as members of the European 
Economic Area (EEA), have to subject third-country workers to a labour 
market test or a quota system, or both. Norway, Finland and Iceland have 
applied a labour market test conducted by a public authority. Denmark uses 
a model to measure labour demand as a labour market test, in order to 
administratively pick out professions entitled to apply for work and work 
permits in Denmark. Sweden has chosen a different approach. Here it is 
left to the employer to carry out a labour market test by advertising the job 
through the European Employments Service (EURES). In Finland, the 
government presented a bill to the parliament in 2009, suggesting that the 
same system was introduced in Finland, but the bill was turned down. It is 
a requirement in all of the Nordic countries that an applicant from a third 
country, in order to obtain a work permit, must present a work contract or 
a work contract offer. This, together with the labour market test, means that 
work migration to the Nordic counties is demand-driven.
All of the Nordic countries have established a demand-driven system for 
recruiting highly educated workers from third countries. Work immigration is 
conducted through the employers’ demand for labour, and it is the employers’ 
choice of employees which selects the immigrants. This has led to changes 
in the regulation to make it easier for employers to hire workers from third 
countries. A demand-driven approach to labour migration has become more 
common in most OECD countries.
The Nordic governments have, however, introduced special regulations to 
facilitate the employment of selected groups of third-country professionals. 
Norway has established a quota of 5,000 specialists and skilled workers that 
can be filled with third-country employees without any labour market test. 
However, qualifications must be documented. Denmark, Finland and Iceland 
have similar regulations covering highly skilled workers or specialists. In 
the case of specialists, both Norway and Denmark have introduced a wage 
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threshold above which a third-country specialist may be employed without 
a test of qualifications. If the employer pays a wage above the threshold, the 
worker is recognised as a specialist. This simplifies the process by which the 
immigration authorities approve the qualifications.
Sweden is the country that has gone furthest in giving employers leeway 
in recruiting. Finland may follow. In Sweden no government or social partners 
are involved in carrying out a labour market test to single out occupations or 
industrial sectors open for immigration. Denmark and Norway have opened 
the same gate, but only for skilled workers and workers with higher education. 
Regulation is achieved through salary level or quotas.
Supply-driven work immigration has been shown to have limitations. 
Although the state might succeed in making foreign labour available in the 
domestic labour market, employers have often been reluctant to hire foreigners. 
This may be because of uncertainty in determining qualifications, or it may 
be because the migrants do not have the right qualifications.
Denmark is the country that has gone furthest among the Nordic countries 
in creating a supply of foreign labour. The introduction of a Green Card scheme 
is the best example. Denmark has also established a Work in Denmark Centre 
in New Delhi, in order to woo Indian professionals and attract educated 
workers to Denmark (Hansen & Boesen 2010, 22–24). Despite the fact that 
Sweden, Norway and Finland have been the most demand-driven in their 
political approach to immigration, we find examples of state policy aimed to 
increase the supply of foreign labour in the local labour market. One example 
is that foreign students have been allowed to stay longer in the country to 
seek employment after they have completed their studies.
Awakened by the competition from newly industrialised countries (NIC 
countries) from the 1980s onward, the industrial OECD countries directed 
their attention towards the significance of a highly educated workforce to 
economic growth. Countries like Canada, Australia and the United States 
decided to stimulate the immigration of highly educated workers from 
developing countries and NIC countries. In the EU, the migration policy 
was coordinated after the millennium. Access for workers from third countries 
was facilitated, particularly for highly educated workers.
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2.3. Leaving the unskilled behind?
The Nordic countries’ legislation concerning third country citizens makes it 
easier for migrants with higher education to get a job in a Nordic country, 
while in many cases, unskilled workers are denied access to the labour markets. 
Is that fair? In Norway and Sweden the governments have directed attention 
to the benefits of labour migration to unskilled workers, and to the concept 
of circular migration. Circular migration occurs when a work migrant returns 
to the country of origin or to another country after a certain period with 
work in a receiving country. Circular migration may increase remittances 
to developing countries and lead to transfer of knowledge, and it will most 
likely also give a more productive use of the labour resources. The Global 
Commission on International Migration (GCIM) has suggested that, “States 
and International Organizations should formulate policies and programs 
that maximise the developmental impact of return and circular migration” 
(GCIM 2005, 31).
However, there are social and personal costs connected to migration, and 
historically circular migration has proven difficult to achieve, as migrants tend 
to stay when they have been in the receiving country for a longer period. 
Two questions can be raised:
 · Is it right to prohibit the migration of unskilled workers if such 
migration promotes development in the sender country and a more 
equal share of global wealth?
 · Can circular migration offer a solution that ensures the interests 
of both sender countries and receiving countries if migration of 
unskilled workers takes place?
Western European immigration policy has been strongly influenced by the 
receiving countries’ own needs for labour in terms of unskilled workers as 
well as highly educated labour. However, the experience of many European 
countries has been that circular migration proves difficult to achieve. At the 
end of the 1970s, it was clear that the guest worker system, which presupposed 
circular migration, did not function according to the theory. Not all of the 
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workers did return, and immigration continued to rise because of family 
reunification. A migrant could have several reasons to stay. They could 
experience changes in the family situation or find it hard to find employment 
in their homeland, and the right to welfare service and social security in the 
receiving country would make it easier to stay in times of economic recession.
In a Swedish Government Official Report from 2010, a Swedish committee 
expects circular migration to increase in the future (SOU 2010:40). The 
committee points to the relation between migration and development, 
and encourages the Swedish government to support and facilitate circular 
migration. The Swedish legislation from 2008 is a step in this direction which 
includes unskilled workers as well. The legislation does not discriminate 
unskilled work migrants as the Danish and Norwegian legislation does.
In Norway, the government wishes to promote circular migration for job-
seekers from developing countries, but has also signalled that it is important 
to prevent brain drain from developing countries (St.meld. nr. 18 (2007–2008), 
215). The Norwegian government supports special migration programmes 
for exchange or circular migration. Some of these involve unskilled workers. 
Migration programs for seasonal workers and au pairs are the most commonly 
used. Approximately 4,000 resident permits are granted annually for these 
groups (Seip et al. 2010, 46). A report from the Fafo Institute for Labour and 
Social Research (Seip et al. 2010) examines these programmes and concludes 
that to have a significant impact on development through remittances, such 
programmes have to take in a large number of migrants. Today this is not 
an actual policy. A study of the au pair scheme in Norway showed that the 
primary reason to employ an au pair is to manage everyday life at home, 
including getting help with regular domestic work. The aspect of cultural 
exchange, as the basis for the au pair scheme, is given little consideration 
(Øien 2009, 87). The study demonstrates that the demand for domestic workers 
in Norway is high. The use of foreign labour for different kinds of work in 
households is much more common in Norway than in the other Nordic 
countries, according to a survey undertaken in 2006 (Dølvik & Eldring 2008, 
35). A smooth running economy and increasing wealth, together with a high 
rate of women participating in the labour force, has created a demand for 
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domestic services not seen in a long time in Norway. If this development 
continues, it may create changes in Norwegian culture and class structure. 
If the import of unskilled labour creates inequality and other undesirable 
changes in Nordic societies, can increased investment in education abroad 
become an alternative strategy? Access to highly educated workers from third 
countries will become increasingly important to industrialised areas, including 
the Nordic countries, in the years ahead. As a result, a global labour market 
will develop for this category of migrants, followed by a homogenisation of 
the educational systems and qualification grading, as we have seen in Europe 
and in the OECD area. 
As an alternative, or a supplement, to hunting for highly educated labour 
abroad, rich countries can contribute to generating more available knowledge 
through education. Why should the Nordic countries not fund the education 
of young people in developing countries? This would bring development and 
prosperity not only to individuals and developing countries, but also to the 
world economy. A strategy that aims at increasing the number of highly 
educated people in developing countries as part of a recruitment strategy 
would make it more legitimate to recruit educated professionals from poorer 
countries to work in the Nordic countries. If we educated 400 nurses in India, 
could we not offer employment to 200 of them in the Nordic countries?
3. Migration and regulation of national labour markets
The new conditions in the Nordic labour markets caused by increased migration 
has ignited a discussion on regulation of wages and working conditions, and 
a search for mechanisms in accordance with common EU regulations. In 
Europe, statutory minimum wages are widespread. Their original function 
was to protect workers against extreme forms of exploitation. Some have 
argued that minimum wages can be used to reduce wage differences and 
fight poverty. The increasing migration in the European labour market has 
brought the debate on minimum wages onto the agenda again. The different 
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system of labour market regulation in Europe makes it difficult to apply one 
single definition of a minimum wage to all countries.
3.1. Social dumping and low wage pressure
The significant influx of foreign workers into the Nordic labour markets 
from EU countries after 2004 was followed by reports on poor wages and 
working conditions, especially for posted workers. A survey among Polish 
workers in Norway reported that a significant proportion of these workers 
had wages and working hours that violated national standards (Friberg & 
Tyldum 2007). Along with low wages followed problems concerning poor 
residential conditions, unregistered work, unpaid wages, hazardous work, 
lack of access to health services and coercion and threats. These social and, 
in some instances, unlawful, conditions required measures of different kinds. 
In Norway the government intensified its supervision of the labour market 
and strengthened the sanctions at the disposal of the Labour Inspection 
Authority. In all of the Nordic countries, problems concerning the regulation 
mechanisms for wage levels were discussed.
The problem of social dumping has been brought to a head in the 
context of posted workers. The EU Posted Workers Directive (PWD) is a 
directive concerned with undertakings to post employees abroad temporarily 
to perform work in the territory of an EU member state other than the 
state in which they are habitually employed (Directive 96/71/EC). Posted 
workers are employed in the country of origin, and their work is regarded 
as the transnational provision of services in the internal market. Under the 
Posted Workers Directive, the host county can enforce laws, regulations and 
administrative provisions pertaining to minimum wages, working hours and 
specific social benefits. These minimum standards can also be enforced by 
collective agreements which have been declared universally applicable.
The EU does not have any authority to issue directives or enact other 
regulations with regard to wage setting. The EU regulation thus rests upon 
a presumption that minimum standards exist, or that such standards will 
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be established if necessary. But is this presumption applicable in all of the 
European countries? As we shall see, the regulatory mechanisms for minimum 
wages are different across the European countries. Eldring and Alsos (2012, 
8) distinguish between three types of minimum wage: 
Statutory minimum wage. Determined by legislation or pursuant to 
legislation. Commonly one rate for all adult employees, valid throughout 
the labour market. Motivated by a desire to ensure a decent living standard. 
This kind of statutory minimum wage is not found in the Nordic countries.
Extended minimum wage. Expansion of the coverage area of the 
minimum wages determined by collective agreements to have validity in an 
entire region, industry and/or profession, irrespective of whether the employer 
and/or employee is organised. Extension of collective agreements is common 
in Finland and Iceland, and has been introduced in Norway in recent years.
Collectively agreed minimum wage. Negotiated between the parties to 
form a collective agreement to reflect the employers’ minimum ability to pay, 
but can be supplemented with local rates. Collectively bargained minimum 
wages are of great importance in the Nordic countries. 
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Table 8.1. Distribution of statutory minimum wage and extension of collective 
agreements in the EU (and Iceland and Norway).
Statutory  
minimum wage
Extension of collective 
agreements possible
Scope of  
extension
Belgium X X High
Bulgaria X X Not used
Czech Republic X X High
Estonia X X Low
France X X High
Greece X X High (recently reduced)
Hungary X X Low
Ireland X X Low
Latvia X X Not used
Lithuania X X Not used
Luxembourg X X Low
Netherlands X X High
Poland X X Not used
Portugal X X High
Romania X X High
Slovakia X X Low
Slovenia X X Low
Spain X X High
Cyprus X
Malta X
UK X
Austria X Low
Finland X High
Germany X Low
Iceland X High
Norway X Low
Denmark
Italy
Sweden
Source: Eldring & Alsos 2012, 10.
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3.2. Statutory minimum wage 
A statutory minimum wage is found in many EU countries. How a statutory 
minimum wage is determined may vary from country to country. Usually, 
statutory minimum wages are guaranteed for all employees, with exemptions 
or reduced rates for young people. Some countries differentiate the rate on 
grounds of disability or skills.
The proportion of the population receiving the minimum wage varies 
significantly in Europe. In Greece over 20% of full-time employees received 
the minimum wage in 2007. In France and Bulgaria, the figure was just over 
12%, whereas the UK, Slovakia and Spain all had a proportion below 2% of 
full-time employees who received the minimum wage. 
The minimum wage levels may vary as well. In countries such as 
Luxembourg, France and the Netherlands, the hourly minimum pay was 
between 8 and 11 Euro in January 2012. Most countries in Central and Eastern 
Europe had a minimum wage level below 2 Euro per hour. 
3.3. Extension of collective agreements
In many European countries, minimum wages and other provisions in 
collective agreements are made generally applicable. The most common 
procedure is to apply major parts of the collective agreement to the entire 
industry or profession that falls under the scope of the agreement (Eldring 
& Alsos 2012, 8). This procedure, founded on the law, makes the regulations 
and provisions of a collective agreement binding for unorganised employers 
and non-unionised employees, and thereby establishes a minimum wage 
level in the industry.
Among the Nordic countries, Finland, Iceland and Norway have made 
use of legislation to extend the scope of collective agreements by making 
them generally applicable. In Finland, it is a regular procedure to make all 
nationwide collective agreements which cover more than 50% of an industry 
generally applicable (Seip 2010, 26). An amendment to the legislation on 
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posted workers in 2005 intended to provide a minimum wage to foreign 
workers who were not covered by a collective agreement (Seip 2010, 29).
Norway has chosen to make use of statutory extension of collective 
agreements only in specific industries. It is a precondition for enforcing 
the extension “that it is probable that foreign workers perform work under 
conditions that are generally inferior to the norms stipulated in nationwide 
collective agreements for the relevant occupation or industry, or to the general 
conditions prevailing in the relevant location or trade” (Alsos & Eldring 
2008, 447). By an extension, core elements of a valid collective agreement 
are made applicable to all workers, unionised and non-unionised alike, who 
perform work of the same type in a specific industry. The effects of these 
regulations are uncertain. Different studies suggest that the effect of the 
extension mechanism is stronger in certain parts of the industry (Alsos & 
Eldring 2008, 453). One of the reasons for this is significant problems with 
regard to the monitoring and enforcement of the extensions in industries 
with many small operators, such as the construction industry. In the onshore 
petroleum industry, the conditions have proven much better (Alsos & Ødegård 
2007, 77). As in other European countries, the Norwegian government’s goal 
has been to facilitate employment across borders in the European labour 
market, but avoid unacceptable or illegal working conditions for immigrants.
3.4. Enforcement of wages by trade unions
None of the Nordic countries has statutory minimum wage. These countries 
have based their industrial relation system on high trade union density and 
bargaining of collectively agreed minimum wages. The minimum wage 
adopted in a collective agreement will only apply to the parties to the 
agreement. Employers who are committed by an agreement also have to 
follow the agreement with regard to unorganised employees.
For this system of minimum wages to have any effect on the lower wage 
levels, it is important that union density is high and that the coverage of 
collective agreements is extensive. In Table 8.2 we can see that the trade union 
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density varies from 54% in Norway to 85% in Iceland, with the three other 
countries at 69%. This gives a fairly high coverage of collective agreements, 
even in Denmark and Sweden, which do not make use of the procedure 
of extending collective agreements. In these countries, the enforcement of 
minimum wages is left solely to the trade unions. Most employers in Sweden 
are organised and obliged, as members of an employer’s organisation, to follow 
a collective agreement. This gives very high collective agreement coverage in 
Sweden without the use of an extension mechanism.
Table 8.2. Collective agreement coverage and trade union density in the Nordic 
countries.
Collective agreement coverage 2008/2009 Trade union density 2008/2009
Denmark 80% 69%
Finland 90% 69%
Iceland 99% 85%
Norway 74% 54%
Sweden 91% 69%
Source: Eldring & Alsos 2012, 10.
When it comes to the increasing influx of foreign labour, Denmark and 
Sweden have based their policy on the ability of the trade unions to negotiate 
collective agreements with the foreign companies. In Sweden, this resulted in 
a conflict in Vaxholm, the so called Laval case, where the Swedish legislation 
was criticised by the European Court of Justice. Before the Laval case, 
Swedish trade unions regularly forced foreign enterprises to sign collective 
agreements through the use of blockades, to ensure that the foreign workers 
received wages in accordance with the Swedish wage levels. When subjected 
to blockade, the Latvian enterprise Laval claimed that such measures violated 
EU regulations on the equal treatment and free movement of labour and 
services. The European Court of Justice found the form of industrial action 
carried out by the Swedish union against Laval to be in violation of EU 
regulation. A Swedish commission concluded in 2008 that the Swedish 
legislation was in conflict with EU regulations (SOU 2008:123).
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The verdict from the European Court and the conclusion that the Swedish 
method of enforcing the use of collective agreement was illegal in the EU has 
presented a challenge to the Swedish and Danish system of labour market 
regulation. The trade unions lost their right to use industrial action to force 
foreign employers to adopt a local collective agreement. Both countries found 
it necessary to amend their national legislation.
Since neither of the two countries have any schemes for the extension of 
collective agreements, and national opposition to statutory minimum wages 
is significant, the countries have decided to rely on a section in the EU 
directive which makes it possible for countries without a system of extension 
of collective agreements to ensure that collectively agreed provisions will 
also apply to posted workers. The EU Posted Workers Directive has an 
opening in Article  3.8. In the absence of a system for declaring collective 
agreements universally applicable, member states of the EU can decide to 
enforce minimum wages and minimum standards in two alternative ways, 
of which Sweden has chosen the first and Denmark the latter.
If a collective agreement is “generally applicable to all similar undertakings 
in the geographical area and in the profession or industry concerned”, or 
if a collective agreement has “been concluded by the most representative 
employers’ and labour organisations at national level and [… is] applied 
throughout national territory”, the states can ensure equality of treatment 
on matters pertaining to minimum wage or minimum standards (Directive 
96/71/EC). Sweden has adopted the first strategy, which seems to imply 
that the collective agreement must de facto cover the whole industry like 
an extended agreement. Denmark has adopted the latter strategy. Under the 
conditions stated in the directive, the Swedish and Danish trade unions can 
use industrial actions to enforce minimum wages.
3.5. Dispute over the minimum wage in Norway
In Norway, minimum wages are stated in collective agreements in combination 
with local rate supplements. In some industries, the collective agreement is 
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made generally applicable through a regulation pursuant to legislation. In 
this system, the minimum wage may comprise several wage elements. This 
caused a dispute between the employers and the unions over what kinds of 
wage element would be in accordance with the EU regulation. 
In the period after 2004, several shipyards on the West coast of Norway 
have been using foreign labour in their production. In 2011, one of the largest 
companies used posted workers in 20% to 40% of the work laid down in the 
shipyards. According to the regulation in 2008 which made the collective 
agreement in the maritime construction industry generally applicable, these 
workers were entitled to a minimum wage per hour. In addition to this, 
the regulation allowed the workers 37.5 work hours per week; extra pay for 
overtime work; additional remuneration to the basic hourly wage for work 
assignments requiring overnight stays away from home; free board and lodging 
in the case of work assignments that require overnight stays away from home; 
and coverage of travel expenses for “a reasonable number of home visits”.3 
Employers in the maritime construction industry found that this regulation 
gave better terms of employment than the minimum standard stated in the 
EU regulation, and brought the case before the court to void the regulation.
The employers lost the case in the Norwegian lower law courts. But in 
an advisory opinion from the EFTA Court, the employers were heard. The 
EFTA Court was established to deal with cases concerning Norway, Iceland 
and Liechtenstein, as members of the European Economic Area, and was 
asked to judge whether the terms and conditions of employment provided 
for in the collective agreement, declared universally applicable within the 
maritime construction industry in Norway, was compatible with the EU 
regulation, specifically Article  36 in the EEA agreement, and the Posted 
Workers Directive (PWD). In the EU and in the European Economic Area 
(EEA), the work of a posted worker is regarded a provision of service across 
borders within the territory of the European Economic Area, and the EU 
regulation (Article 36) prohibits restrictions on the provision of such services.
3  Regulation FOR-2010-12-20-1764, Forskrift om delvis allmenngjøring av Verkstedsoverenskomsten 
for skips- og verftsindustrien. My translation.
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However, a host country can enforce minimum standards concerning 
wages and terms of employment. These standards are explicitly mentioned 
in the mandatory catalogue of the EU Posted Workers Directive (Directive 
96/71/EC, Article  3-1). Terms and conditions of employment for posted 
workers on other matters than stated in Article  3-1 of the directive can 
only be applied by a member state “in the case of public policy provisions”, 
interpreted by the EU commission as “those mandatory rules from which 
there can be no derogation and which, by their nature and objective, meet 
the imperative requirements of the public interest.”4
In its advisory opinion, the EFTA Court found that two of the clauses 
in the collective agreement could be in breach of the EU regulation. The 
court stated that the EU regulation, in principle, precludes an EEA state 
from requiring a foreign company to pay an additional remuneration to the 
basic hourly wage for work assignments requiring overnight stays away from 
home. Nor did the Posted Workers Directive permit an EEA State to secure 
workers posted to its territory from another EEA State compensation for 
travel, board and lodging expenses in the case of work assignments requiring 
overnight stays away from home. The EFTA Court found that these terms and 
conditions of employment in the collective agreement were not compatible 
with the EU regulation, “unless the provision of such terms can be justified 
on the basis of public policy provision.” (EFTA Court 2012.) In light of this 
judgment, the employers of the Norwegian shipyards seemed to have won 
support of their view, and a victory which in turn would give them lower 
labour costs.
After a loss in the lower courts of law, the employers appealed to the 
Norwegian Supreme Court, with the advisory opinion from the EFTA Court 
representing their best argument. However, the Norwegian Supreme Court 
found the agreement’s provisions to be in accordance with the EU regulation. 
The additional remuneration to the basic hourly wage for work assignments 
requiring overnight stays away from home was founded in the Posted Workers 
4  Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the Economic and 
Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions – The implementation of Directive 96/71/EC in 
the Member States, 25/7/2003 (52003DC0458).
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Directive. The remuneration was a minimum wage provision, and gave the 
workers concerned a genuine benefit which significantly added to their social 
protection (NSC 2013, Section  116). The national court disagreed with the 
employers and the EFTA Court, in that this remuneration, because of the costs 
involved, would reduce the job opportunities for foreign workers to the extent 
that the clause on additional remuneration would be to their disadvantage. 
The Supreme Court added that there will always be a risk that increased 
social protection will create higher costs and result in a weakening of the 
labour market. This risk cannot alter the genuine character of a minimum 
wage as an objective advantage for the worker, the Norwegian Supreme 
Court argued (NSC 2013, Section 110–115). 
Concerning the free board and lodging, and coverage of the travel expenses 
for “a reasonable number of home visits”, the EFTA Court had found that 
this could not be regarded as “pay”, neither could it fall within any other of 
the matters listed in the Posted Workers Directive’s Article  3-1. Hence it 
could only be justified on the basis of public policy provision.
The Norwegian Supreme Court seemed to disagree, but found it 
unnecessary to settle whether or not such provisions would fall within the 
Article  3-1 of the Posted Workers Directive, because this clause regarding 
free board and lodging and coverage of the travel expenses, “under any 
circumstances”, is required as a public policy provision (NSC 2013, Section 155). 
The Supreme Court found it sufficiently proved that the clause under concern, 
made generally applicable, was necessary for the prevention of the Norwegian 
model of wage setting and cooperation among the social partners. If the clause 
were removed from the Norwegian regulation concerning foreign workers 
in the maritime construction industry, this could a cause chain reaction to 
other industries, and herby undermine the institutionalised practice of the 
social partners in Norwegian working life (NSC 2013, Section 170).
In its verdict, the Norwegian Supreme Court defined the minimum wage 
in correspondence with the Norwegian system of wage setting in collective 
agreements. In this system, several elements can make up the minimum 
compensation which employers have to pay their workers. The verdict shows 
that it is possible, within the EU and EEA regulations, to defend social 
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standards, jeopardised by extensive migration within the open European 
labour market, by means of collective agreements. For the maintenance of 
the Nordic labour market model, this is important.
4. Conclusion
The increasing work migration that is occurring all over the world takes place 
in three different labour markets: the national market; the common European 
market; and the global labour market. Each of these markets is subjected to 
specific regulations concerning the nation state involved. 
The Nordic countries have chosen a demand-driven migration policy in 
the global labour market, to pick out the highly skilled workers from third 
countries that they need. Educated immigrants with a job are welcome. On 
the other hand, the immigration of unskilled workers from the same third 
countries is restricted by regulation. These immigrants are not welcome in the 
Nordic countries, with the exception of Sweden, even with a job offer at hand. 
The national labour markets of the Nordic countries have been shaped by 
traditions and national regulations since the 19th century. In this regulation, 
the use of collective agreements as a means to set minimum wages has been 
fundamental. When the European labour market was created in 1957 by the 
founding nations of the European Economic Community, this started a long 
process of shaping a common labour market through EU regulation. One of 
the major shifts came with the accession of the new Member States in 2004 
and in 2007, and the significant work migration that it created in Europe. 
This migration led to instances of social dumping in many countries, and 
gave reason for further regulation, both at a national and a European level. 
In this on-going process, a political fight is taking place. The question is how 
to protect social standards without imperilling the free competition of the 
European market. The different ways in which a minimum wage is set in the 
European stats makes this not only a fight over the interests of employers 
and employees, but a fight over the interests of states as well. 
186
ÅSMUND ARUP SEIP
References
Alsos, Kristin, and Line Eldring (2008), ‘Labour mobility and wage dumping: The case of 
Norway’, European journal of Industrial Relations, 14 (4), pp. 441–459.
Alsos, Kristin, and Anne Mette Ødegård (2007), Sikrer Norges framtid på minstelønn. 
Østeuropeisk arbeidskraft på petroleumsanlegg på land, Fafo-rapport 2007:32, Norway: 
Allkopi AS.
Directive 96/71/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 1996 
concerning the posting of workers in the framework of the provision of services (Posted 
Workers Directive).
Dølvik, Jon Erik, and Line Eldring (2008), Mobility of Labour From New EU states to the 
Nordic Region – Development Trends and Consequences, TemaNord 2008:537, Nordic 
Council of Ministers, Denmark: Ekspressen Tryk & Kopicenter.
EFTA Court (2012), Judgement of the Court 23 January 2012, in Case E-2/11.
Eldring, Line, and Kristin Alsos (2012), European Minimum Wage: A Nordic Outlook, Fafo-
report 2012:16, Norway: Allkopi AS. 
Friberg, Jon Horgen, and Guri Tydlum (eds) (2007), Polonia i Oslo. En studie av arbeids- og 
levekår blant polakker i hovedstadsområdet, Fafo-rapport 2007:27, Norway: Allkopi AS.
The Global Commission on International Migration (GCIM) (2005), Migration in an 
Interconnected World: New Directions for Action. Report of the Global Commission on 
International Migration, October 2005, Switzerland: SRO-Kundig.
Hansen, Nana Wesley, and Anne Marie Boesen (2010), ‘Danmark’, in Nana Wesley Hansen, 
Åsmund Arup Seip and Line Eldring (eds), Rekruttering av kompetansearbeidskraft fra 
tredjeland til Norden. – Reguleringer, strategier og realiteter, TemaNord 2010:536, Nordic 
Council of Ministers, Denmark: Kailow Express ApS, pp. 19–45.
Napierala, Joanna, and Paulina Trevena (2007), ‘Motiver for å reise ut’, in Jon Horgen Friberg 
and Guri Tydlum (eds), Polonia i Oslo. En studie av arbeids- og levekår blant polakker i 
hovedstadsområdet, Fafo-rapport 2007:27, Norway: Allkopi AS, pp. 19–26.
Norwegian Supreme Court (NSC) (2013), Verdict of 5 March 2013 in Case 2012/1447.
Seip, Åsmund Arup (2007), Jakten på kompetanse. Bruk av utenlandsk arbeidskraft i norsk 
industri, Fafo-rapport 2007:12, Norway: Allkopi AS.
Seip, Åsmund Arup (2010), ‘Allmenngjøring i Finland’, in Torgeir Aarvaag Stokke (ed.), 
Allmenngjøring i EU og Norge, Fafo-rapport 2010:14, pp. 25–39.
Seip, Åsmund Arup, Kaja Reegård and Anne Marte Skaland (2010), Sirkulær migrasjon. 
Midlertidig arbeidsinnvandring av ufaglært arbeidskraft fra utviklingsland, Fafo rapport 
2010:29, Norway: Allkopi AS.
Statens Offentliga Utredningar (SOU) (2008:123), Förslag till åtgärder med anledning av 
Lavaldomen, Betänkande av Lavalutredningen, Stockholm: Edita Sverige AB.
187
WORK MIGRATION AND LABOUR MARKET REGULATIONS IN THE NORDIC COUNTRIES
Statens Offentliga Utredningar (SOU) (2010:40), Cirkulär migration och utveckling 
– kartläggning av cirkulära rörelsemönster och diskussion om hur migrationens 
utvecklingspotential kan främjas, Delbetänkande av Kommittén för cirkulär migration 
och utveckling, Stockholm: Elanders Sverige AB.
Stortingsmelding (St.meld.) nr. 18 (2007–2008), Arbeidsinnvandring, Det Kongelige arbeids- 
og inkluderingsdepartementet, Norway: 07 Gruppen AS.
Øien, Cecilie (2009), On equal terms? An evaluation of the Norwegian au pair scheme, Fafo-
report 2009:29, Norway: Allkopi AS.
188
Chapter 9
Family migration, gender equality and  
the Nordic welfare state 
Opposing policy processes
Saara Pellander
Migrant family relations have shifted from being neglected in both public 
debates and research to becoming one of the most central migration and 
integration policy issues in European countries (Kofman et al. 2013).The 
regulation of family migration can be divided into two different policy logics 
used by parliamentarians when they defend certain policies that target family 
migrants. The first policy logic is related to social exclusion and the economy 
of the welfare state. I call this process ‘economic gatekeeping’, referring to 
the fact that family reunification policies try to ‘filter’ those migrants who 
are expected to have a certain socio-economic background. This aspect of 
regulating family migration will be explored in the first analytical section. 
In the second part of my analysis, I will show how the migrant woman has 
moved from the margins of the migration debate to the centre, and now 
features in political arguments for the restriction of family migration policies 
and integration requirements. This second policy logic is related to gender 
equality, and represents what I call ‘moral gatekeeping’ (Wray 2011a). Here, 
the perception of the oppression of migrant women is used to introduce 
restrictive policy measures. In the concluding part, I will look at how the 
aims and outcomes of the policy processes described above contradict one 
another. Before exploring the processes of economic and moral gatekeeping, 
I will provide an introduction to the issue of family migration, defining what 
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it is, how it is regulated in the Nordic countries, and how family migration 
is linked to welfare state policies.
1. What is family migration?
Family migration is the migration of family members to either form a 
family or reunite with their family members. Family migration can thus 
mean immigration by which residents in the receiving country are united 
with immediate family members who are living in another country. This is 
often referred to as family reunion: the completion of relocation of a family. 
Marriage migration also falls under the category of family migration. Marriage 
migration refers to the migration of one partner to the country of residence 
of the spouse. Marriage migration can either be inter-ethnic, so between two 
spouses of different ethnic origin, or in cases of chain migration or so called 
‘homeland’ marriage of the second generation, intra-ethnic (Charsley 2012).
Family ties have grown to be the most common reason for being granted 
residence permits in Europe. Migration scholarship has for a long time 
neglected family migration, and viewed it as secondary to labour migration 
(Kofman 2004). Family members were seen as mere followers of labour 
migrants. Recently, marriage and other family ties have started to attract 
scholarly interest, and, besides single country studies, there is a growing 
body of literature on family and marriage migration across different countries 
and contexts (see Charsley 2012; Kraler et al. 2012; Grillo 2008). This paper 
focuses particularly on the way in which family and marriage migration is 
connected to the gendered norms of the welfare state. The gendered norms 
of the regulation of family migration have particularly been explored by legal 
scholars (Wray 2011b; de Hart 2009; van Walsum 2008). A few scholars have 
explicitly connected family and marriage migration to questions related to 
the Nordic welfare state (cf. Eggebø 2010).
The interaction of immigration control and family norms offers insight 
into some of the central debates that have grown ever more topical in the 
Nordic countries. Immigration critics often refer to the control of immigration 
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as a way of protecting the welfare state (see for example Pyrhönen 2013). In 
most of the Nordic countries,1 migrant residents with legal resident permits 
have similar entitlements to social benefits to other citizens, because of the 
Nordic countries’ residence-based welfare state system (Lister et al. 2007, 86). 
While many migrants are subject to a number of exclusionary practices – 
which will be discussed later – the most effective way of excluding migrants 
from the welfare state is to not grant them entry into the country in the first 
place. I will thus first introduce some of the key elements of the regulation 
of family migration to the Nordic countries.
2. Policies and regulations on family migration 
Legislation on family migration regulates the immigration of immediate 
family members. The definition of who is considered to be a family member 
in immigration regulations differs between EU and non-EU migrants, because 
the regulation of family migration distinguishes between two different 
categories. For the movement of citizens of an EU member state or of 
the European Economic Area (EEA), the applicable regulation is the EU 
directive on free movement within the EU member states (Directive 2004/38/
EC). Each country has national regulations which regulate the migration 
of people from outside the EU/EEA to join family members living in that 
country. These two sets of rules interact when EU citizens move to another 
EU country and exercise their right to move and reside freely. After having 
lived in another EU country, EU citizens obtain, in addition to other social, 
political and civil rights, the right to bring their family members. As the 
definition of family members is broader for family members of EU citizens 
than for other nationals, some couples in which one of the spouses is an 
EU citizen migrate to another country in order to become EU ‘free mover’ 
1  With the exception of Denmark, which has departed from the Nordic principle of universalism in 
2002 by introducing a so-called ’start help’ for incoming migrants during their first seven years in 
Denmark. This benefit is lower than social assistance and thus creates a system with two different 
standards for welfare provisions for native citizens and migrants.
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migrants (Carrera 2005). The best known example of this is when couples 
move from Denmark to neighbouring Sweden to escape the strict Danish 
rules on family reunification (cf. Wagner 2014).
Generally, three types of family members qualify for family reunion. Family 
members who migrate through family reunification are either the children of 
a resident, are the parents or guardians of an under-aged child residing in the 
country, or are a partner who is married, co-habiting or living in a registered 
partnership with the resident. In exceptional cases, it can be possible to bring 
other relatives such as elderly parents. In the case of elderly relatives, most 
countries require proof that these relatives are totally dependent on the child 
living abroad and are not able to obtain care in their country of residence. 
For EU citizens who live in another EU member state and who have family 
members outside the EU, the definition of a ‘family’ is broader, and parents 
of adult children can also join their child in another EU/EEA country. 
Figure 9.1. Composition of migratory ﬂows. Percentage of ﬂow of permanent migrants.
The EU directive for family reunification (2003/86/EC) lays out some 
general rules for the family reunification of so-called third country nationals, 
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referring to migrants from countries that are not members of the EU or the 
European trade agreement. However, the directive has not been adopted by 
Denmark, Ireland or the United Kingdom. Norway is not a member of the 
European Union, but is obliged, as a member of the European Economic 
Area (EEA) and party to the Schengen Agreement (borderless Europe), to 
adopt EU regulations. A working group set up by the Finnish Ministry for 
the Interior compared Finland, Sweden, Norway and Denmark’s regulations, 
and found that Finland and Sweden have quite similar regulations on family 
migration, while Denmark and Norway are more similar to each other than 
to Sweden or Finland (Sisäasiainministeriön maahanmuutto-osasto 2012). 
Almost all countries require some sort of minimum income from either 
the incoming migrant or the so-called ‘sponsor’, the family member who is 
already a resident and is seeking to be unified with a family member from 
abroad, with certain exemptions. In Finland, for example, there is only an 
income requirement for family members wishing to join a non-Finnish/
Nordic/EU/ETA-sponsor. Some humanitarian migrants are also exempted. 
There is no minimum for how long the Finnish sponsor has to have lived 
in Finland (which Norway requires for family establishment and Denmark 
for both family reunification and establishment, with certain exemptions). 
There are no housing requirements in Finland. Denmark has a housing 
requirement, which is not applied when underage children are moving to be 
with their parents. Norway only has housing requirements for some groups 
of migrants coming from outside the ‘nuclear family’. Sweden has a housing 
requirement, but refugees and children are exempted (Sisäasiainministeriön 
maahanmuutto-osasto 2012). Denmark is the only Nordic country with an age 
limit for marriage migration – both the sponsor and the incoming migrant 
must be at least 24 years old.
Family relations are the main ground for granting residence permits 
in Europe and the Nordic countries. Resident permits on family grounds 
make up about 30% of all residents permit decisions in the Nordic countries, 
with the exception of Denmark, which decreased from around 30% between 
1988 and 2001 to only 9% in 2010. The number of family migrants has thus 
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gone down rapidly since Denmark introduced tighter restrictions on family 
reunification after 2001.
Finland has also recently tightened the requirements for family 
reunification. Finland introduced biometric residence permits at the beginning 
of 2012. These cards include a fingerprint, which means that the migrant 
now has to personally apply for residence permits at the closest Finnish 
embassy. This might often involve travel to another country, a hurdle that 
for both financial and practical reasons can be too difficult to overcome. 
This measure has caused a significant drop in the number of applications 
for family reunification (Maahanmuuttovirasto 2013).
3. The Nordic welfare state and (family) migration
Before proceeding on to introduce the debates on immigration and the 
welfare state, it is vital to critically examine the notion of a Nordic welfare 
state and define what is meant by it. Almost every study that considers 
itself to be research on the welfare state sets off by quoting Gøsta Esping-
Andersen and his distinction of several welfare state regimes (Esping-
Andersen 1990). Despite the fact that his distinction into liberal, corporative 
and social democratic welfare state regimes is widely referred to in welfare 
state literature, is has been criticised from several perspectives. Feminist 
welfare state research has argued that these welfare state classifications do 
not take the gendered nature of welfare states into account (Langan & 
Ostner 1991; Lewis 1992; Orloff 1993; Daly 1994; Hobson 1994; Borchost 
1994; O’Connor 1996; Sainsbury 1996). As a response to this critique, Esping-
Andersen introduced the notion of defamilisation, which refers to policies 
that maximise the individual’s independence from family resources (Esping-
Andersen 1999, 45). Scholars have criticised Andersen’s understanding of 
defamilisation from the perspective of women’s independence, as it measures 
the support of the welfare state to the family, and not how welfare states 
enhance the independence of individual women (Bambra 2004). There has 
also been a growing critique on the way in which literature on welfare state 
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regimes has neglected ethnicity (see, among others, Banting & Kymlicka 
2006; Sainsbury 2012). Another critique of ideal welfare state types highlights 
the fact that research on welfare state models tends to neglect transnational 
historical and empirical trajectories, as Kettunen & Petersen (2011) point out. 
Instead of seeing welfare states as national entities, they argue, welfare states 
should be conceptualised as the result of a transnational movement of ideas 
and policy solutions, each of which carries different historical contingencies. 
Kettunen and Petersen thus suggest that welfare state models should be seen 
as analytical ideal types rather than empirical realities.
The Nordic model has been conceived of as a model with five exceptions 
(Christiansen et al. 2006), and, in line with this, feminist scholars have pointed 
out that the Nordic countries represent five different gender profiles (Bergqvist 
et al. 1999), and that they also differ in their migration histories and policies 
(Mulinari et al. 2009). When referring to the Nordic welfare state in this 
paper, I am not suggesting an ideal type of the Nordic welfare state (see 
also Kettunen 2001). I am using the notion of a Nordic welfare state as an 
analytical tool through which I link the topic of family migration to existing 
welfare state literature that concerns the Nordic welfare states, literature that 
either analyses individual Nordic cases, or which refers to institutional and 
legal similarities between the Nordic countries.
The movement of people into the Nordic countries is older than the 
Nordic welfare state. When scholars speak of the challenge that migration 
poses to the welfare state, they mean more recent migration flows since the 
Second World War. For the purpose of this paper, I will also focus on the 
newer immigration after the Second World War, but still wish to contest 
the idea that migration in the Nordic countries should be conceived of as a 
new phenomenon. Most literature on the Nordic countries describes them 
as being comprised of a rather homogenous population. This perception 
does not account for the existence of traditional ethnic groups such as the 
Sami, the Roma and Muslim Tatars, neither does it account for the role that 
incoming migrants have played in the political, intellectual and economic 
history of the Nordic countries. However, most research on migration to the 
Nordic countries tends to state that diversification of the population only 
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began with the recruitment of a foreign labour force in the post-war period, 
ignoring migration flows that took place in earlier periods.
A growing amount of scholarship has recently been exploring the inter-
relations of immigration and the welfare state (see, among others, Bommes 
& Geddes 2000; Brochmann & Hagelund 2010; Clarke 2004; Kvist et al. 
2012; Banting & Kymlicka 2006; Mau & Burkhardt 2009; Schierup et al. 
2006; Vad Jønsson et al. 2012; Sainsbury 2012). While some scholars argue 
that immigration undermines the reciprocal trust on which the support for an 
encompassing welfare state is based, empirical findings on the issue are mixed. 
Some research finds a positive attitude towards distribution to correlate with 
a larger degree of immigration, while others have identified a weak negative 
correlation between the number of immigrants and support for the welfare 
state (Blomberg 2008; van Oorschoot 2006; Senik et al. 2009).
Restricting immigration has often been justified politically by the limits 
of welfare state resources and the cost of immigration for the welfare state. 
The universal welfare state has been most severely eroded in Denmark, 
where immigrants find themselves falling under specific welfare schemes and 
receiving lower benefits than the national population (Andersen 2007). In her 
comparison of six welfare states, Sainsbury (2012) finds that regardless of the 
welfare state type, migrants are disadvantaged in comparison to native citizens. 
This first systematic comparative analysis of immigrants’ social rights across 
welfare states shows that migrants have fewer employment opportunities, a 
lower standard of living and less access to benefits.
Mulinari and Neergaard (2004) refer to the position of migrants in the 
Nordic welfare state as ‘subordinated inclusion’. In their research on Sweden, 
Mulinari and colleagues show how policies and public debates position 
migrants as a group with a potential claim on welfare state services, and 
not as active contributors to society (Mulinari et al. 2009, 5). The concepts 
of ‘welfare nationalism’ and ‘welfare chauvinism’ capture the ways in which 
excluding policy mechanisms define certain groups that are excluded from 
and discriminated against by the welfare state (Suszycki 2011; Mulinari et 
al. 2009).
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Until the end of the 1990s, immigration policies traditionally targeted 
work-related migrants. Family migrants were seen as mere dependents of 
work migrants, and it is only in the past two decades that research as well 
as policy-making has started to increasingly focus on ‘family migrants’. 
The Nordic countries have recently introduced a number of restrictions 
on family related migration. Family related migration can be viewed as a 
form of unwanted migration ( Joppke 1998; Staver (forthcoming)), while the 
immigration of highly skilled labour has particularly been facilitated in several 
Nordic countries. From a welfare state perspective, the situation of seasonal 
or circular workers is especially problematic, and there are recurring reports 
on the exploitative and precarious employment situations of groups such as 
domestic workers, berry-pickers or construction workers (see, among others, 
Gavanas 2010; Jokinen et al. 2011; Kontula 2010; Lutz & Palenga-Möllenbeck 
2010). Also irregular migrants, migrant sex workers and trafficked migrants 
find themselves on the margins of the welfare state (Lund Thomsen et al. 
2010; Nielsen 2013; Skilbrei & Tveit 2011).
Policies that steer and govern migration have been divided into 
immigration and integration policies. While the two fields of entrance and 
integration policies are traditionally conceptualised as standing apart from 
one another, a recent development has been witnessed of putting in place a 
set of integration standards for the migrant as requirements upon their arrival 
(Borevi (forthcoming); Kofman et al. 2013). In the case of family migration 
policies, these include requirements for a certain type of housing and for 
the sponsor of the moving family not to rely on welfare benefits, as well as 
requirements for language skills and educational background: Denmark has 
the most restrictive set of requirements. I will move on to give two examples 
of this overlap of integration and immigration policies, processes that I call 
economic and moral gatekeeping. Both are linked to calls for the integration 
of migrants, but in their actual outcome lead to a reduction of the numbers 
of incoming family migrants.
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4. Economic gatekeeping 
As stated above, family migration is often considered as ‘unwanted’ migration, 
because of the expectation that most migrants who move for family reasons 
will not integrate into the labour market. Kofman et al. (2013) show in their 
comparative study on family migration policies in Europe that there is a 
common understanding that the integration of migrants has supposedly 
failed. Migrants are said to be marginalised and form “an ethnic underclass” 
(Kofman et al. 2013, 5). In particular, spouses who are uneducated are seen as 
being unable to raise and educate the next generation, and thus as continuing 
to uphold social inequalities ( Joppke 2007; Kofman et al. 2013). Kofman et al. 
argue that the policy response to this argumentation logic is to select migrants 
with a certain background and prevent family formation with spouses who 
might be expected to not demonstrate labour market participation. This 
process of selecting spouses with a certain socio-economic background is 
what I call ‘economic gatekeeping’. In the Nordic countries, this economic 
gatekeeping for family migrants has been established by introducing certain 
income requirements for family migrants and/or their spouses. I will discuss 
how the income requirement has been argued for by policy-makers, and give 
some examples of Swedish and Finnish policy-making.
As I referred to in the introductory part of this chapter, all Nordic countries 
now have an income requirement for family migrants. These requirements 
vary as does the policy as to whether the spouses’ own income is taken into 
account. The income requirement is often justified with the argument that 
it will lead to better integration outcomes ( Jørgensen 2012). Sweden was 
until 2010 the last Nordic country to not require a certain amount of income 
for family migrants. The introduction of an income requirement for family 
migration in 2010 marks a clear policy change in Sweden, where previously, 
integration achievements and immigration rights were seen as rather separate 
from one another. In her analysis, Karin Borevi interestingly notes how 
the introduction of the income requirement in Sweden has been seen as 
a clash with understandings of the universalism of the welfare state: “To 
partially or wholly deprive foreigners of the right to the benefits managed by 
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society, according to, e.g., the social insurance system, would of course conflict 
both with the principle that everyone is of equal value and with the norms 
underlying the welfare society” (SOU 2005:103, 115–116, translated in Borevi 
(forthcoming)). The Swedish centre-right government set up a working group 
in 2008 to inquire regarding an income requirement for Sweden. The working 
group argued that an income requirement would lead to better integration 
outcomes, and that integration would be facilitated if family migrants joined 
persons with a job and adequate housing (SOU 2008:114, 19). Opponents to 
this suggestion argued in an appeal body that an income requirement would 
hinder and not promote integration, as it would make family reunification 
more difficult. Interestingly, the family members of Swedish citizens were 
excluded from the requirement, which clearly shows that the target group of 
these policies was people with a migration background who rely on public 
funds. The law that was finally passed in Sweden was more generous than 
the original government proposal, as within the government, there were also 
critical voices against introducing it. In particular, the Christian Democrats 
demanded that families with children be exempted, which made it into the 
final version of that law. In critical motions by the Social Democratic, Left 
and Green parties, they accused the government of having a hidden agenda 
of restricting the immigration of ‘unwanted’ family migrants, and of hiding 
that agenda behind calls for further integration (Borevi (forthcoming)).
While Swedish politicians were concerned as to whether the policies 
would hinder or promote the integration of migrants, recent Finnish debates 
on the income requirement have mostly focused around whether or not 
Finland would attract family migrants by having more favourable policies 
than other Nordic countries (Sisäasiainministeriön maahanmuutto-osasto 
2012). The Finnish government which was formed in 2011 by a so-called 
‘rainbow coalition’ of almost all parties except the agrarian Centre Party and 
the populist True Finns, introduced in its government proposal that it would 
tighten regulations on family reunification. It also announced that it would 
particularly investigate the need for including more groups of humanitarian 
migrants into the income requirement, as well as investigating the need for 
a housing requirement. In 2010, under the previous centre-right government, 
199
FAMILY MIGRATION, GENDER EQUALITY AND THE NORDIC WELFARE STATE
the Finnish Ministry of Interior had published a report to the Parliament 
in which it compared European entry regulations on family reunification. 
The report concluded that “[. . .] the policies on family reunification in 
Finland in comparison to other states are not more attractive than in other 
countries” (Sisäasiainministeriö 2010). However, the new government which 
started its governmental period one year later found the need to investigate 
the exact same issue, stating in its government programme that Finland’s 
policies on family reunification might need to be modified to fall into line 
with those of the other Nordic countries. A report by the Finnish Ministry 
of the Interior published in 2012 suggests that Finland should also introduce 
a broader income requirement for more groups of humanitarian migrants.
In Denmark, the spouse living in Denmark is required to have not 
received public assistance during the three years prior to the application 
being processed by the Immigration Service. This gives a clear signal that 
only family migrants who are part of the working population and are able 
to meet a certain minimum income can be joined by their family members. 
This restriction also has a gendered bias, as Kofman et al. (2013) point out. 
On average, women earn less than men and will thus have more problems 
meeting income requirements. For example the very high requirements that 
were introduced in the UK in 2012 mean that 61% of employed women in 
Britain as well as 32% of men in employment do not earn enough to be able 
to act as sponsor for a family member (Kofman et al. 2013).
Family related migration is not always ‘unwanted’ migration. Certain 
groups of family and marriage migrants are excluded from restrictive measures 
and are thus positioned as ‘more desirable’ (see Staver (forthcoming)). Calls 
for the restrictions of certain groups of family migrants are often embedded 
in discourses on gender equality, which can also be seen as a normative 
yardstick that the Nordic countries use in creating dichotomies between 
liberated Nordic women and oppressed women in migrant families. These 
dichotomies and how they are related to what I call ‘moral gatekeeping’ will 
be explored in the next section.
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5. Moral gatekeeping
Migrant women have moved to the centre of European debates about 
immigration and integration. In particular Muslim family life is portrayed 
as incompatible with Western liberal family norms (see also Razack 2004). The 
governmental measures that follow this logic are those that restrict types of 
family formation that are deemed oppressive towards women, such as forced 
or even arranged marriages. These governmental measures can be seen as 
either the result of political aims to enhance the welfare of migrant women, 
or as a sign of islamophobic and anti-immigrant tendencies in policy-making.
The dualism between the public perceptions of patriarchal migrant family 
life and Nordic notions of gender equality is a central element of debates on 
migration in the Nordic countries. I will next explore how rules, regulations 
and public debates on family migration are in opposition to notions of 
equality in the Nordic countries. Gender equality has been found to be a 
self-understanding and a core value of the Nordic welfare state. Nordic gender 
equality is often referred to as state feminism (see Kantola 2006) – feminists 
have been taking part in state politics and thus engaged in creating what 
Helga Hernes has called a “potentially women friendly welfare state” (1987). 
The notion of the women friendly welfare state has been very influential in 
welfare state literature, but has also earned critiques, the most prominent of 
which is in line with the intersectional critique of the white middle class 
feminist movement, namely that it assumes a group of women that can and 
should have a shared interest. In their influential critique of Hernes’ women 
friendly welfare state approach, Borchorst and Siim (2002) particularly stress 
the position of migrant women, who are not targeted by many ‘women 
friendly’ policies. When it comes to immigration and integration policies, 
gender equality has actually featured as an element of exclusion. Policy makers 
use normative understandings of gender equality as a means to argue for a 
range of restrictive policy measures. These state policies and discourses of 
nationhood draw boundaries between equal Nordic families and patriarchal 
‘migrant families’.
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The most central way in which questions of gender equality feature in 
the regulation of family migration is the prevention of forced marriages, 
which policy makers, particularly in Denmark and Norway, have defined 
as an explicit policy goal behind restrictive immigration policies ( Jakobsen 
& Liversage 2012; Staver (forthcoming); Eggebø 2010; Razack 2004). As 
part of these policies, Denmark has introduced an age limit of 24 years for 
marriage migrants. Jakobsen and Liversage explain that the logic behind the 
age limit is that young girls are expected to be economically and socially 
more independent from their families at an older age, and thus would be less 
likely to be influenced by their parents seeking to engage their children in 
matrimony with a spouse from the family’s country of origin. This argument 
also carries with it the logic of the welfare state educating young women 
to become independent from patriarchal family structures, as they have the 
time to be socialised and exposed to Danish/Norwegian society. It is worth 
noting that the prevention of forced marriages has been a very explicit policy 
goal in both Denmark and Norway, but has not featured as prominently in 
Finnish or Swedish debates on immigration policy.
A central issue related to migrant families, gender equality and the welfare 
state is the debate on honour-related violence in the Nordic countries as 
constructions of nationhood. Keskinen (2012) argues that Finnish public 
debates on honour-relating violence situate Finland as being part of other 
(Western) European countries with higher number of Muslim minorities, 
where honour-related violence features as a more central element for national 
policy making than in Finland. Discourses on honour-related violence that 
explain violence by referring to a patriarchal and violent culture fail to 
situate violence in its societal context and to analyse the structural, societal 
and psychological processes that lie behind all violence in families. Razack 
(2007) has, in this regard, raised the difficulty of speaking out on issues 
of honour-related violence without falling into the pitfall of culturalising 
and dichotomising. Stereotypical figures of the ‘dangerous’ Muslim man, 
the ‘imperilled’ Muslim woman, and the ‘civilised’ European are prominent 
elements in migration policy debates that build on the notion of Nordic 
gender equality versus oppressive migrant culture. The way in which these 
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racialised exclusions are embedded into institutions of Nordic welfare states 
and their historical legacies has particularly been explored by postcolonial 
feminist scholars in the Nordic countries (cf. de los Reyes & Mulinari 2005; 
Jensen & Loftsdóttir 2012; Keskinen et al. 2009).
6. Opposing policy processes
Immigration laws include definitions of relationships, roles or institutions or 
make underlying assumptions that shape and influence the life and position 
of migrants in a gendered way (Piper 2006). One very common assumption is 
that of the male breadwinner, which reproduces the dependency of immigrant 
women on men. This assumption also influences the way in which immigrants 
perceive themselves and their families. Particularly when migration takes 
place on the basis of family reunification, the (in the majority of cases female) 
migrant is often classified only by her relationship to her male counterpart 
and not as an independent individual. This dependency relationship makes it 
more difficult for migrants to obtain legal rights in their own name, as their 
status is dependent on that of their family members (Boyd & Grieco 2003; 
Harzig 2003, 51; Jørgensen 2007, 179–180; Lotherington & Fjørtoft 2006, 31; 
Mahler & Pessar 2006, 40; Palriwara & Uberoi 2008, 45).
The legislation on residence permits for marriage migrants has resulted 
in a dependency on the providing spouse, even in cases of domestic violence. 
The so-called three-year rule in Norway, two-year rule in Sweden, four-year 
rule in Finland and five-year rule in Denmark expects spouses to stay with 
their partners for that amount of time before being granted an individual 
residence permit. Apart from Finland, the Nordic countries have explicitly 
information in their Aliens Act section of the Immigration Office’s website 
on the fact that a migrant can keep a residence permit in the case where 
physical abuse by the partner can be proven to have taken place. But even 
though the residence permit would be granted after proving domestic violence, 
studies show that women rather allow the waiting period to pass, even while 
being subjected to violence and abuse, as the process of proving abuse and 
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pressing charges against the husband is difficult (Burman 2012; Lotherington 
& Fjørtoft 2007, 119; Tanttu 2009, 45–46).
Overall, we can see opposing policy processes at play. While the integration 
of migrants, particularly into working life, is used as an argument both on the 
EU level and by national policy makers to introduce income requirements, the 
law factually creates a dependency on the spouse. Thus, the dependency on the 
state that these policies are seeking to avoid is replaced by a dependency on 
the partner. While the policies are claimed to lead to a better integration of 
family migrants, they factually select migrants with a certain socio-economic 
background who can afford to be joined by their family members. It is 
questionable as to whether having a migrant population that has little or no 
income separated from their family members in their new country of residence 
improves integration outcomes. I would argue that this can actually lead to 
the opposite effect, namely a further marginalisation of a certain population.
Another opposing policy process is that of ‘promoting’ gender equality 
by trying to fight against forced marriages and honour-related violence. The 
policies and public debates surrounding these issues situate migrant women as 
oppressed by ‘their’ culture and families, leaving them with little or no agency 
to claim their own cause (see Razack 2004). Thus, while the argument is that 
policies that target certain (often Muslim) family practices are motivated 
by a wish to promote gender equality, they actually do the opposite; namely 
stigmatise and thus further exclude migrant women.
The regulation of family migration touches upon one fundamental concept 
that is vital in current debates on the welfare state, namely that of citizenship. 
As Lister et al. point out, citizenship does not only include the question 
of rights and obligations, but “[. . .] involves a set of social and political 
relationships, practices and identities that together can be described as a 
sense of belonging” (2007, 9). This belonging is particularly problematic for 
certain groups of migrants who are targeted by the growing restrictions on 
family reunification, and who, even when they have entered the country, find 
themselves on the margins of the welfare state. The evaluation of migrants’ 
private lives for immigration purposes is what Plummer calls ‘intimate 
citizenship’ (2003). As this chapter has shown, in the Nordic countries, 
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debates on the way in which these intimate citizenships are negotiated rely 
on the perception of a shared idea of Nordic gender equality. However, the 
placing of migrant family life in opposition to shared notions of equality is 
not only a Nordic phenomenon. Comparative studies have found that the 
‘migrant family’ features as a site of patriarchal practices and as an obstacle to 
integration across Europe (Kraler 2010). This chapter argues that the Nordic 
welfare state offers a particularly interesting framework through which these 
tendencies towards the inclusion and exclusion of migrant family life take 
place. In order to deepen our understanding of the way in which the welfare 
state interacts with very topical questions of immigration, it seems vital to 
further explore the connections and links between feminist welfare state 
research and migration scholarship.
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Chapter 10
Housing policy and the ‘new citizen’  
of the Chinese city 
On the social protection of migrant workers  
regarding their residential rights
Ka Lin, Longfei Yi and Shuang Wu
1. Backgrounds: housing policy and migrant workers
Since the establishment of the socialist regime, China has developed into 
the kind of society which has the identifiable feature of social dualism. In 
this structure, the social rights of the urban and rural populations are diverse: 
urban residents are well protected by the state (and its associated state-
owned enterprises) regarding aspects of employment, income, health care 
and housing, whereas the rural population stands on their own feet, with 
collectives as the resource of assistance. This feature of social dualism is 
typically reflected in the housing registration system, which is attached to 
various kinds of rights regarding welfare entitlement. Taking housing policy 
as an example, in the past, urban residents enjoyed free allocation by their 
workplaces, and in the present day, their right to apply for social housing is 
ensured once they have fallen into the ‘housing poor’ category.
However, this dualist structure of society has become vague during 
the urbanisation process. Under this circumstance, the social structure has 
become more open and freedom of moving between cities and countryside 
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has been increased. This development has given rise to a large body of migrant 
workers. From 2003 to 2009, the size of the floating population increased 
from 15 million to 211 million (National Bureau of Statistics of China 2010). 
By 2012, the number of migrant workers had reached almost 253  million, 
accounting for 17% of the total Chinese population (Han 2012). In 2009, 
63% of those migrants worked in the large or middle-sized cities, and most 
of them worked in the manufacturing, construction and service industries 
(Liu & Feng 2012). This trend of domestic migration will continue in the 
next decade, with more and more farmers pouring into the cities. Within 
this perspective, some institutes such as the National Health and Family 
Planning Commission of China have estimated that China’s urbanisation 
rate will reach 60% of the total population by 2020, and therefore, an average 
annual increase of 13–16 million migrant farmers migrating into the cities 
is expected in the next ten years (Chinese Government Net 2012). These 
migrant workers are indeed acting as the main agents of urbanisation in 
contemporary China.
Evidently, the flow of migrant workers is the outcome of the on-going 
industrialisation process. From Lewis’ dual sector model (Lewis 1958), the 
‘capitalist’ sector will draw labour from a non-capitalist backward ‘subsistence’ 
sector in this process, and this implies a large move of labour from agricultural 
areas to cities (especially before the ‘Lewis turning point’). According to 
Todaro, the factors affecting the rural labour force’s migration into cities 
include wage differences and job opportunities (Todaro 1989). Eventually, 
these migrant workers will gradually settle down in the cities and become 
new urban residents. A survey conducted by the Development Research 
Centre of the State Council demonstrates this trend: in the new generation 
of migrant workers, 80% of the surveyed respondents indicated their wish 
to stay in the cities or towns, with less than 10% wanting to go back to the 
countryside. Despite the fact the actual rate of return in this group is far 
higher than that illustrated by this data, a large-scale phenomenon of migrants 
becoming ‘new urban citizens’ over the years seems inevitable.
However, this process of migration is accompanied by a number of social 
problems. Since these workers settle in ‘stranger’ land without having a strong 
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local context, they meet with many difficulties in housing arrangement (in 
particular because of their low economic status in urban society). In urban 
China, social housing programmes targeted at the ‘housing poor’ consist 
of various schemes of low-rent housing, affordable housing and low-cost 
commercial house building (Ran 2012; Jin 2010). These newcomers to the 
cities prefer to have the chance to enter low-rent and public-rented housing, 
but these schemes are open only to urban registered households. Since these 
migrant workers have left their domicile counties to work in the city, they 
cannot be identified as formal urban citizens. Thus, these programmes fail 
to meet the housing needs of this population (Li 2002).
Thus, most migrant workers have to find their own solution to their 
housing problems (apart from  those who have accommodation offered by 
their workplaces). They remain outside the state’s compulsory housing saving 
programme, able to access neither the public–rented housing programme nor 
the affordable housing programmes or low-rent housing system. This has been 
confined by a survey using data collected from Beijing and Shanghai (Wu & 
Wang 2002): the respondents have no access to the urban social housing system. 
Some scholars have underscored this situation by discussing their status of 
exclusion from the household registration system (Peng & Tang 2012; Chan 
& Li 1999; Li, Duke & Peng 2008; Cui & Mao 2005), and this situation has 
made the housing question a serious problem for them to deal with in their 
daily life. According to the survey data, respondents often list the problem 
of accommodation as the top factor making life difficult for migrant labour.
Since in most cases, these workers left their hometown to earn a living, 
they intend to rent houses at a cheap price. For this sake, they often aggregate 
in urban districts or the so-called ‘urban villages’. These areas could not be 
simply described as urban slums, but they have poor facilities and lack the 
provision of many necessary public services. Thus, housing issues become 
not only about their housing arrangements, but take on a general sense of 
shaping their view on urban life and society. The poor housing conditions 
give them a sense of social exclusion, and this indeed becomes the major 
barrier to them forming an integral part of urban life. Accordingly, Zhang 
(2006) expounds the need to pay attention to the issue of migrant workers 
214
KA LIN, LONGFEI YI AND SHUANG WU
in order to construct a harmonious society, and Li & Wang (2006) explain 
that migrant workers’ sense of relative deprivation will discourage them to 
adopt a sense of fairness and social equality.
Within this context, we have a great need to study the actual situation of 
migrant workers in urban life in order to find solutions. Gao (2006) states that 
the limited housing rights of migrant workers originated from a number of 
reasons such as institutional design, and the legislative system and concepts, 
which are harmful to building social harmony. This study will investigate 
migrant workers’ living conditions in Hangzhou and Xiamen cities. Based 
on the interview data, the study will discuss the problems associated with 
housing matters and the policy measures undertaken by local government. 
The study will compare policies and measures taken in both cities in order to 
promote the proper integration of the floating population into local society. 
With this background, this study will first of all report on the research data 
collected from both Hangzhou and Xiamen, and then evaluate the social 
impact and importance of these policy measures.
2. The general conditions of migrant workers in Hangzhou 
and Xiamen
In Hangzhou, the number of migrant workers from outside has increased 
dramatically in the last decade. According to official statistical data, this group 
reached at 2.18 million in 2005 and increased to 2.74 million in 2006. It was 
2.26 million in 2012, accounting for 25.7% of the total population (Hangzhou 
Net 2013; Hangzhou Commission Science and Technology 2009). As to the 
occupational distribution, over half of the migrant workers were engaged in 
the manufacturing industry, with some in the service sector (Yang 2012). These 
workers have made a great contribution to economic growth in Hangzhou. 
For instance, during the period of implementing the tenth five-year plan, 
the floating population of Hangzhou contributed more than 20% of GDP 
(Hangzhou Net 2009). As to the background information of the migrants 
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in Hangzhou, around 60% of them hold a high or middle-school certificate, 
and more than 60% are married. 
In Xiamen, the permanent resident population was 361 million in 2012, 
including 185 million migrant workers (Xiamen Net 2012). The ratio of the 
registered population to migrants (outside urban household registration) 
was almost one to one. As shown by our interviews, most of them come 
from Jiangxi, Henan, Anhui or Shaanxi Province, and some from the areas 
surrounding of Xiamen, such as Zhangpu and Ningde. The situation seems 
a bit better for these interviewees, with a more stable employment situation. 
This group is the most vulnerable to the risk of unemployment, and have 
had to return to the country once the economic recession happened (Ma & 
Chen 2008). However, they work mostly in the processing and manufacturing, 
construction, mining, quarrying, transportation, sanitation, housekeeping and 
public services industries. Their contribution to the economic development 
of Xiamen is enormous. They reduce the cost of human resources in 
production, thereby attracting more foreign capital for economic growth in 
Xiamen (Research Group on Foreign Population and Economic and Social 
Development in Xiamen 2003).
In order to gain a better understanding of the living and working conditions 
of this group in these two cities, we conducted interviews in early 2013. With 
the help of some non-governmental organisations, our survey team discussed 
housing arrangements with more than 30 families in Hangzhou. As to general 
information, these interviewed workers mostly acted as regular employees in 
companies, but in the service sector some are on a temporary basis, with a small 
part of this group unemployed. The age of the informants is mainly between 
18 and 35 years old, and they hold some training or secondary education. The 
period of their stay in Hangzhou varies from one to ten years.
In Xiamen, we interviewed around 50 migrant workers from different 
sectors of the manufacturing construction, transportation, sanitation and 
service industries. The majority of employees have an education under college 
level, and about 60% of them are married. Almost 60% of them have been 
working here for more than three years, and 60% have been to more than 
two cities before coming to Xiamen. These data are comparable with another 
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107 samples, which show that the age of this group is mainly between 16–30 
(90% of the sample), with 37% of the group married, 60% unmarried and 
3% divorced. A total of 89.7% have received middle school and high school 
education, with 6.6% in higher education, together with 3.7% with a primary 
school education. About 20% of this group have worked for more than 
two years, 55% have changed job twice and 25% have changed job more than 
three times (Zhou & Liu 2006).
In regard to the income level of the migrant workers, research shows that 
in Hangzhou, 36.15% of migrant workers have an average monthly income 
of 1,500 to 2,000 RMB, 30.7% earn 2,000–2,500 RMB, 10.9% earn 2,500–
3,000 RMB, 5.9% earn 3,000–3,500 RMB, 3.65% earn 1,000–1,500 RMB, 3.35% 
earn less than 1,000 RMB and 0.45% earn more than 4,000 RMB (Zhan 
2012). This is comparable with statistical data that shows urban households’ 
average income as around 2,800 RMB per month, while 73.85% of migrant 
workers’ income is less than 2,500 RMB. Hence, most migrant workers belong 
to the middle–low income levels (Zhan 2012). In a survey conducted in 
Xiamen in 2005, 92.3% of migrant workers had an average monthly income 
of less than 1,400 RMB, 4.8% earned 1,100–2,000 RMB per month and 3.5% 
earned more than 2,000 RMB per month (Dai 2005).
3. Housing arrangements of the migrant workers
In Hangzhou, the most popular housing arrangement among migrant workers 
is renting in the housing market (Ma & Chen 2008). According to some 
surveys, around 2% of them have already bought housing in Hangzhou, and 
more than 90% live in rented houses or apartments provided by their work 
units. For economic reasons, most of them look for houses at a cheap price, 
but struggle to save for the future or send money back to their home village. 
As our survey disclosed, three quarters of the interviewees pay rent which 
represents around one fifth of their total monthly income in Xiamen and 
about one third in Hangzhou. This report is comparable with other surveys. 
For instance, Ma and Chen reported that 67.2% of respondents paid less 
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than 500 RMB per month in rent (Ma & Chen 2008). This is not very low 
if compared to Zhengzhou city, where 46.69% of surveyed migrant workers 
paid housing costs of less than 100  RMB per month (Chen & Xu 2013). 
Under this circumstance, housing conditions could be expected to be hard, 
and this makes housing matters the major reason for life difficulties.
Besides this, some people engaged in the processing and manufacturing, 
construction and extractive industries also lived in dormitories or sheds 
provided by their work units. In our survey in Hangzhou, about 20% of 
interviewed respondents are living in dormitory units provided by their work 
units. Ruan’s survey (2012) made in Shanghai reported that 20.5% were renting 
houses, and 61.7% arranged by dormitory at working unit (together with 
12.5% and others by 5.3% in other options). Even so, our survey also shows 
that most respondents are reluctant to live in dormitory units due to their 
poor conditions and lack of privacy. In addition, those engaged in domestic 
service may live also inside urban households.
Regarding living space, the average living space per capita for urban 
households in Hangzhou was 33.7 square metres in 2011, and in Xiamen, it 
was 31.97 square metres in 2010. The eligibility standard for applicants to the 
social housing is no more than 15 square metres per person in Hangzhou and 
12 square metres in Xiamen. In comparison, migrants have a small living space. 
In our survey, 70% of those living with their spouses and children in rental 
apartments have less than 30 square metres. Among them, 40% of them have 
two people (usually a couple) sharing a room, and 20% have three people 
sharing a room (usually a couple and one child). This information corresponds 
to another survey made on migrant workers in Hangzhou, as the per capita 
housing area is less than 8  square metres (Zhan 2012). These data are also 
comparable to those of Zhengzhou’s survey, which states that about 67% of 
respondents had a housing area per capita of less than 10 square metres in 
Zhengzhou. This presents a huge gap compared to the local residents (with 
26.08 square metres of housing area per capita for local residents in 2010) 
(Chen & Xu 2013).
On the location of living, our survey in Hangzhou shows that 70% of 
respondents are living on the borders or the outskirts of the city, including 
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Jianqiao, Liuxia, Jiubao and Xiasha. These areas are known for their high-
density floating population, and usually lack facilities and high-quality 
infrastructure. In Xiamen, half of our respondents are living within Huli 
District, (including Xinlinguancun and other urban villages). Some are living 
around the urban villages of Siming District, but most of their living places are 
far away from their workplaces. Reasonably, they complain that the commute 
between home and workplace uses too many hours per day.
As for home facilities, our respondents tend to live in a single bedrooms 
with no separate kitchen and bathroom, and 10% of the migrant workers live 
in rooms no kitchen or toilet facilities apart from public toilets; 70% of migrant 
workers live in shabby rooms with a small space for the kitchen and bathroom 
and 80% in places with poor public health service or property management. 
This situation is coherent with another survey made in Hangzhou. In Zhan’s 
(2012) survey, 28% had no independent toilet, and 35% no independent kitchen. 
Thus, they state that sanitation (95.32%) and infrastructure (86.13%) are the 
most important environmental factors affecting living conditions (Zhan 2012).
During the process of urban renewal, many urban villages are reconstructed, 
and the migrants living in those areas have to change their accommodation 
frequently. In our survey, 30% of respondents have had to change living places 
twice and 20% three times within a year, with only 10% staying stable for a 
year. The reason for these changes may be job relocation (Chan & Li 1999), 
but they are often due to the changing surrounding and buildings being 
demolished during urban renewal. This brings great distress and disturbance 
for the migrant workers in their daily lives.
4. Housing policy and local administration
To respond to these problems of housing arrangements, the central and 
local governments have to make efforts to release the pressure on housing. 
Since the mid-2000s, central government has released a number of notification 
concerning housing policies for migrant labourers. Starting in 2005, the 
Ministry of Construction addressed this issue as one of the central tasks on 
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its working agenda, and in the following year, the State Council also released 
a notification including a demand for improving migrant workers’ housing 
conditions (Lin & Gao 2007). Together with other ministries, the Ministry 
of Construction published Guidance on Improving the Living Conditions of 
Migrant Workers in 2008, which explicitly states that the housing issues of 
migrant workers should be incorporated into the overall planning of urban 
development.
This direction of development has been moved forward in recent years. 
By 2010, the state had issued a document that highlighted the housing issue 
and the Ministry of Construction had also requested local governments in 
the developed regions to open up access to public rental housing to those 
migrant workers who are regular employees and stay in the city for years. 
Accordingly, many cities introduced a series of housing policies to meet with 
these requests from the central governments, using the measures of land 
allocation, financial budgets, support of land-transferral fees, and developing 
rental markets and investing in social housing. In Guangzhou, Dongguan 
and Suzhou cities, policies have been created to support migrant workers 
(Liu & Feng 2012). In Nanning city, for instance, the local government has 
started to widen access to applying for affordable housing to those migrant 
workers with labour contracts who have been working for years (Ruan 2012).
In regard to Hangzhou and Xiamen, the People’s Congress of Hangzhou 
promulgated two official documents in 2007 named Further Plans to Protect 
and Promote the Rights of Migrant Workers in Hangzhou and Interim Provisions 
of Apartment Construction and Lease Management for Migrant Workers. In 
2011, the Hangzhou municipal government also issued Implementation Details 
of Public Rental Housing Lease Management in Hangzhou (Trial), to define 
the purpose, responsibility, operation and leasing management of its public 
apartment programmes. These official documents all refer to the issue of 
migrant workers. The government also put together The City Plan of Housing 
Construction in Hangzhou (2010–2012), The Outlook of Urban Plan for Housing 
Construction in 2011–2015, and The Regional Plan of the Public Rented Housing 
in 2012, with a target of developing social housing programmes in areas with 
large aggregations of migrant workers. In policy practices, these efforts can 
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be traced back to 2004, when the Hangzhou government set up the Two 
Apartments Project for migrant workers. The project was to build dormitories 
in areas near industrial parks (Yang 2012). In the following year, the Hangzhou 
government also issued a document to encourage companies and community 
groups to construct dormitories for migrant workers.
In Xiamen, the local government created the relevant policies in 2008 
targeted at migrant workers in industrialised zones. Through the regulations 
on housing protection for the migrant worker in industrial areas, it called 
attention to including the housing poor into social housing programmes (The 
Land Resources Bureau of Xiamen 2008). In 2009, the People’s Congress of 
Xiamen city proceeded the rules on social housing management together with 
25 other relevant documents (The People’s Congress of Xiamen 2009). And by 
2011, the municipal government was concentrating on accelerating the process 
of constructing public rented housing in Xiamen, with the purpose of renting 
them to migrant workers at a low price (Xiamen Municipal Government 2011).
Nevertheless, despite these demands from central and local government, 
it is still outside the bounds of possibility to formulate an effective system 
of public sector support for housing affairs. Currently, the public housing 
system in Hangzhou is composed of six programmes, including low-rent 
housing, economically affordable housing, resettlement housing, public rental 
housing, dilapidated housing and talent housing ( Jin 2010). These programmes 
are not applicable for migrant workers, apart from public rental housing. 
This last programme is targeted at two groups, those with low income and 
new entrants into the labour market (including both migrant workers and 
college graduates) (Yang 2012). Applicants must hold a residential permit and 
must have acquired a certificate of professional and vocational qualification. 
Besides, they should have signed a labour contract and paid social insurance 
contributions for more than one year. In our surveys, around 10% of our 
interviewees live in the public rental housing.
In Xiamen, the municipal government started to implement an experiment 
to open access to public rental housing for the floating population at the 
district level, but not at the city level. Because of the insufficient amount of 
this public housing, the programme is restricted and information available 
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to the public limited. In our interview, about 50% of the respondents are 
not aware of this programme; even those who know about this programme 
comment that the access is too narrow to apply. Therefore, most of the 
respondents are not optimistic about the benefit of government  housing 
policies. Besides, in 2012 the municipal government also set up a Gold-Silver 
Engineering Project, in which the term ‘silver’ refers to placement housing for 
landless farmers, and ‘gold’ refers to rental apartments in the areas surrounding 
industrial parks (Huang 2009). This project has been proved to effectively 
provide cheap rental levels (lower than the rent in the housing market) for 
migrant workers.
5. The solution for migrant workers
Clearly, there has a serious need for social support for migrant workers 
in housing matters, as the situation is very tough for them. The state has 
demanded that local governments improve their work in this direction, but it 
seems difficult to realise this. There are certain barriers to policy development 
in this direction. The financial issue is a basic one, as the funds to support 
social housing programmes mostly come from the local governments, but the 
floating population is outside the local urban household registration system. 
Thus, they are ineligible for getting the same housing benefits as urban 
residents. Besides this,  urban resources of land and space are limited and it 
is unrealistic to expect local governments to build many public rented houses, 
especially when the flow of immigrants cannot be limited. The large-scale 
construction of social housing needs a great deal of investment, and will be 
a huge burden on local governments.
Thus, in theory, local governments should have a moral duty to protect 
the residential rights of their residents, but in practice, many barriers make 
it difficult to fulfil this duty. In previous studies, some scholars suggest 
developing low-rent housing for migrant workers to supplement social and 
commercial housing ( Jin 2010). However, such a proposal could be an ideal 
but not a realistic solution. Based on our survey, we notice that 10% of our 
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interviewees live in public rented houses in Hangzhou – a good starting point 
for developing this orientation of work – but this also implies too limited 
access to this programme.
Along another line, encouraging enterprises to build more dormitories 
will be helpful for improving the living conditions of their employees. In our 
survey, around 20% live in a company-provided dormitory, so strengthening 
the notion of ‘corporate responsibility’ should be useful for developing 
company housing programme. This is in particular needed for migrant 
workers who cannot access social housing programmes. These programmes 
can contribute to increasing a sense of belonging and emotional attachment 
of those employees to their workplace. This can also reduce the living costs 
of their employees and make their life more comfortable, as well as having 
a positive impact on urban administration.
Still, as many migrant labourers live in urban villages, it is important 
to improve the facilities of the surrounding area and raise the quality of 
public service in those villages. Once those areas require reconstruction and 
restoration, the government should consider the interests of local residents 
and develop channels of dialogue with local residents (including migrant 
workers as renters), in order to coordinate interests between renters and the 
rentees, employees and employers, the government and construction firms as 
an important way to improve the quality of life of migrant workers.
Again, local governments should also resolve a set of issues concerning 
social housing programmes in regard to urban design, regulation, investment 
and management. With its information from Hangzhou and Xiamen, this 
study reflects the serious demand for public assistance for developing urban 
housing programmes for migrant workers as ‘new urban citizens’. In regard 
to urban planning, developing public rental housing system can be a suitable 
solution to improve quality of life of migrant workers (Chen & Feng 2011), 
as observed from Hangzhou’s experience: the Xinyan Apartment Project in 
Xiasha district has had great success, in which the government encouraged 
various agents to construct public rental housing system under an arrangement 
unified by the municipal government.
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6. Conclusions
When human society entered the 20th  century, to have a place of shelter 
was claimed to be a basic right of citizens in modern states. This right was 
announced by the UN’s declaration The Human Right to Adequate Housing, 
which commits that “Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate 
for the health and well-being of himself and of his family, including food, 
clothing, and housing and medical care and necessary social services, and 
the right to security in the event of unemployment, sickness, disability, 
widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond 
his control” (UN 1991). Accordingly, many countries have developed their 
housing policy programmes to ensure the right of basic accommodation as 
the duty of modern states.
In this regard, China has also developed its housing policy system and set 
up a number of programmes. The housing problems of migrant labourers in 
China are caused not only by the lack of the relevant programmes but by social 
dualism, which permits different access for the urban and rural population 
to social housing programmes. Thus, when discussing social development in 
China, we must consider the housing situation of these migrant workers, 
especially as more of the rural population will migrate to the cities in the 
near future (Long 2011). This makes housing policy the core part of China’s 
new urbanisation strategy, as its success or failure will influence the social 
integration of Chinese society. Thus, if China cannot cope with this challenge 
successfully in the long run, it will exacerbate the conflicts and tensions 
between the floating population and local urban residents, and eventually 
impose the shortcomings of urbanisation (Lv & Zhou 2008).
In order to promote social integration and social stability, we should 
treat housing policy issues seriously. This issue concerns not only the matter 
of the housing poor, but also the future of China’s urbanisation. According 
to some commentators, the issue will affect the speed and quality of the 
urbanisation process in China and its future of success or failure (Zhao 2013). 
It touches various aspects of urban living, including urban management, urban 
environment, urban planning, employment opportunity and social security 
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benefit. Indeed, under the request of the central government, local government 
has taken the major responsibility for operating social housing programmes 
to react to these issues, such as widening access to the public-rental housing 
system. The real solution does not so much depend on the demands, but 
on policy implementation. Accordingly, we should develop housing policy 
to encourage local governments and enterprises to take action. The reform 
of the household registration system should further allow these workers to 
protect their residential rights within the status of urban citizen (Zhan 2012).
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Chapter 11
Income inequality between China and India 
A perspective on structural comparisons
Heng Quan
1. Introduction: the theoretical framework of structural 
comparisons
Comparative studies of China and India are becoming more and more popular 
now at the international level. A majority of these studies are from the 
perspective of international relations, less so from the perspective of economics. 
This paper will focus on the comparison of income distribution and inequality 
between China and India in terms of their economic development.
There are many similarities between the eco-social structures and 
development background in China and India which make comparison of 
the two nations possible on an objective basis. Firstly, China’s and India’s 
economies have been influenced by a planned economy, and both them 
have deemed socialism’s justice and equality their common idea. Secondly, 
these two largest developing countries face many dimensions in inequalities, 
including inner-urban, inter-rural and rural-urban regional disparities during 
the process of industrialisation and modernisation. Thirdly, the two nations’ 
societies have typical characteristics of dualistic economic and social structures, 
and their rural-urban development is unbalanced now; and lastly, they are 
both experiencing a great transformation of reform and openness, which plays 
an important role in income distribution and inequality in the two countries. 
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In addition, the state’s role and its redistributive policy have affected their 
income inequalities deeply.
It is very hard to assess which of China and India has the highest level 
of income inequality. The purpose of the comparisons made in this paper 
is to discover the structural differences in income inequality between them, 
not to claim which has the highest income inequality. Using a structuralism 
methodology, this paper will compare the structural differences of income 
inequality in inner-urban, inner-rural and between rural and urban, inter 
regions between China and India, and their causes and consequences, according 
to the two nations’ eco-social structures and development backgrounds.
The plan of the rest of this paper is as follows: Section  2 reviews and 
comments on the existing literature on the subject; Section 3 illustrates the 
data collection and methodology; Section 4 details the structural comparisons 
of income distribution between China and India, including the dimensions. 
Section  5 gives some comprehensive explanations for the causes of the 
structural differences in income inequality between China and India and 
the last section concludes.
2. Literature review
Much academic research has been undertaken on income distribution in 
China and India. Most studies have been made on China or India alone. 
Studies of income distribution and poverty in China are commonly based on 
two data sources: the State Statistics Bureau (SSB), an official data resource; 
and three surveys conducted by the Institute of Economics, Chinese Academy 
of Social Sciences. Scholars consider that China’s regional disparities have 
been expanded increasingly using the above data (Hu & Wang 1995; Hu et 
al. 2002; Wei 2000). The Chinese Academy of Social Sciences emphasises 
personal income inequality in China’s rural and urban areas: their findings 
show that the Gini coefficient was 0.45 in 2001; and they also think that the 
disparities between central-west China and east China have been expanding 
(Zhao & Li 1999; Li &Yue 2004a), while the gaps between rural and urban 
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populations in the central-west China area have also been increasing (World 
Bank 2000; Chen & Ravallion 1996; Kanbur & Zhang 2003; Li & Yue 2004b).
Personal inequality in Indian rural and urban populations and regional 
disparities are the focus of studies of India’s inequality, which are often 
conducted using National Sample Survey (NSS) data covering most states in 
India. Most study the overall inequality in India and measure the Gini index 
by taking consumption or expenditure as a proxy. Other empirical studies 
have found increasing regional inequality, particularly since 1991, when the 
economic reforms and openness were launched (Das & Barua 1996; Rao et 
al. 1999; Kurian 2000).
Very few studies focus directly on the comparison of income inequality 
between China and India. Many scholars have simply compared the countries 
based on the World Development Indicators (WDI) which show the most 
countries’ Gini index, pointing out that China’s inequality is much higher 
than India’s, according to the latter’s low Gini index as shown in WDI. The 
problem here is that the variables used to measure the Gini indexes are 
different between China and India: the Chinese Gini Index is measured by 
income, but the Indian Index is measured by expenditure or consumption. 
Apparently, in the latter, the Gini calculation comes out lower than in the 
former (Quan 2006). So it is not appropriate to compare the inequality of 
the two nations using this method.
It is worth pointing that one comparative study has examined patterns 
of regional inequality to find the driving forces behind its changes in China 
and India, using expenditure data covering a number of years (Gajwani et al. 
2006). In addition, Borooah et al.’s study uses microdata to compare income 
inequality in rural China and rural India (Borooah et al. 2006).
All of these studies and findings are very insightful and helpful for our 
understanding of China’s and India’s income distribution and inequality. But, 
of these, some only mention one aspect of income inequality; for example, 
only regional disparity between the two nations was studied in Kanbur and 
Gajwani et al.’s comparisons, while only rural inequality was compared in 
Borooah et al.’s study. The limitations of these studies are that the gross 
structural income inequality on many dimensions in the two countries and 
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the structural differences between them have not been studied systematically, 
and the causes and consequences of these structural inequality differences 
are also not mentioned. 
3. Data collection
Data for Chinese rural and urban income and inter-province GDP all 
originate from the China Statistical Yearbook (over several years). The 
other source and reference comes from the three surveys conducted by the 
Institute of Economics, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. The Indian 
data mostly comes from the National Sample Survey Organisation (NSSO), 
which includes data on detailed personal expenditure, households and labour 
markets. All of the Indian state GDPs are available from the EPW Research 
Foundation (EPWRF 2003). In addition, this paper uses the household income 
and expenditure surveyed by NCAER (2003) as a reference. China’s and 
India’s Gini Index comes from the Global Poverty and Inequality Database 
(GPID) and the UNU-WIDER World Income Inequality Database (WIID) 
collected by the World Bank. This allows the study and results to be more 
comparable between China and India.
4. Structural comparisons of income distribution between 
China and India: empirical studies and their evidence
4.1. Income level in China and India
Economic growth and income growth are the foundation of income 
distribution and equality. It is very clear from Table 11.1 that GNI per capita 
in USD in China, at 1,230, was more than twice as high as the corresponding 
Indian level of 590 in 2004. Undoubtedly, income growth is one matter, 
income distribution is another, and they do not go together spontaneously, 
which means that equality does not always become reality automatically.
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Table 11.1. GNI per capita in China and India (USD).
1990 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
China 320 840 900 970 1,100 1,230
India 390 450 460 470 540 590
Source: The World Bank 2005.
4.2. Inner-urban income inequality in China and India
According to the Global Poverty and Inequality Database (GPID) and the 
UNU-WIDER World Income Inequality Database (WIID) collected by the 
World Bank, we can observe that inner-urban income inequality in China 
and India have increased since the 1980s, but apparently, Indian inequality 
is much higher than that in China, although the latter is increasing rapidly. 
In fact, the Indian Gini level is measured using consumption which makes 
it lower than that measured by income; we can conclude that the actual 
inner-urban inequality in India is much more serious than that in China.
Table 11.2. Inner-urban income inequality in China and India.
Year Chinese urban Gini Indian urban Gini
1978 34.71
1981 16.1
1982 12.1
1983 15.8 34.08
1987 15.8 36.75
1988 16.9 35.57
1989 17.8 34.80
1990 18.0 35.59
1991 17.5 37.98
1993 28.47 34.34
1996 29.09 37.06
1999 31.55 35.0
2001 33.32
Source: WIID (Chinese Gini 1981–1991 and Indian Gini 1978–1991); GPID (Chinese Gini and Indian 
Gini 1992–2001).
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4.3. Inner-rural inequality in China and India
Table 11.3 indicates that inner-rural inequality in India was higher than that 
in China from 1978 to the beginning of the 1990s, then China’s inner-rural 
inequality became higher than India’s after the 1990s; it is very clear that, 
while Indian inequality in rural areas was declining in the 1970s, and has 
risen since 1995, China’s inequality kept rising from 1978 and then declined 
after 1996. On the whole, from 1978 to 1999, China’s rural inequality has 
experienced an increase while India’s has experienced a decrease.
It is however necessary to state here that the overall inner-rural inequality 
in China and India is now similar if we consider other information and 
factors. How can this be? The reason is that the above-mentioned Gini index 
in China is measured by income but it is measured by expenditure in India, 
so if we think of the income measurement for the Gini index, the mass 
poverty of the population in rural areas, and the 40–50% of the agriculture 
workforce who are landless (Patnaik 2000) in India, we can conclude that 
the two nations’ rural inequality would be similar, or maybe India’s situation 
would be a little worse than China.
More importantly, there are some regional differences in the two nations’ 
inner-rural inequality. According to Borooah et al. (2006), in 1995, the Gini 
index (0.41) of per capita household income in eastern Indian rural areas 
was below that (0.44) of western Indian rural areas at the same time, while 
those (0.42 and 0.49, respectively) of central and west Indian rural areas were 
above those (0.33 and 0.37, respectively) of central and western China’s rural 
families (Borooah et al. 2006).
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Table 11.3. Inner-rural inequality in China and India.
Year Chinese rural Gini Indian rural Gini
1978 28.2 30.92
1980 24.99
1981
1982
1983 30.06
1984 26.69
1985 27.12
1986 30.22
1987 29.45 30.13
1988 29.51
1989 28.23
1990 30.57 27.72
1992 32.03 29.88
1993 32.13 28.59
1994 34.00 27.65
1995 33.98 30.17
1996 33.62 28.43
1997 33.12 30.56
1998 33.07
1999 35.39 28.11
2000
2001 36.33
Source: GPID.
4.4. Income distribution between rural and urban areas in China 
and India
4.4.1 Inter-provinces’ (states’) income gap between urban and 
rural in China and in India
Tables  11.4 and 11.5 show the inter-province (China) or inter-state (India) 
income gap between urban and rural areas in 2000. The smallest income gap 
between urban and rural areas in China is 1.89 ( Jiang Su), the ratio in India 
is 1.18 (Delhi), and the average income gap between urban and rural areas in 
China is 2.79 and is 2.05 in India. The biggest gap in China is 5.58 (Tibet) and 
it is 2.08 in India (Orissa). We can conclude that China’s income gap between 
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urban and rural areas is much higher than that in India, whether viewing this 
in terms of the biggest, smallest or average income gap between urban and 
rural areas. Furthermore, only one province in China has an urban-rural gap 
below 2, while the rest are over 2, while there are only four states in India 
whose urban-rural gap is over 2, the gap for the rest of India being below 2. 
Table 11.4. Inter-province urban-rural income gap in 2000 in China (RMB).
Province
Per capita annual disposable 
income of urban households
Per capita annual net income 
of rural households
Ratio of 
urban to rural Rank
Jiang su 6,800.23 3,595.09 1.89 1
Shanghai 11,718.01 5,596.37 2.09 2
Zhejiang 9,279.16 4,253.67 2.18 3
Tian Jin 8,140.50 3,622.39 2.25 4
Bei Jing 10,349.69 4,604.55 2.25 5
Liao Ning 5,357.79 2,355.58 2.27 6
He bei 5,661.16 2,478.86 2.28 7
Heilongjiang 4,912.88 2,148.22 2.29 8
Fu Jian 7,432.26 3,230.49 2.30 9
Ji Lin 4,810.00 2,022.50 2.38 10
Jiang Xi 5,103.58 2,135.30 2.39 11
He Nan 4,766.26 1,985.82 2.40 12
Hu Bei 5,524.54 2,268.59 2.44 13
Shang Dong 6,489.97 2,659.20 2.44 14
Hai Nan 5,358.32 2,182.26 2.46 15
Shan Xi 4,724.11 1,905.61 2.48 16
Neimenggu 5,129.05 2,038.21 2.52 17
Guang Dong 9,761.57 3,654.48 2.67 18
An Hui 5,293.55 1,934.57 2.74 19
National 6,279.98 2,253.42 2.79 
Ji Nan 6,218.73 2,197.16 2.83 20
Ning Xia 4,912.40 1,724.30 2.85 21
Si Chuan 5,894.27 1,903.60 3.10 22
Guang Xi 5,834.43 1,864.51 3.13 23
Chong Qing 6,275.98 1,892.44 3.32 24
Gan Su 4,916.25 1,428.68 3.44 25
Qing Hai 5,169.96 1,490.49 3.47 26
Xin Jiang 5,644.86 1,618.08 3.49 27
Shang Xi 5,124.24 1,443.86 3.55 28
Gui Zhou 5,122.21 1,374.16 3.73 29
Yun Nan 6,324.64 1,478.60 4.28 30
Source: Author’s calculations, based on National Bureau of Statistics of China 2002.
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Table 11.5. Inter-states urban-rural income gap in 2000 in India (INR).
State/ 
urban territory
Per capita annual 
disposable income of 
urban households
Per capita annual 
net income of rural 
households
Ratio of 
urban to 
rural
Rank
Delhi 29,364 24,852 1.18 1
Haryana 18,134 14,855 1.22 2
Chandigarh 34,509 27,256 1.27 3
Punjab 21,413 16,540 1.29 4
Pondicherry 18,938 13,215 1.43 5
Rajasthan 15,850 10,693 1.48 6
Assam 17,231 11,109 1.55 7
Gujarat 22,742 14,574 1.56 8
Goa 17,440 11,017 1.58 9
Karnataka 18,394 11,300 1.63 10
Kerala 17,372 10,342 1.68 11
Andhra Pradesh 19,143 11,033 1.74 12
Bihar 12,404 6,976 1.78 13
Uttar Pradesh 12,257 6,738 1.82 14
Himachal Pradesh 19,881 10,816 1.84 15
Tamil Nadu 24,246 12,888 1.88 16
Maharashtra 23,747 11,769 2.02 17
All India 19,407 9,481 2.05
Madhya Pradesh 14,719 7,079 2.08 18
Meghalaya 20,714 9,284 2.23 19
West Bengal 23,892 8,792 2.72 20
Orissa 15,993 5,704 2.80 21
Source: NCAER 2003. Note: not including Arunachal Pradesh, and other states.
4.4.2 Urban-rural consumption gap in China and India
Tables  11.6 and 11.7 show the data on the consumption gap in China and 
India, respectively. Table  11.6 shows that China’s urban-rural consumption 
gap was 3.13 in 1957, then it declined to  2.04 in 1984; since 1985, particularly 
after 1991, it has been increasing gradually and reached 3.29 in 2003, which 
was over the ratio (3.13) found in 1957. At the same time, India’s consumption 
gap remained stable with a slight decrease from the 1950s to the 1980s. Very 
similarly, it increased since 1985, particularly after 1991. Compared to China, 
the urban-rural consumption gap is very small in India. The biggest ratio in 
2000 in India was 2, still smaller than that in China (the ratio was 3.13 in 
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2000). It is very clear that China’s urban-rural consumption ratio is always 
higher than India’s.
Table 11.6. Urban-rural consumption ratio in China 1957–2004 (RMB).
Year Per capita consumption of urban households
Per capita consumption of 
rural households
Ratio of urban 
to rural
1957 222 71 3.13
1978 312 116 2.69
1979 135
1980 437 162 2.70
1981 457 191 2.39
1982 471 220 2.14
1983 506 248 2.04
1984 559 274 2.04
1985 673 317 2.12
1986 799 357 2.24
1987 884 398 2.22
1988 1,104 477 2.31
1989 1,211 535 2.26
1990 1,279 585 2.19
1991 1,454 620 2.35
1992 1,642 660 2.49
1993 2,111 770 2.74
1994 2,851 1,017 2.80
1995 3,538 1,310 2.70
1996 3,919 1,572 2.49
1997 4,186 1,617 2.59
1998 4,332 1,590 2.72
1999 4,616 1,577 2.93
2000 4,998 1,670 2.99
2001 5,309 1,741 3.05
2002 6,030 1,834 3.29
2003 6,511 1,943 3.35
2004 7,182 2,185 3.29
Source: Author’s calculation, based on SSB 2005. Note: the urban per capita consumption in 1980 is an 
estimate due to a lack of specific data. 
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Table 11.7. Urban-rural consumption ratio in India 1954–2001 (INR).
Year Per capita consumption of urban households
Per capita consumption 
of rural households
Ratio of urban to 
rural
1954–55 24.7 15.0 1.65
1956–57 25.1 17.0 1.48
1959–60 27.5 20.0 1.38
1961–62 30.9 21.7 1.42
1964–65 36.0 26.4 1.36
1966–67 41.5 30.9 1.34
1969–70 50.4 34.7 1.45
1973–74 70.8 53.0 1.34
1977–78 96.2 68.9 1.40
1983 164.0 112.5 1.46
1986–87 222.0 140.9 1.58
1987–88 245.7 157.7 1.56
1988–89 266.9 175.1 1.52
1989–90 298.0 189.5 1.57
1990–91 326.8 202.1 1.62
07–12/1991 370.3 243.5 1.52
1992 399.0 247.2 1.61
01–06/1993 383.4 244.1 1.57
1993–1994 458.0 281.4 1.63
1994–1995 508.1 309.4 1.64
06/1995–06/1996a 599.2 344.3 1.74
01–12/1997a 645.4 395.0 1.63
01–06/1998a 684.3 382.1 1.79
06/1999–06/2000 971.6 486.1 2.0
07/2000–06/2001a 914.6 494.9 1.85
a) The results are based on thin samples
Source: author’s calculation, based on NSSO 2006; CSO 2004. Note: the urban and rural consumption is 
monthly. 
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4.5. Regional disparities between China and India
Table 11.8 shows the two nations’ Gini index measured by per capita GDP 
(at province or state level). We can observe that the two nations’ regional 
disparities have been increasing gradually and, furthermore, India’s increase 
has been faster than China’s since 1991, particularly speeding up after 1995, 
while China’s regional gap seems to be declining. Secondly, China’s regional 
differences were higher than those in India before 1990–1991; this could be 
seen as a product of the lower Gini coefficient in India than that in China. 
But India’s gap has been growing since 1991 and became higher than China’s 
after that year.
Table 11.8. Regional disparities between China and India 1980–2002.
China’s Gini coefficient,  
provincial per capita GDP
India’s Gini coefficient,  
state per capita GDP
Years Gini coefficient Years Gini coefficient
1980 0.236 1980–81 0.209
1981 0.226 1981–82 0.202
1982 0.220 1982–83 0.211
1983 0.217 1983–84 0.200
1984 0.220 1984–85 0.205
1985 0.223 1985–86 0.211
1986 0.226 1986–87 0.214
1987 0.227 1987–88 0.217
1988 0.228 1988–89 0.216
1989 0.226 1989–90 0.220
1990 0.216 1990–91 0.224
1991 0.229 1991–92 0.228
1992 0.242 1992–93 0.244
1993 0.251 1993–94 0.239
1994 0.254 1994–95 0.248
1995 0.253 1995–96 0.250
1996 0.247 1996–97 0.262
1997 0.249 1997–98 0.264
1998 0.252 1998–99 0.276
1999 0.256 1999–00 0.278
2000 0.245 2000–01 0.292
2001 0.263
2002 0.267
Source: China’s Gini measured by provincial per capita GDP, data from China Statistical Yearbook 2003; 
Chen & Xu 2004. India’s Gini measured by state per capita GDP, data from EPWRF 2003.
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Here we choose the top five states (Maharashtra, Tamil Nadu, Gujarat, Punjab, 
Haryana) in India whose per capita GSDP (Gross State Domestic Product) 
is the highest and the bottom six states (Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, 
Bihar, Rajasthan, Orissa, Assam) whose per capita NSDP is the lowest and 
look at the disparities, comparing this to China, where the top five are 
(Guangdong, Zhejiang, Shanghai, Beijing and Tianjin) and the bottom six 
are (Guangxi, Yunnan, Shanxi, Guizhou, Gansu and Tibet).
In India, the gap between the top five and the bottom six states has 
widened. In Table 11.9, the top five states, which accounted for 24.7% of the 
country’s total population, had a share of 34.6% of all of the states’ GSDP 
during the early 1980s, and this share increased to 38.2% at the end of the 
1990s. On the other hand, the bottom six states which accounted for 41.6% of 
the country’s total population, have suffered a decrease in their GSDP share 
from 35.3% to 26.9% between these two periods. In Table 11.10, the top five 
provinces in China had a share of 22.1% during the early 1980s and the share 
increased to 23.5% and 27.3% during the mid-1990s and 2001, respectively. 
On the other hand, the bottom six provinces have also suffered a decrease 
in their share of GDP from 19.8% to 12.6%, 10.4% and 8.7% during these 
three periods.
In India, if we compare the highest state (Punjab) to the lowest state 
(Bihar) in per capita NSDP, we can find that the gap between them moved 
from 3.02 in the eve of the 1980s to 4.52 in 2001. Likewise, in China, the 
ratio of the per capita GDP of the highest province (Guang Dong) to the 
lowest province (Tibet) moved from 2.1 in the early 1990s to 2.6 in 2001.
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Table 11.9. Percentage share of GDP* of the top ﬁve and bottom six states in India 
(three-yearly annual average).
Annual averages from 
1980–81 to 1982–83
Annual averages from 
1990–91 to 1992–93
Annual averages from 
1993–94 to 1995–96
Annual averages from 
1998–99 to 2000–01
Top ﬁve, total 34.6 Top ﬁve, total 36.2 Top ﬁve, total 37.5 Top ﬁve, total 38.2
1. Maharashtra 14.0 1. Maharashtra 15.3 1. Maharashtra 15.3 1. Maharashtra 15.6
2. Tamil Nadu 6.9 2. Tamil Nadu 7.1 2. Tamil Nadu 8.2 2. Tamil Nadu 8.3
3. Gujarat 6.4 3. Gujarat 6.4 3. Gujarat 7.2 3. Gujarat 7.4
4. Punjab 4.4 4. Punjab 4.3 4. Punjab 4.0 4. Punjab 3.9
5. Haryana 2.9 5. Haryana 3.1 5. Haryana 3.0 5. Haryana 3.0
Bottom six, total 35.3 Bottom six, total 33.4 Bottom six, total 28.1 Bottom six, total 26.9
1. Uttar Pradesh 13.3 1. Uttar Pradesh 12.6 1. Uttar Pradesh 10.8 1. Uttar Pradesh 10.2
2. Madhya Pradesh 6.6 2. Madhya Pradesh 6.2 2. Madhya Pradesh 5.1 2. Rajasthan 5.1
3. Bihar 6.2 3. Rajasthan 4.6 3. Rajasthan 4.8 3. Madhya Pradesh 4.8
4. Rajasthan 4.0 4. Bihar 3.0 4. Bihar 3.0 4. Bihar 2.8
5. Orissa 3.0 5. Orissa 2.4 5. Orissa 2.4 5. Orissa 2.2
6. Assam 2.2 6. Assam 2.0 6. Assam 2.0 6. Assam 1.7
*) At 1980–81 prices. 
Source: EPWRF 2003.
Table 11.10. Percentage share of GDP* of the top ﬁve and bottom six provinces in China 
(three-yearly annual average).
Annual averages  
1981–1983
Annual averages  
1991–1993
Annual averages  
1994–1996
Annual averages  
1999–2001
Top ﬁve, total 22.1 Top ﬁve, total 23.5 Top ﬁve, total 23.8 Top ﬁve, total 27.3
1. Shanghai 6.3 1. Guang Dong 9.4 1.Guang Dong 9.7 1. Guang Dong 10.8
2. Liao Ning 6.0 2. Liao Ning 5.7 2. Zhejiang 6.0 2. Zhejiang 6.8
3. Hei Longjiang 4.7 3. Shanghai 4.2 3. Shanghai 4.2 3. Shanghai 5.1
4. Beijing 3.0 4. Beijing 2.6 4. Beijing 2.4 4. Beijing 2.8
5. Tianjin 2.1 5. Tianjin 1.6 5. Tianjin 1.6 5. Tianjin 1.8
Bottom six, total 19.8 Bottom six, total 12.6 Bottom six, total 10.4 Bottom six, total 8.7
1. Henan 5.2 1. Henan 4.8 1. Sichuan 4.3 1. Guangxi 2.3
2. Sichuan 5.2 2. Anhui 3.1 2. Jiangxi 2.1 2. Yunnan 2.2
3. Anhui 3.6 3. Jiangxi 2.1 3. Shanxi 1.7 3. Shanxi 1.9
4. Guangxi 2.3 4. Guizhou 1.3 4. Guizhou 1.1 4. Guizhou 1.1
5. Yunnan 2.0 5. Gansu 1.2 5. Gansu 1.0 5. Gansu 1.1
6. Guizhou 1.5 6. Tibet 0.1 6. Tibet 0.1 6. Tibet 0.1
*) At constant prices. 
Source: Author’s calculation: data SSB 2005 (years 1981–1996); National Bureau of Statistics of China 
2001–2003 (years 1999–2001).
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Interestingly, China’s regional development shows that the coastal area is 
always much better than the central and western area in terms of economic 
growth and social progress during the period of reform and openness. 
Compared to China, India’s regional growth and income gap is much more 
diversified, which means that not all growth and development in coastal 
areas is good: for example, Orissa, located in the coastal region, is still very 
poor in terms of economic growth and social development. Another point 
of difference from China is that not all of the poorer states lagged behind. 
For example, Rajasthan, one of the poorer states, experienced much stronger 
growth in per capita SDP, more than double that of the other states (Ahluwalia 
2000). So we can say that the trend of regional divergence is very similar 
between China and India since the initiation of reform and openness in both 
countries, but on the other hand, there are also structural differences in the 
regional disparities between them.
5. Structural differences of income inequality between China 
and India: some sources and explanations
Considering that many scholars and researchers have presented good 
explanations for the causes of the transformations of China’s and India’s 
income distribution, this paper concentrates on the causes and consequences 
of these structural differences of income inequality between China and India, 
particularly from the international perspective.
5.1. Land reform, education, government’s role and rural 
inequality in China and India
Land institution plays a very important role in rural growth for the two 
countries. China underwent relatively successful land reform during the 1950s: 
all farmers’ land distribution was equal at the national level and this was the 
foundation of rural economic growth and farmers’ increased income. After 
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1978, another rural reform called the household contract responsibility system 
was implemented, greatly improving farmers’ incentives to production. At 
the same time, China had a good basic education and health service in rural 
areas after the establishment of the new system, and this created a great deal 
of human capital to support the development of non-agricultural industry1 
and also allowed educated farmers to grasp the opportunities that that market 
provided during the reform and openness period. It should be noted that 
all of these reforms and policy measures created a very positive effect on 
farmers’ income and rural poverty reduction. Farmers’ income increased very 
rapidly in 1980–1984, and rural poverty population declined very remarkably.
However, some other factors have had a negative effect on rural income 
distribution: the rural household education is different in every family for 
several reasons. Those with a good education always achieve much more 
human capital and apparently have more opportunities to become richer 
than those who have no or less education. Furthermore, regional differences 
plays a role in regional rural income disparity, for example, farmers who live 
in the fast-growing eastern China have a higher income than those living 
in western China. The high dependence on agriculture is another cause of 
farmers’ low income. In addition, the government’s supportive policy on rural 
area has been reduced with the movement of reform and openness to urban 
areas since 1985. In particular, during this time, Chinese farmers’ burdens 
became very heavy due to many kinds of fees and charges, such as education 
fees, health service fees and the so-called “unwarranted pooling of funds, 
arbitrary requisition of donations and exaction of fees from enterprises” (“San 
Luan” for Chinese abbreviation).Thanks to these factors and influences, inner 
rural income distribution has worsened and income inequality has increased 
gradually since liberalisation and openness. In particular, the part-privatisation 
of hospitals and the destruction of the traditional health service system in 
rural areas have actually exacerbated the inequality.  
1  In the countryside, if growth is primarily concentrated in the non-farming sector, its ability to reduce 
poverty depends on the quality of human resources and initial development conditions (such as 
infrastructure and power) (Datt & Ravallion 1996).
244
HENG QUAN
Similarly to the early years in China, Indian farmers benefited from 
the early land reforms, such as the dismantling of the Zamindari system. 
From 1963–1964, India adopted Green Revolution-type technologies which 
accelerated agricultural growth and farmers’ income increases, and also 
a considerable drop in poverty, which could explain the decline in rural 
inequality from 1970–1990.
However, compared to China, India’s land reform is not good and there 
still exists a massive inequality in land distribution. From all the India Report 
on Agricultural Census, we can see that about 62% of the population who hold 
the land have only 17.2% of the area of operational land holdings, while about 
1.6% of the land-holding population have 14.8% of the land holdings. Medium 
and large holdings together cover 40% of the land, but these holders together 
represent only about 7.3% of the land-holding population. So, about 92% of 
land holders (marginal, small and semi-medium) have less than 60% of the 
land area (GOI 1998; Chanda & Sundaram 2000; GOI 2003; IAMR 2004).
More importantly, with the India’s integration into globalisation and the 
reform of liberalisation, the unequal distribution of land has generated many 
problems and issues for farmers and increased rural inequality much more 
since 1991. Firstly, most farmers who have no or only a little land could not 
access finance to develop non-agricultural means of production that could 
increase their household income. Sometime they were forced to borrow money 
from an unorganised financial sector where the interest rate was usually 
very high,2 to an extent where they could not repay it, with some farmers 
committing suicide owing to heavy indebtedness (Mohanakumar & Sharma 
2006). Secondly, although the Green Revolution produced a positive effect 
on agricultural growth and farmers’ income, it also brought other negative 
effects such as higher and higher costs of seeds, irrigation and technology, 
and at same time agricultural product prices declined due to India’s entry 
2 The Punjabi farmer today leads the country in rural indebtedness. We have reached a situation where 
the total annual rural debt of the state – INR 24 000 crore in 2003–04 – is more than its gross annual 
earnings from agriculture. According to a recent report of the Indebtedness of Farmer Households 
report published by National Sample Survey Organisation (NSSO) in 2005, each Punjab farmer has a 
debt of INR 41,576, against the national average of INR 12,505 (Ghuman 2006).
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into the WTO regime. As a result, farmers’ income increases have actually 
slowed n and agriculture growth has become very unstable since 1991.
On the other hand, India’s government public services, such as the basic 
education and health service system, in rural areas are still poor, although 
they provide the rural population with some public goods such village roads, 
drinking water, and electricity because of democracy and electoral promises. 
In many Indian villages, even in Punjab and Gujarat where economic growth 
is better than in other states in India, there are not sufficient education 
resources in many public schools, for example not enough classrooms or desks 
in schools, or poor teaching quality in classrooms, with students forced to sit 
under the trees or on the ground to study.3 This has led to less and poorer 
human capital being created and, as a result, non-agricultural development 
has been very slow in rural areas, so the effects of rural growth on poverty 
reduction have not been as remarkable as those in China. 
The roles of India’s public distribution system (PDS) played in the 
assistants to rural poor farmers were less; particularly, it was very weak for 
offering the poor improved access to food. Actually the targeting and coverage 
of the PDS have been inadequate (Mundle & Tulasidhar 1998;Jha et al.1999). 
So, poor government’s policy could not help improve the worsening income 
inequality in rural. Actually, there is compelling evidence that the liberalisation 
and the integration into globalisation have exacerbated the rural inequality 
in India (Kabra 2005); Alternative Survey Group 2005).
5.2. Economic growth, employment, abnormal income and urban 
inequality in China and India
Marketisation reform and openness have accelerated urban economic growth 
in China and India and particularly made an important contribution to urban 
poverty reduction (Datt & Ravallion 1997; Datt1999). But, interestingly, the 
3  The researcher observed this situation in many villages when they visited Gujarat, Punjab and other 
places.
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urban inequality in these two nations has been increasing very rapidly and, 
comparatively, India’s urban inequality is much higher than that in China. 
There are three main reasons: firstly, the rapid development of service 
sectors in urban areas in India would be a key to high inequality. In India, 
the leading service sectors such as finance, IT, real estate and R&D absorbs 
only a few skill-intensive workers and highly educated talents in terms of 
employment; they usually have high human capital and consequently, can 
get higher income than other workers. Furthermore, India’s manufacturing 
period was very short and could not absorb a larger share of employment, 
so very high unemployment has been produced in urban areas. In contrast, 
in China, the leading urban sector is a very highly developed manufacturing 
industry that has generated many jobs and so had a positive effect on urban 
inequality.
On the other hand, the employment and income gap between the 
organised and the unorganised sectors in urban areas is another source of 
inequality in urban India (Kumar 2005). In China, although SOE reform 
has produced new groups of laid-off workers, many private economies and 
FDI created many more new job opportunities in urban areas, helping to 
reduce urban inequality. 
The urban slums are another source of inequality, although they are a 
consequence of the disparity between rural and urban areas. Now nearly 
40 million live in Indian urban slum areas: they are still very poor and have 
no stable job, so most are relegated to urban poverty. In urban China there 
are no slums due to the very strict residents’ registration system (Hukou), 
which includes no permission for labour mobility, but there is a big gap 
between rural and urban China because of Hukou.
Finally, black market income in China and India plays a very important 
role in urban inequality. China’s black income was about 10–15% GDP in 
2004, while India’s black economy was about 40% of GDP in 1999–2000 
(Kumar 1999). In China, corruption and smuggling or other abnormal income 
produced a very negative effect on income distribution. In the latter, according 
to Kumar, if taking the white economy alone, the ratio of per capita income 
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between the bottom 40% and the top 3% would have been 1:11.5, but if we 
consider black market income, this ratio is 1:57 (Kumar 2002).
5.3. Democracy, labour mobility and urban-bias policy and the 
urban-rural gaps in China and India
Whether viewed from a perspective of income or consumption, the urban-
rural gaps in India are smaller than in China. The basic reason is that in India, 
free labour mobility plays an important role in narrowing the gap, although it 
becomes one of the sources that increases inner-urban inequality. In addition, 
there is a close positive relation between democracy and the provisions of 
rural public goods. According to the author’s survey, Indian governments 
(including central and states governments) can pay much attentions to rural 
public goods and provide villages with basic education, health services, roads, 
drinking water and electricity, etc., or at least would like to provide these in 
terms of gaining votes. 
From the beginning of 1985, China’s reform and development policies 
moved to urban areas and many policies and projects were implemented to 
develop urban economy and industrial sectors. This caused the urban areas 
to develop faster and faster, and at the same time, rural growth became slow; 
farmers’ incomes increased slowly in the 1980s and 1990s. So, the urban-biased 
policy has played a key role in the increase of the rural-urban gap in China.
Certainly, comparing free labour mobility, China complemented the strict 
Hukou system to limit migration, so the rigid labour policy had a negative 
effect on rural-urban gaps in China.
5.4. FDI, human capital, governance, policy and regional 
inequality in China and India
The integration of FDI and sufficient human capital has played an important 
role in determining regional growth in China and India. To further compare, 
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location advantages, infrastructure, FDI and supportive government policies 
together play much more of a role in regional inequality in China. There is 
no doubt that the ‘let some of the regions become richer first’ policy has been 
the biggest policy contribution to regional inequality in China.
In India, the Green Revolution that happened in some states first which 
had good weather, irrigation and initial conditions, gave rise to unequal 
regional growth effects, meaning that just a few states like Punjab, Haryan 
and Tamil Nadu have achieved high growth in agriculture, but other states 
where the initial conditions were not good enough to support the Green 
Revolution, fell behind. India’s regional disparities in growth may also have 
arisen because some states are better managed and therefore able to create 
a good environment (in terms of education, human capital, infrastructure 
and transparency) to support growth. On the contrary, some poor states, like 
Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan and Uttar Pradesh (BIMARU), have poor 
governance, corruption and low administrative efficiency.
6. Conclusions and significance to policy 
This paper has systematically examined China and India’s income inequality 
in many dimensions and emphasised the study of the structural differences 
between them, and the causes and consequences of these structural inequality 
differences.
Through the perspective of structural comparisons, the main findings are 
that: 1) The inner-urban income inequality in China and India increased in 
the 1980s, but apparently, Indian urban inequality is much higher than in 
China, although the latter’s inequality is also increasing rapidly; 2) The two 
nations’ rural inequality is similar but the distribution of inner-rural inequality 
is characteristic of some regional differences in the two nations; 3) Whether 
in terms of income or consumption, the rural-urban gaps in India are smaller 
than in China; 4) The two nations’ regional disparities have been increasing 
gradually and comparatively: China’s regional differences were higher than 
India’s before 1990–1991, but India’s regional gap has been increasing more 
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rapidly since 1995, while China’s regional gap has seemed to be declining 
in recent years.
The causes of the above trends of inequality and structural differences 
between China and India are very complex and various factors have had 
positive effects on the two nations’ income inequality while others have 
produced negative effects. On the positive side, the two nations’ reform and 
gradual openness has been eliminating many obstacles resulting from old 
institutions and systems, which has helped to create a good institution and 
environment for socio-economic progress. For China, continuous high growth 
has established a substantial foundation for poverty reduction and inequality 
improvement. Likewise, India’s democracy could provide its poverty reduction 
with a good political term and in particular has had a positive effect in 
narrowing the substantial urban-rural inequality through the provision of 
basic public goods for villages and farmers.
On the negative side, some other institutions still represent blocks and 
resistance to the improvement of inequality and, furthermore, these blocks 
have actually eliminated the positive effects of high growth on poverty and 
inequality reduction; to a large extent, they have become the main contributor 
to the increasing inequality in the two countries. For India, the half-completed 
land reform has played a key role in agricultural development and inner-rural 
inequality; for China, the strict Hukou system to limit migration is a main 
source of enormous rural-urban gaps.
In terms of economic growth, India’s disequalising growth and unbalanced 
industrial structures are also an important source of unequal income 
distribution and urban inequality, particularly through employment. 
Regarding policy, the Indian government’s supportive policies, such as 
the public education for the poor, PDS, could not actually help to improve 
the poor in rural and urban areas effectively, while China’s urban-bias policy 
works to promote regional disparities. 
In brief, institutional factors and governmental policy bias plays much 
more of a role in China’s inequality and changes, while economic structural 
and disequalising growth and education plays much more of a role in India’s 
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inequality and its trends. Some other social factors, which affect social 
inequality, such as caste, should not be ignored in India. 
From the development perspective, the worsening income distribution and 
increasing inequalities have become one of the biggest challenges for the two 
nations: for China, it will block the construction of a socialist harmonious 
society; for India, this problem will become a political threat to reform and 
openness and will also reduce people’s support of the government. 
Therefore, some policies should be proposed for the two countries. The 
recommendation for China is to make a further adjustment to the idea of 
income distribution policy and change the urban-bias growth policy; further 
deepen institutions and try to increase transparency and reduce abnormal 
income. For India, the recommendation is to implement equitable land reform, 
adjust economic structures and build a labour-intensive industrial pattern. 
At the same time, India should improve public education, particularly rural 
basic education, by using democracy and its proper practices. 
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Chapter 12
Meeting the demographic challenges 
Ageing and pension systems in the Nordic countries, in a 
European perspective
Jørgen Goul Andersen and Aksel Hatland
1. Introduction
One of the most impressive steps forward in human life conditions during the 
last century has been the decrease in mortality and longer lives. Since the 1950s, 
life expectancy at birth has increased globally by more than 20 years, from 
46.9 years in 1950–1955 to 68.7 years in 2005–2010. One of the most remarkable 
examples is China, where life expectancy rose from 44.6 to 74.4 years during 
this relatively short historical period. In the early 1950s, longevity in the 
Nordic countries was about 30 years above China. By 2005–2010, this lead 
had shrunk to 5.5 years. 
But every shining coin has a reverse side. And this reverse side is costs. How 
should we respond to this demographic revolution and develop sustainable 
pension and health policies for future generations of senior citizens?
This chapter describes the demographic challenge in the Nordic countries 
and how it has been dealt with by reforming the pension systems. As regards 
the demographic challenges, these are relatively minor, as compared to other 
European countries. Much of this is an effect (initially an unintentional side 
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effect) of pro-natal policies: At least by European standards, fertility has 
remained high in the Nordic region.
The financing problems have been solved by rather thorough and systemic 
reforms. Initially, the solution was to send a bigger bill to the taxpayers. But 
this has changed. A central element in the new strategies has been to shift 
the costs of ‘the positive risk’ of longer lives from the shoulders of the younger 
taxpayers to the shoulders of the pensioners themselves. Moreover, to a large 
extent the reforms take automatic account of changes in life expectancy.
With universal, flat-rate pensions as the point of departure, all of the 
Nordic pension systems have ended up as multipillar pension systems with 
a state pillar, an employment-related pillar, and an entirely private pillar. In 
different ways, these pillars combine to cover basic needs (protection against 
poverty), income replacement and fulfilment of the gap between income from 
employment and pension income. Because an important proportion of the 
pensions are funded, and because these funded pensions incorporate deferred 
taxes, the states indirectly possess substantial assets that are not registered 
in official accounts. In a Europe haunted by sovereign debt crises, all of the 
Nordic welfare states except Iceland stand out as being without any net state 
debt. In Norway, Sweden and Finland, the state even has substantial net 
assets; in the Danish case, the net assets would be positive if deferred taxes 
in pension funds were accounted for. In fact, during the deep economic crisis 
of Europe and the USA, the Nordic welfare states stand out as being among 
the few European countries with very healthy economies. 
From an economic perspective, many reforms of the type we have seen 
in the past should be superfluous in the future. Basically, the Nordic welfare 
states are well adapted to demographic change. From a political perspective, 
the future is more difficult to foresee. We do not imply that governments 
will abstain from change. Even though economic pressures may be moderate 
to low, there always remains a political struggle between conflicting welfare 
state preferences. 
The chapter is structured as follows: First, we present the projected 
demographic changes. Next, we analyse the Nordic pension reforms, arguing 
that they are to quite an extent functionally equivalent, in spite of institutional 
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differences. This is followed by an account of government finances in the 
Nordic countries, as compared to the rest of Europe. Finally, we emphasise 
the embeddedness of retirement policies in the over-arching concern for 
maximising labour supply that has been the dominant solution to demographic 
and other pressures on the welfare state. 
2. The demographic challenge
The single most important factor behind the long-term demographic 
transformation in all countries is decreased infant mortality. However, 
mortality has gone down in all parts of the life span. Until around 1980, 
there was little improvement in life expectancy at the age of 60, but this has 
changed very substantially in recent decades. Below, we focus on increasing 
life expectancy during the period of life when people have usually retired 
from work.
Table 12.1 illustrates the historical growth rates in the five Nordic countries 
after 1960. We see the biggest improvements in Finland. Finnish women, 
who retired at age 65 in 1960, could on average look forward to living until 
they turned 79. When their granddaughters retired at the same age in 2010, 
they would live, on average, until they reached 86. 
There is almost full agreement among demographers that life expectancy 
among elders will continue to grow. But there is no agreement about the 
growth rates. According to OECD (2011) “life-expectancy projections have 
consistently under-predicted mortality improvements, often to a substantial 
degree”. There is reason to believe that this also applies to the OECD 
projections in Table  12.1. The projections indicate that life expectancy will 
grow by from 2.3  years (Danish men) to 3.8  years (Icelandic women).1 In 
1  Demographic projections are usually made on the basis of national data and may sometimes be 
extrapolated from temporary deviances, projecting ever-increasing divergence. In the Nordic case, it 
might be more reasonable to expect convergence in the future. If this is the case, life expectancy in 
Denmark should not grow less than in the other countries, but rather grow more (the most recent 
national data covering 2011 and 2012 in fact confirm this).
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other words, life expectancy will grow by some 15% for Scandinavian elders 
during the next 40 years.
Table 12.1. Life expectancy in the Nordic countries and China at age 65. Years.
A. Males 1960–1965 2005–2010 2045–2050 (OECD) Increase 2005–2050
Iceland 15.1 18.3 21.4 +3.1
Sweden 13.9 17.8 20.7 +2.9
Norway 14.2 17.5 20.5 +3.0
Finland 11.5 17.0 19.4 +2.4
Denmark 13.6 16.5 18.8 +2.3
China 7.7 14.7 17.1 +2.4
B. Females 1960-1965 2005–2010 2045–2050 (OECD) Increase 2005–2050
Iceland 16.6 20.6 24.4 +3.8
Sweden 15.6 20.8 23.8 +3.0
Norway 16.0 20.8 24.1 +3.3
Finland 13.8 21.0 24.3 +3.3
Denmark 15.4 19.3 22.6 +3.3
China 9.9 16.8 20.1 +3.3
Source: 1960–2010: UN (2012); 2045–2050: OECD (2011).
The demographic changes as regards life expectancy are roughly similar across 
Western Europe. The Nordic countries, however, are under less pressure than 
most European countries. As Esping-Andersen (2009, 4) puts it, “pension 
reform begins with babies”, and because of their ‘pro-natal’ child policies, all 
of the Nordic countries have maintained relatively high fertility rates, close to 
2.0 (Table 12.2).2 Even though the ratio of elderly people (65 years or more) to 
2  High-quality child care, parental leave and child benefits are the main aspects of what is sometimes 
described as a ‘Nordic fertility regime’ (Andersson et al. 2009). Empirical evidence regarding 
determinants of fertility remains disputed. But it is agreed that several socio-economic determinants 
of fertility have reversed (Billari & Kohler 2004; Myrskylä et al. 2009; Bloom & Souza-Poza 2010), 
and most studies converge towards seeing pro-natal policies embedded in a (policy-nourished) family-
friendly culture as fertility-enhancing (Sleebos 2003; Hilgeman & Butts 2009; Hoem 2008). 
  By contrast, the impact of cash benefits is contested. Here, Denmark to some extent provides a 
natural experiment. In an economic package in May 2010, child benefits were put under a cumulative 
ceiling. This was a concession to the anti-immigration Danish People’s Party. Initially, most families 
with three children would reach the ceiling, but as the incidence of three-child families among ethnic 
Danes became clear, the ceiling was redesigned so that most families with three dependent children 
would not be affected. In addition, the package contained a limitation in government payment for 
fertility treatment. As some 10% of children owe their lives to fertility treatment, the impact of the 
latter was quite substantial. In 2011, the total fertility rate in Denmark fell from 1.88 to 1.76. As of 
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the working age population (15–64 years) is expected to increase substantially 
from about 25% to slightly above 40% from 2010 to 2050, the Nordic countries 
will remain quite ‘young’ by European standards (Figure 12.1). Besides this, the 
delineation of the ‘working age population’ as including only 15–64-year-olds 
becomes increasingly irrelevant with changes in pension age.
Table 12.2. Fertility and life expectancy at birth, selected countries, 2011–2012.
Fertility Life expectancy
Men Women
Iceland 2.04 81.6 84.3
Norway 1.85 79.5 83.5
Denmark 1.73 78.1 82.1
Sweden 1.91 79.9 83.6
Finland 1.80 77.7 83.7
France* 2.01 78.7 85.7
UK* 1.96 79.1 83.1
Netherlands 1.72 79.3 83.0
Belgium 1.79 77.8 83.1
Germany 1.38 78.6 83.3
Austria 1.44 78.4 83.6
Switzerland 1.52 80.6 84.9
Italy* 1.40 80.1 85.3
Spain 1.32 79.5 85.4
Poland 1.30 72.7 81.1
Japan* 1.39 79.4 85.9
USA* 1.90 76.3 81.1
China* 1.66 73.8 76.4
2011 data marked with a * 
Source: Europe: Eurostat (Table tps00025m tsdde220); USA, Japan, China: WDI. Accessed 19 December 2013.
2012, the 2010 regulation was repealed, but in return the incoming government introduced uncertainty 
about the means-testing of child benefits. This was settled by the tax reform of June 2012 which 
included an income test for child benefits. This situation comes close to a natural experiment. By 
2012, Danish fertility had dropped even further, to 1.73. Comparing pre-crisis figures (2003–2008) to 
the 2012 figures reveal a change of –.09 for Denmark, but almost no change for the other countries 
(increase of .10 in Sweden; –.01 to –.02 for the other countries). Furthermore, the Danish decline in 
2010–2011 was 12% for third and subsequent children, but only 5–6% for the first and second child 
(Statistics Denmark 2013). This seems to indicate that cash benefits do have an impact.
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By comparison, the old age dependency ratio in Japan will pass the 40% level 
as soon as 2014, and in Japan, the old age dependency ratio is expected to 
reach nearly twice the Nordic level in the 2050s (Table 12.3 and Figure 12.1). 
China is expected to reach approximately the same old age dependency ratio 
as the Nordic countries by 2050.3
Figure 12.1. Projected old-age dependency ratios in selected countries, 2050. 
Population 65 years or more as percentage of population 15–64 years.
Source: Eurostat (http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/tgm/table.do?tab=table&init=1&language=en&plugin
=1&pcode=tsdde510); Statistics Japan (2013); UN (2012); UN, Probabilistic Population Projections: Old-age 
Dependency Ratio.
3  Needless to say, this depends crucially on fertility rates. The figures presented here are almost 
equivalent to the low fertility (1.50) variant in Wei & Jinju (2009).
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Table 12.3. Old age dependency ratios, 2000, 2010 and 2050 (projections).
65 y.+ as per cent of 15–64 y. 2000 2010 2050
Denmark 22.2 24.9 41.8
Norway 23.5 22.5 40.3
Finland 22.2 25.6 44.9
Sweden 26.9 27.7 41.7
UK 24.3 24.9 39.4
Netherlands 20.0 22.8 46.5
France 24.3 25.6 45.5
Belgium 25.5 26.0 42.5
Germany 23.9 31.4 58.1
Italy 26.8 30.8 56.3
Spain 24.5 24.7 56.9
Poland 17.8 19.0 53.0
Japan 25.5 36.1 75.3
USA 18.7 19.5 35.0
China 10.2 11.4 41.7
Source: As Figure 12.1.
Nevertheless, the Nordic countries have adopted encompassing policy changes 
in order to address the demographic challenge. This includes not only pension 
reforms, but also an ‘activation’ of the entire social and tax policy in order to 
stimulate labour supply. The latter has aimed at postponing retirement, and 
at improving employment incentives and incentives to work longer hours. 
The ‘activation’ of social protection and taxes has addressed short-term goals 
as well, but worries about dependency ratios in an ageing society have been 
a major underlying concern. Even during the financial crisis from 2008 
onwards, stimulating labour supply has remained a core policy goal, especially 
in Denmark. This paper only briefly addresses this ‘broader’ adaptation to 
the challenge of ageing, but includes a short description of changes in early 
retirement. 
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3. Ageing, pensions and retirement
Even though their long-term demographic problems are small, comparatively 
speaking, the Nordic countries have been proactive in changing their pension/
retirement systems (NOSOSCO 2009a; 2009b; Kangas et al. 2010). Formally 
speaking, at least, this has happened in highly different ways. All of the Nordic 
countries have departed from their former people’s pension model, but in 
different directions. The people’s pension was a universal, flat-rate state-funded 
minimum pension for all citizens. The classical problem of such schemes is 
that they provide too little income replacement for the growing middle class. 
In the 1960s, Sweden, Finland and Norway added a second, earnings-
related tier to the people’s pension. The Danish labour movement, however, 
was divided on the issue as people feared this would lead to increasing 
inequality among pensioners. Instead, they were successful in improving the 
people’s pension to a very generous level (Albrekt Larsen & Goul Andersen 
2004). Still, income replacement for the middle classes remained modest, 
and occupational pensions for white collar workers began to mushroom, in 
particular in the public sector. Like other ‘laggards’ failing to introduce a public 
earnings-related pension during the ‘golden age’ of the welfare state (Myles & 
Pierson 2001), Denmark moved directly to a multipillar system (resembling 
Australia, Switzerland, and to some extent the Netherlands and the UK). 
In Denmark, the transformation of the pension system was carried through 
without any formal pension reform, in fact without any legislation at all 
(even though it was negotiated with the government). Instead, a layer of 
fully funded labour market pensions was introduced as of 1991 to nearly 
all employees via collective negotiations between the trade unions and the 
employers. Initially, the contributions were very small, but over the course of 
15 years they grew to a minimum of 12% of the wage. Through this process of 
layering and differential growth, labour market pensions gradually changed 
from a supplement to the backbone of the pension system when the system 
matures.
In principle, Danish labour market pensions are private pensions, unlike 
the public pensions in Sweden and Norway, but most collectively negotiated 
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‘private’ arrangements in the Nordic countries have the same impact in 
practice. In the case of pensions, employers without a collective agreement 
normally include in the labour contract an equivalent pension scheme provided 
by the pension funds or by pension companies. In Denmark, furthermore, 
the classical people’s pension (and other first pillar state pensions) were 
maintained, albeit in a more targeted version (Goul Andersen 2007; 2011a); 
see also below.
In the other countries the two-tier people’s pension (with a defined 
benefit4 earnings-related supplement) was replaced by notional (partly funded, 
however) defined contribution schemes with social minima (Figure  12.2).5 
Arguably, these countries moved closer to a Bismarckian system, that is, from 
a mixture of notional defined contribution/defined benefit principles towards 
more strict (notional) defined contribution systems. This strengthening of the 
defined contribution principle of strictly relating pensions to contributions 
and thus providing unmodified incentives to work is similar to the situation 
that is found in most countries. The defined contribution principle is also 
fully embodied in the funded Danish labour market pensions.
4  Pension entitlements can either be based on the principle of defined benefit or on defined 
contribution. The latter means that entitlements are directly determined by contributions and revenues 
from the investment of the money (also labelled actuarial fairness). Defined benefit means that 
entitlements are politically defined in a way that modifies the strict calculation of pensions from 
contributions and returns on investments. Typically, such pensions have been defined as flat rate, or as a 
fixed proportion of the wage over a certain number of years, provided that some minimum requirement 
is fulfilled (for instance, 30–40 years of contributions).
5  The Icelandic pension system comes closer to the Danish one. The public pension scheme pays a 
basic pension from the age of 67 and a means-tested supplementary pension after retirement. But the 
most important part are the fully funded occupational pensions, as in Denmark. This took a major 
leap in the wage negotiations of 1969 between the unions and the employers. From 1974, membership 
of occupational pension funds became compulsory for wage erarners, and from 1980, also for self-
employed (Gudmundsson 2001).
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Figure 12.2.  
(A) Deﬁned contribution pensions with a social minimum pension (Sweden, Norway 
and Finland).  
(B) Multipillar system with people’s pension and labour market pension (Denmark).
In practice, the difference between the Danish (and Icelandic) system 
(Figure 12.2.B) and the other Nordic ones (Figure 12.2.A) is not extremely 
large. In some instances, a targeted people’s pension and a minimum pension, 
combined with a defined contribution pension scheme, are equivalent. The 
difference in outcomes depends mostly on the size of the minimum pension. 
With appropriate settings of the minimum pension, the Nordic systems may 
produce roughly the same outcome. 
Denmark, Sweden and Finland have very generous housing benefit 
schemes for pensioners6 which should be counted as part of the first pillar 
(state) pensions. These schemes are highly important as regards protection 
against poverty. In practice, the minimum level in Denmark is higher than 
in the other countries if the preferential rules for pensioners’ housing benefits 
are taken into account (see below). The after tax value of pensions and other 
6  For Finland, see e.g. http://www.kela.fi/in/internet/english.nsf/NET/270808144314HS?OpenDocu
ment. For Denmark and Sweden, see Goul Andersen (2007, 2011a). In Denmark there was a direct 
link, since payments of contributions to a Social Pension Fund for unspecified pension improvements 
(1971–1982) were finally decided to be applied to housing benefits.
minimum pens.
people’s pension
labour market pens.
deﬁned contribution
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benefits for a single pensioner without any other income is roughly equivalent 
to the benefits for an unemployed person receiving maximum unemployment 
benefits (Goul Andersen 2007).
The Danish system,7 which is the most complicated (Figure 12.3), is in 
fact a socially balanced variant of a World Bank (1994) system, but it was 
introduced several years before the World Bank issued its recommendations 
(Ploug 2001; Green-Pedersen 2007).8
Sweden also has a comprehensive system of collectively negotiated 
occupational pensions that are formally private, but contributions are 
significantly lower than in Denmark. In addition, individual pensions are 
growing (Kangas & Luna 2011; Lindquist & Wadensjö 2011; Goul Andersen 
2011a), but they remain substantially smaller than in Denmark, where 
combined employer/employee contributions are typically made up of 12–17% 
of the wage. 
7  To some extent, the Danish pension system could be described as the lucky outcome of short-term 
economic stabilisation policies. With one exception, all of the changes in the pension system since 1964 
were triggered by short-term economic policy goals, in some instances by political decision-makers 
who were not fully aware of the long-term implications. This may also run in the opposite direction. In 
2009, a fully funded component of the pension system (SP) was sacrificed by the government, and the 
money was paid out in order to stimulate the economy.
8  Collectively negotiated occupational pensions were not entirely new. They had been introduced 
gradually over several decades to a large minority of workers, in particular to white collar workers in 
the public sector (Andersen & Kristiansen 2009, 18–21, 39–47).
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Figure 12.3. Pillars and tiers of the Danish Multipillar Pension System.
First Pillar Second Pillar Third Pillar
State pensions and special 
arrangements for pensioners
Occupational 
pensions
Personal 
pensions
Third tier
(topping up / 
replacement 
gap)
Rent pension
Capital pension/
Age pension
Rate pension
(Index contracts)
Second/third 
tier 
(income 
maintenance)
Civil servants’ pensions 
(Company pensions)*)
Semi-mandatory 
labour market 
pension
Civil servants’ 
pensions 
(Company pensions)*)
SP: Special Pensions savings 
(terminated 2009)+)
First tier 
(basic security/ 
poverty 
protection)
ATP: Supplementary Labour Market 
Pension
People’s 
pension
Basic Amount  
Pension supplement
Supplementary pensions beneﬁts
Individual supplements
(health, personal, heating)
Preferential housing beneﬁts
Notes: Dark grey: Means-tested. Light grey: Fully funded 
+) People had to pay 1% of their gross income for the SP Pension scheme (introduced as a temporary 
scheme to calm an overheated economy in 1997 but made permanent in 1998). From 1999–2000, pensions 
from the scheme were nearly flat-rate, but from 2001 this was changed in favour of ordinary defined 
contribution principles by the incoming Liberal-Conservative government.  
*) For civil servants in municipalities, pensions are often funded through insurance in order to avoid 
financing the labour power of the past through current expenses. Employee contracts as civil servants have 
declined very significantly. The huge majority have ordinary employment contracts. 
In most countries, inequality among pensioners is expected to increase. 
Changing the basic principles towards defined contributions means that 
inequality among the employed are reproduced at pension age. Denmark is an 
exception, however: Inequality among pensioners is not expected to increase 
when the labour market pensions mature (Government of Denmark 2005, 14).
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3.1. Basic security: Minimum pensions
Although there are many differences, some common characteristics of the 
Nordic pension schemes should be emphasised. 
All residents, irrespective of citizenship, are mandatory members of the 
national old age pension schemes. However, three years of residence are 
required in order to be eligible for a pension, and 40 years are needed to get 
a full pension. Everyone fulfilling the residence requirements is guaranteed 
a minimum pension, irrespective of any contribution. As seen in Table 12.4, 
Denmark and Iceland are the most generous countries for people with little 
or no previous income. In these countries, the ‘basic security’ component 
remains strong. In Denmark, it is possible to defer the public old-age pension 
for up to ten years (the later the pension is taken up, the higher the annual 
pension). At the opposite end, we find Finland, which to a larger degree is 
an ‘earnings-related’ welfare state resembling those in Continental Europe. 
In between, Norway and Sweden to a larger degree combine basic security 
with income related benefits. 
Table 12.4. Guaranteed minimum pension including housing allowance for a single 
pensioner. Percentage of average national pay, after tax. 2007.
Denmark  56%
Iceland 55%
Norway 52%
Sweden 46%
Finland 38%
Source: NOSOSCO 2009b.
3.2. Earnings-related pensions
All of the Nordic countries have second tier earnings-related pensions. Apart 
from in Denmark, they are regulated by law. But there are major differences 
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between the schemes and major differences in strategies for handling growing 
life expectancy.9
In Denmark, the ATP (the Danish Labour Market Supplementary 
Pension) is a statutory, insurance-based, defined-contribution scheme. 
Contributions are small (about 1% of the wage). Contributions are negotiated 
in collective agreements between the social partners and diverge somewhat 
between different segments of the labour market. ATP provides a lifelong 
pension from the formal pension age (currently 65 years). It covers all wage 
earners. The unemployed have a double ATP contribution paid by the state. 
ATP membership is voluntary for the self-employed and for disablement 
pensioners. ATP covers almost the entire population and comes close to 
absolute universality. The contribution is a fixed amount, varied only against 
the number of hours worked (28  hours count as full-time). In a defined 
contribution scheme like the ATP, higher life expectancy results in lower 
pensions per year, but the ATP uses a number of financial instruments to 
cover the risk of unexpected changes.
The main income replacement scheme for Danish pensioners is labour 
market pensions (see below). In addition to pensions, there is also an important 
early retirement scheme which is de facto being phased out according to a 
retirement reform negotiated in 2011 and formally adopted in 2012 (see below). 
In Finland, all economically active citizens are covered, but by different 
schemes for different sectors of the economy. The pensions are based on 
lifetime earnings, but earnings at later ages count more than early ages. From 
2005, the accrual rate is 1.5% of pensionable earnings at ages 18–52, 1.9% at 
ages 53–62, and 4.5% at ages 63–67. This provides a strong inbuilt incentive 
to participate in the labour force for middle-aged and elderly people. The 
pension age is flexible between 63 and 68 years. Pensions are increased if they 
are started to be drawn beyond 68 years of age. From 2010, new earnings-
related pensions are reduced according to increases in life expectancy from 
2009. The adjustment takes the form of an annuity calculation using a discount 
rate of 2% per year. The adjustment expected in the year 2040, based on the 
9  The following text is to a large extent based on the contributions in Ebbinghaus (2011), and on 
OECD (2011).
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mortality projections, is to reduce benefits to 85.2% of their value under the 
pre-reform rules. 
Iceland has mandatory schemes for employees. The law requires 
contributions with accrual rates of 1.4% each year. This adds up to 56% of 
income after 40 years of employment. Many schemes pay higher pensions 
based on voluntary agreements. The ordinary pension age is 67, but reduced 
pensions may be drawn from age 65, and retirement may be postponed with 
higher pensions until the age of 70. So far, no elements to adjust for increased 
life expectancies have been introduced in Iceland, but the retirement age in 
Iceland is extremely high by European and even by Nordic standards.
Sweden has a mandatory earnings-related pension for employees and the 
self-employed. Contributions of 18.5% of income from work are credited and 
then uprated in line with average earnings. The retirement age is flexible and 
possible from age 61. At retirement, the accumulated capital will be converted 
into an annual pension. This calculation will be based on individual retirement 
age and life expectancy. So there is an inbuilt automatic adjustment to changes 
in life expectancy. The longer a cohort of pensioners is supposed to live, the 
lower the annual pension. If a person wants to increase their annual pension, 
they may postpone retirement and work longer.
Norway has reformed its pensions system, to a large extent along the same 
lines as Sweden (West Pedersen 2008). The new system is being gradually 
implemented from 2011. But a major difference is that in Norway there is no 
link between contributions and pensions (like in Sweden) but between income 
from work and pensions. Each year’s acquired pension right is equivalent 
to 18.1% of annual income. The system covers both employees and the self-
employed. Flexible retirement for the age group 62–75 was introduced in 
2011. This system is cost neutral. The earlier you take out a pension, the lower 
the pension will be. It is possible to combine work and pension fully or 
partly from the age of 62 without an earnings test. In 2011, a life expectancy 
adjustment of the pension for new old-age pensioners was introduced. The 
life expectancy adjustment will be determined for each cohort, based mainly 
on remaining life expectancy.
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By 1979, Denmark had introduced a voluntary early retirement scheme 
enabling people to withdraw from the age of 60 if they were members of an 
unemployment insurance fund and had paid contributions (the contribution 
requirement was gradually increased). Until the most recent reform adopted 
in 2012, the allowance was equal to the maximum unemployment benefit. 
By 1998, it was decided that people who retired at the age of 60 or 61 would 
receive only 91% of the allowance. Besides this, a substantial deduction for 
pension assets was introduced. 
By 2006, the early retirement age and pension age was indexed to life 
expectancy at the age of 60 (see below), and by 2012, the duration of early 
retirement was cut to three years, with a very substantial deduction for pension 
assets, even for people with relatively low incomes. In practice this means 
that the voluntary early retirement scheme is being phased out. In 2012, 
people were allowed to withdraw their contributions paid between 1998 and 
2011. Some 40% of those insured did so. As tax deductions for contributions 
to the scheme have been progressively reduced (to a target of 25% by 2019), 
contributions have become increasingly expensive. 
De facto, the 2012 reform means that the scheme is being phased out.10 
However, as retirement age was increased in the 2006 reform as an alternative 
to abandoning early retirement, and as early retirement is phased out, this 
means that the lowest retirement age has increased very radically in Denmark. 
For birth cohorts until 1953, early retirement at the age of 60 is possible; for 
birth cohorts 1970 and onwards, the retirement age is 70 years, projected to 
increase even further if life expectancy at 60 increases. Due to substantial 
(and increasing) social differences in health and life expectancy, this will bring 
quite large numbers of working class men and women into trouble, as the 
criteria of disablement pensions have at the same time become more tough. 
A so-called ‘senior pension’ was introduced as a sort of compensation in the 
2012 reform, but this was partly a case of symbolic politics, as the criteria are 
largely the same as for ordinary disablement pensions. The main modification 
10  Ironically, even though the reform becomes effective only as of 2014, the number of recipients of early 
retirement allowance has decreased by itself by about 35% from 2007 to 2013.
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in the law was that the procedure is less complicated and takes less time 
(Goul Andersen & Jensen 2011).
3.3. Automatic adaptation of retirement to longevity
The automatic adaptation of retirement age to longevity is not a particularly 
Danish phenomenon. In fact, all of the Nordic countries except Iceland have 
been heading towards automatic adaptation of retirement to longevity. The 
models are different, however. 
Pension ages in the Nordic countries have traditionally been relatively 
high, and labour market participation for people in their sixties has been 
correspondingly high. Initially, the pension age was 67 years in all countries, 
and this remains the case in Norway and Iceland. In Denmark, Sweden and 
Finland, the pension age was reduced to 65 years. 
Fixed pension ages, however, play a lesser role than they did previously. 
One reason is that many retire before the official pension age, in most cases 
on a disability pension or pre-retirement scheme. But, more importantly, the 
size of the pension the individual can withdraw will depend increasingly on 
the age of retirement, because of the defined contribution principle.
Table 12.5 provides an illustration of the first point. It shows the age at 
which people who were working at the age of 47 actually withdrew from 
the labour market in 2006. In practice, retirement happened up to five years 
before the pension age (women in Denmark and Finland). From a cost 
perspective, this is exactly what the recent reforms have addressed. Finnish 
women, for instance, who retire at 60, will live on their income from pensions 
for on average 26 years.
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Table 12.5. Average age of exit from the labour market 2006. People who were 
economically active at age 47.
Denmark Finland Iceland Norway Sweden
Formal retirement age, men and women 65 65 67 67 65
Actual retirement age, women 60.3 60.5 66 62.2 62.7
Actual retirement age, men 61.8 60.8 68.1 63.2 63.3
Source: NOSOSCO 2009b.
This is why the Nordic countries have been heading towards the automatic 
adaptation of retirement to longevity, only in different ways. In Sweden, 
Finland and Norway, pension contributions are fixed, and pensions are 
adjusted downwards according to life expectancy by a special formula. This 
means that people from the younger generations have to work for longer if 
they want to maintain the same pension as previous generations.
In Denmark, the same happens automatically for the labour market 
pensions, as they are fully funded. As regards public pensions, the age brackets 
for the pension and early retirement are fully indexed to life expectancy for 
60-year-olds, and according to population projections, the formal pension 
age in Denmark will be 70 years for people born after 1970. This is projected 
to increase even further later on. As the baseline of the indexation of age 
brackets was life expectancy for 60 years old 1979–1995, and as life expectancy 
has increased by three years since then, the number of years for which people 
will receive public pension in Denmark will gradually decline by about three 
years as compared to 2013. In other words, regardless of future increases in 
life expectancy, there will be fewer years to live as a pensioner.
Still, people are allowed to withdraw labour market pensions and other 
private pensions up to five years before formal retirement age. Accordingly, 
as in Sweden, people face a choice between relatively early retirement and 
lower annual pensions, or late retirement and higher annual pensions.
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3.4. Social inequality
Provided that health conditions improve roughly in accordance with life 
expectancy, and that there are no significant social differences, these reforms 
represent ‘natural’ adaptations to higher life expectancy and healthy ageing. The 
problem, however, is that there is a strong and even increasing social gradient 
in health conditions and life expectancy, with only modest improvements at 
the lower level of the social ladder. 
Since health improvements are not equally distributed across social classes, 
the reforms are tantamount to a privatisation of social risks that aggravate 
class inequality. This may be particularly pronounced in Denmark (Brønnum-
Hansen 2006; Brønnum-Hansen & Baadsgaard 2008), but the basic pattern 
is most likely the same in the other Nordic countries. If there were no class 
differences in health and longevity, there would be a free choice between 
duration of retirement and annual pension; but unfortunately, this choice is 
not free for those who experience deterioration in health before pension age. 
If the health deterioration is furthermore insufficient to obtain a disability 
pension, the economic responsibility is completely privatised.
In short, even though their demographic changes are comparatively small, 
the Nordic countries have acted radically to the challenge of ageing. Increasing 
longevity will affect the size of pensions, retirement age, or both. There is 
uncertainty about the effects, as there are many pathways to retirement, but 
in order to avoid deterioration of retirement income, people will have to 
work for longer if they are able to do so.
3.5. Pensions, early retirement and work incentives
Via the defined contribution principle, pension reforms in most countries 
also aim at strengthening work incentives and postponing retirement. As 
mentioned, Finland has furthermore introduced a progressive accrual rate 
for people above 53 years to discourage early retirement (Kangas 2007, 285). 
Throughout the period under discussion, Sweden maintained the highest 
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employment rates in the EU among 55–64-year-olds, both for men and for 
women (76% and 70%, respectively, by 2012). The Norwegian figures are just 
below this. Finland resorted to early retirement for older workers during the 
severe crisis in the 1990s, but from 2000 to 2012, employment rates increased 
from 44% to 57% for men and from 41% to 60% for women (Table 12.6). 
In spite of generous early retirement provision from the age of 60,11 
Danish employment rates were higher than in Finland and Continental 
Europe during the 1980s and 1990s. According to the OECD figures, the 
Danish 1998 reform (fully implemented by 2004) was not too successful, 
but register-based data show more improvements towards the end of the 
period, and the take-up of the early retirement allowance declined by nearly 
35% from 2007 to 2013 (see also Goul Andersen & Jensen 2011). However, 
Continental European countries have moved even faster. Employment rates 
among German and Dutch men have overtaken the Danish figures. Among 
55–64-year-old women, Danish employment rates remain slightly higher than 
in Germany and the Netherlands, but by 2012, they were the lowest among 
the Nordic countries.12
11  Moreover, from 1994–1996 there was access to pre-early retirement for the long-term unemployed 
from the age of 50 (the so-called ‘transitional allowance’ until the ordinary early retirement allowance 
from the age of 60).
12  OECD data are survey-based. Reliable register-based data reveal more improvement for Denmark. 
This even holds for labour force participation rates. From 1997 to 2009, labour force participation rates 
for 55–59-year-olds increased from 80% to 83% for men, and from 62% to 78% for women. Among 
60–64-year-olds, the corresponding figures were 43% and 52% for men, and 18 percentage points lower 
for women.
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Table 12.6. Employment rates (percentage of entire age group) among 55–64-year-
olds, by gender. 1990–2012.
Men, 55–64 years Women, 55–64 years
1990 2000 2012 2000–2012 1990 2000 2012 2000–2012
Denmark 65.6 61.9 65.9   +4.0 42.4 46.2 55.8   +9.6
Finland 46.3 43.7 56.7 +13.0 39.7 40.9 59.7 +18.8
Sweden 74.5 67.7 76.4   +8.7 64.7 62.4 69.8   +7.4
Norway 70.7 73.1 74.8   +1.7 52.8 61.2 66.9   +5.7
Iceland 92.6 94.2 83.0 –11.2 78.3 74.4 75.5   +1.1
Austria - 40.5 52.5 +12.0 - 16.8 34.1 +17.3
France 37.0 32.8 47.4 +14.6 25.0 26.0 41.7 +15.7
Belgium 34.3 35.1 46.0 +10.9 9.4 15.4 33.1 +17.7
Germany 52.0 46.4 68.5 +22.1 22.4 29.0 54.8 +25.8
Netherlands 44.5 49.7 68.1 +18.4 15.8 25.5 49.1 +23.6
UK 62.4 59.7 65.4   +5.7 36.7 41.4 51.0   +9.6
Switzerland 85.2 76.7 79.5   +2.8 43.5 50.3 61.5 +11.2
USA 65.2 65.7 65.5   –0.2 44.0 50.6 56.1   +5.5
OECD 62.2 59.2 64.5   +5.3 33.5 36.7 47.2 +10.5
Source: OECD 1999; 2013a.
4. Economic sustainability and government finances
As regards sustainability, the Danish pension system is in an exceptionally 
good situation. By the end of 2012, the accumulated value of fully funded 
state, labour market and individual pensions amounted to nearly 200% of 
GDP (see Figure 12.4). This was roughly equivalent to the value of the assets 
accumulated in the Norwegian state’s oil fund at that time. The pension savings 
belong to the pensioners, not to the state, but they contained deferred taxes 
amounting to some 80% of GDP. Figures are smaller in the other Nordic 
countries, but assets are none the less substantial by comparative standards, 
except in Norway.
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Figure 12.4. Pension savings in OECD countries, as percentage of GDP, 2012.
*) Figures from 2011.
Source: Calculated from OECD statistics (all funds’ assets and GDP, in current prices, national currency). 
Accessed 9 November 2013.
From a micro perspective, this means that quite a large proportion of Danish 
pensioners will remain net contributors to the welfare state throughout their 
lives, or at least until they experience serious illness. They will pay taxes from 
their pensions, and their pension supplements are reduced. In many cases, 
people will pay more in income tax than they receive in pension. This will 
almost uniformly be the case for professionals, whereas groups like nurses, 
school teachers, or metal workers are likely to pay about the same as they 
receive. By 2012, a single pensioner earning 50% of an average worker’s wage 
(OECD definition) in addition to the state pension pays about the same 
in income tax as they receive in state pension. In addition, this person will 
pay 25% value added tax, and other taxes on consumption, motor vehicles, 
property, etc.
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This also means that the old age dependency ratio can be misleading: The 
conventional age brackets will become obsolete, and a significant proportion 
of pensioners will not be ‘dependent’. They will become net contributors to 
the welfare state. According to calculations based on the main Danish long-
term economic model (called DREAM) the impact of ageing on public 
budgets, including extra health care and elder care costs, will be roughly 
neutral (Forsikring & Pension 2012).
As contributions to private pensions are tax deductible – taxes being 
paid when the pensions are paid out – there is a substantial accumulation of 
deferred taxes which is not accounted for. If we estimate the tax rate at 40%, 
the Danish state possesses a ‘hidden’ asset of nearly 80% of GDP in terms 
of deferred taxes. The other Nordic countries are in a similar situation, but 
the accumulated assets are much smaller.
Even excluding these unaccounted assets, the financial situation of the 
Nordic welfare states is very healthy by comparative standards (Table  12.7 
and Table  12.8). With the exception of Iceland, the Nordic countries have 
maintained surpluses or small deficits on their state budgets throughout the 
crisis since 2008. In addition, they have no net debt.
Apart from Iceland, the Nordic countries belong to the 9–12 top countries 
of the world as regards creditworthiness in 2013. This should come as no 
surprise. Their balances of payment are also extremely good. In fact, the Danish 
labour market pensions were initially ‘invented’ as a means to improve the 
trade balance: Consumption was too high, savings too small. After 30 years 
of permanent balance of payment deficit, Denmark changed to a permanent 
surplus alongside the universal introduction of labour market pensions. Oil 
in the North Sea (less than for Norway, but considerable) contributed to 
this as well, but pensions have played a major role.
In addition, Denmark and Sweden receive revenues from taxation of the 
current returns on pension savings (15% and 20%, respectively). In Denmark, 
this constituted about 2% of GDP in 2010–2012.
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Table 12.7. Net lending/net borrowing of general government, and net ﬁnancial 
liabilities.
Budget surplus/deﬁcit Net public assets/debt
2007 2010 2011 2012 2007 2010 2011 2012
Denmark 4.8 –2.7 –2.0 –4.1 +3.8 +1.7 –3.1 –7.0
Sweden 3.6 0.8  0.0 –0.7 +22.4 +23.8 +20.5 +23.3
Finland 5.3 –2.8 –1.1 –2.3 +72.6 +65.6 +54.1 +54.6
Norway 17.3 11.1 13.4 13.9 +137.9 +162.7 +166.3 +173.6
Iceland 5.4 –10.1 –5.6 –3.4 +1.0 –48.2 –55.1 –60.5
Germany 0.2 –4.2 –0.8 0.2 –42.6 –49.4 –50.8 –50.9
France –2.7 –7.1 –5.3 –4.9 –35.7 –57.5 –62.5 –70.7
Netherlands 0.2 –5.0 –4.4 –4.0 –27.8 –34.4 –38.7 –42.0
Belgium –0.1 –3.9 –3.9 –4.0 –73.1 –79.7 –81.1 –82.0
Italy –1.6 –4.3 –3.7 –2.9 –90.4 –103.0 –97.5 –112.9
Greece –6.8 –10.8 –9.6 –10.0 –86.5 –121.2 –142.6 –102.8
Spain 1.9 –9.7 –9.4 –10.6 –17.8 –40.1 –49.7 –61.0
Portugal –3.2 –9.9 –4.4 –6.4 –49.7 –71.7 –78.5 –88.5
Ireland 0.1 –30.8 –13.3 –7.5 +0.3 –40.8 –76.8 –79.5
UK –2.8 –10.0 –7.9 –6.5 –28.3 –53.8 –67.8 –70.9
USA –2.9 –11.4 –10.2 –8.7 –48.0 –74.3 –81.6 –87.1
Switzerland 1.0 0.3 0.5 0.7 –6.7 –6.9 –6.3 –5.5
Japan –2.1 –8.3 –8.9 –9.9 –80.5 –113.1 –127.4 –135.9
Euro (15) area –0.7 –6.2 –4.1 –3.7 –42.7 –57.6 –60.6 –66.3
Source: OECD 2013c. Accessed 9 November 2013.
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Table 12.8. Current Accounts as per cent of GDP, 2011, and average 2006–2011. OECD.
2010 2011 2012 Average 2006–2011
Denmark   5.9   5.6   5.7   +3.9
Sweden   6.3   6.4   6.0   +7.4
Finland   1.4 –1.6 –1.9   +1.5
Norway 11.9 12.8 14.4 +13.7
Iceland –8.1 –6.5 –5.6 –13.8
Germany   6.1   6.2   7.0   +6.5
France –1.4 –1.8 –2.2   –1.4
Netherlands   7.4   9.5   9.4  +7.4
Belgium   1.1 –1.2 –2.2   -0.1
Italy –3.5 –3.1 –0.5  –2.4
Greece –10.2 –10.0 –2.5 –10.7
Spain –4.5 –3.8   4.7  –3.5
Portugal –10.6 –7.0 –1.5  –9.1
Ireland   1.1   1.2   4.4 +1.5
UK –2.7 –1.5 –3.8 –2.2
USA –3.0 –2.9 –2.7 –3.8
Switzerland 15.0   8.9 11.1 10.0
Japan   3.7   2.0   1.1 +3.1
Euro (17) area   0.0   0.1   1.2 –0.1
China   4.0   1.9   2.3 +5.9
Source: OECD, Key Short-Term Economic Indicators. Accessed 9 November 2013.
Briefly, the Nordic welfare states are very rich and very economically solid, 
unlike most other European countries. At the same time, the Nordic welfare 
states have much less to fear as regards demographic change, due to their 
high fertility rates, net immigration and reformed pension systems.
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5. Increasing labour supply, activating social protection
As indicated in the introduction, the discussion about ageing and the declining 
labour force, relative to the population, has catalysed more general efforts to 
increase the labour force. As in other countries, such efforts go way beyond 
the issue of retirement and include an activation of the entire system of social 
protection and taxation (Barbier 2002). Employment efforts have successively 
been extended to all of the groups that were previously given low priority: 
The disabled, the sick and recipients of long-term social assistance (Goul 
Andersen 2011b). Besides this, special exemptions for the elderly unemployed 
and other difficult-to-place workers have been abandoned. Furthermore, the 
Nordic countries have also put much more emphasis than previously on the 
labour market integration of immigrants. And finally, tax systems have been 
adjusted in accordance with the new conventional wisdom that marginal 
taxes affect labour supply. 
As elsewhere, the number of people receiving disability pension has 
shown a long-term growth in the Nordic countries. This has been particularly 
noticeable in Norway, where figures increased from 236,000 in 1995 to 339,000 
in 2008 (NOSOSCO 2009a, 171; Øverbye 2006); in Denmark and Sweden, 
the increase was halted earlier. But figures close to 10% of the working age 
population (OECD 2010, 103, 134, 145, 162) have been a source of concern 
everywhere, and solutions have been difficult to find. A large number of 
measures have been applied in the attempt to reverse the trend. All of the 
Nordic countries have underlined the fact that a disability pension should 
only be granted on the basis of medical criteria, and only as a last resort. All 
of these countries have experimented with enabling people to take a job and 
have a ‘sleeping pension’ meanwhile, or with granting disability pensions on 
a temporary basis. In Sweden, the term ‘disability benefit’ was even formally 
abolished by a reform (2003) in favour of an ‘activity and sickness benefit’ 
(NOSOSCO 2004; Riksrevisionen 2005).
Comprehensive changes in rules and procedures were introduced in 
Denmark in 1998 and onwards alongside the idea of an ‘inclusive labour 
market’ (OECD 2003, 129; Bengtsson 2009; Bredgaard 2004), and of 
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‘corporate social responsibility’. Besides this, the instrument of ‘flexible jobs’ 
was introduced as an alternative to disability pension for people with reduced 
work capacity.13 From 1998, application for disability pension should only take 
place after all possibilities of treatment, activation and rehabilitation had 
been considered. This was embodied in a disability pension reform adopted 
in 2001 and implemented in 2003, based on the principle of focusing on the 
remaining resources rather than on lost capacities. These programmes have 
enjoyed some success, and after a slow start the number of people working 
in permanently subsidised ‘flexible jobs’ has grown significantly. 
Even though a flexible job was considered a last resort before disability 
pension, some deadweight losses were entailed. Flexible jobs did contribute 
to reversing the increasing number of disability pensioners, but to a lesser 
extent than had been hoped for, and, as in the other Nordic countries there 
was an increase in the number of young applicants for disability pensions. By 
2012, a new flexible job/disability pension reform was adopted in Denmark. It 
aimed at providing higher participation rates and budget cuts, but the reform 
dramatically reduced subsidies for flexible jobs, and disablement pension for 
people below the age of 40 was only to be granted in exceptional circumstances.
The growth in the number of disablement pensioners seems to have halted 
in all four countries by 2010.14 It is noteworthy that except for the Danish 
2012 reform, the countries did not resort to lower disability pensions (which 
are comparatively generous) in order to improve work incentives. Nor did the 
systems converge. In Denmark, the disability pension has remained a flat rate 
universal benefit accessible (in principle) regardless of employment record. In 
the other Nordic countries, benefits are earnings-related (NOSOSCO 2009a, 
169; Blekesaune et al. 2010). However, as some supplementary compensation is 
typically included in Danish labour market pension agreements, the outcomes 
are not that different. But it remains true that the Danish scheme is the 
most generous for people with low wages (or no income), and benefits 
13  Flexible jobs typically allow people to work shorter hours and/or with less demanding tasks while still 
maintaining an ordinary wage following collective agreements, and in principle maintaining the same 
rights as ordinary employees. The subsidy is normally 50–66%.
14  As pointed out by Hytti (2006), comparisons are difficult, as sick, disabled and unemployed overlap; 
differences over time or between countries may reflect political decisions and administrative praxises.
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were furthermore improved, both by the 2001 reform (for a single person, 
pension is roughly equal to the maximum unemployment benefits), and by 
new supplements for some of those who remained under the old rules. Even 
though one could expect that restricted access to disablement pensions would 
mean a higher take-up of voluntary early retirement, Danish and Norwegian 
figures do not indicate such a correspondence.
In addition, it should be underlined that nearly all of the policies of the 
1980s and 1990s aimed at reducing labour supply have been terminated. In 
Finland, schemes from the crisis of the 1990s encouraging older workers 
to retire were gradually phased out. In Denmark, it was decided as early 
as the mid-1990s to scrap sabbatical leave and to abolish the ‘transitional 
allowance’ enabling the long-term unemployed to retire from the age of 50 
(both schemes were introduced in 1992 and extended/improved in 1993). 
Educational leave was terminated a few years later, in favour of a ‘work first’ 
approach. In addition, the right for elderly workers in Denmark to maintain 
unemployment benefits indefinitely, and to be exempted from activation, was 
cut off bit by bit, and eventually fully abolished.
 
Figure 12.5. Marginal tax rate for an average worker (single, no children), selected 
OECD countries. 2012. Percentage of labour costs.
Source: OECD 2013b.
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This holds true for taxation as well. Average tax rates as well as marginal tax 
rates for labour have been reduced. In Denmark and Sweden, the highest 
marginal taxes remain slightly above the European average, but in general 
Nordic taxes on labour are quite modest – with some significant intra-Nordic 
differences. Figure 12.5 reveals the marginal tax rate for an average worker, 
which has become lower in Sweden and Denmark than in most European 
countries. One may question the impact of this, but it at least reveals a 
considerable willingness to reform welfare and tax systems in accordance 
with the waves of reform that have swept across Europe, and it illustrates 
the concern for maintaining sustainability vis-à-vis the challenge of ageing.
6. Conclusions
Not least because of the perceived challenge of ageing, the Nordic countries 
have reformed their pensions and retirement systems thoroughly. In addition, 
they have put much effort into increasing the labour supply from the working 
age population.
In a way, this is an irony, since these countries are benefiting from their 
pro-natal polices, which are ensuring (alongside net immigration) that the 
changes in the demographic structure will be less pronounced than in most 
other European countries. Besides this, unlike most European countries, they 
have a strong financial point of departure. 
This does not mean that all challenges of ageing are met, but it does 
seem certain that ageing cannot affect the foundations of the Nordic welfare 
model. Roughly speaking, pensions do not constitute a problem – what 
remains are increasing costs for health care and for elderly care. However, 
increasing labour force participation rates among the elderly are likely to 
neutralise this effect as well.
286
JØRGEN GOUL ANDERSEN AND AKSEL HATLAND
References 
Albrekt Larsen, Christian, and Jørgen Goul Andersen (2004), Magten på Borgen, Aarhus: 
Aarhus University Press.
Andersen, Mads Bryde, and Jens Kristiansen (2009), Arbejdsmarkedspension 2009, 
Copenhagen: Jurist- og Økonomforbundets Forlag.
Andersson, Gunnar, Marit Ronsen, Lisbeth B. Knudsen, Trude Lappegård, Gerda Neyer, 
Kari Skrede, Kathrin Teschner and Andres Vikat (2009), ‘Cohort fertility patterns in 
the Nordic countries’, Demographic Research, 20, pp. 313–352.
Barbier, Jean-Claude (2002), ‘Peut-on parler d’activation de la protection sociale en Europe?’, 
Revue française de sociologie, 43 (2), pp. 307–332.
Bengtsson, Steen (2009), Førtidspension – forskning og politik i samspil, available at http://
www.sfi.dk/Default.aspx?ID=4509
Billari, Francesco C. and Hans-Peter Kohler (2004), ‘Patterns of low and lowest-low fertility 
in Europe’, Population Studies, 58 (2), pp. 161–176.
Blekesaune, Morten, Tale Hellevik and Axel West Pedersen (2010), ‘Uførhet’, in Ann-Helén 
Bay, Aksel Hatland, Tale Hellevik and Charlotte Koren (eds), De norske trygdene. 
Framvekst, forvaltning og fordeling, 2nd ed., Oslo: Gyldendal Akademisk, pp. 251–271.
Bloom, David E., and Alfonso Sousa-Poza (2010), ‘Economic consequences of low fertility in 
Europe’ (introduction to special issue of the European Journal of Population), European 
Journal of Population, 26 (2), pp. 127–139.
Bredgaard, Thomas (2004), ‘Corporate social responsibility between public policy and 
enterprise policy’, Transfer, Vol. 3, pp. 372–392.
Brønnum-Hansen, Henrik (2006), ‘Sociale forskelle i udviklingen i danskernes dødelighed’, 
Ugeskrift for Læger, 168 (21), pp. 2066–2069.
Brønnum-Hansen, Henrik, and Mikkel Baadsgaard (2008), ‘Increase in social inequality in 
health expectancy in Denmark’, Scandinavian Journal of Public Health, 36 (1), pp. 44–51.
Ebbinghaus, Bernhard (ed.), The Varieties of Pension Governance: Pension Privatization in 
Europe, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Esping-Andersen, Gøsta (2009), The Incomplete Revolution: Adapting Welfare States to Women’s 
New Roles. Cambridge: Polity Press.
Eurostat, Population Statistics, available at http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/
population/introduction
Forsikring & Pension (2012), Pensionisterne betaler for sig selv, available at http://
www.forsikringogpension.dk/presse/Statistik_og_Analyse/notater/Documents/
Pensionisterne%20betaler%20for%20sig%20selv.pdf
Goul Andersen, Jørgen (2007), Ældrepolitikken og velfærdsstatens økonomiske udfordringer. 
Tilbagetrækning, pension og ældreservice i Danmark, CCWS Working Paper #47.
Goul Andersen, Jørgen (2011a), ‘Denmark: the silent revolution towards a multipillar pension 
system’, in Bernhard Ebbinghaus (ed.), The Varieties of Pension Governance: Pension 
Privatization in Europe, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 183–209.
287
MEETING THE DEMOGRAPHIC CHALLENGES
Goul Andersen, Jørgen (2011b), ‘Denmark – ambiguous modernisation of an inclusive 
unemployment protection system’, in Jochen Clasen and Daniel Clegg (eds), Regulating 
the Risk of Unemployment. National Adaptations to Post-Industrial Labour Markets in 
Europe, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 187–207.
Goul Andersen, Jørgen and Per H. Jensen (eds) (2011), Tilbagetrækning fra arbejdsmarkedet – 
årsager og effecter, Copenhagen: Frydenlund Academic.
Government of Denmark (2005), National Strategy Report on the Danish Pension System, 
available at http://ec.europa.eu/social/BlobServlet?docId=5420&langId=en
Green-Pedersen, Christoffer (2007), ‘Denmark: A “World Bank” pension system’, in Ellen 
M. Immergut, Karen M. Anderson and Isabelle Schulze (eds), The Handbook of West 
European Pension Politics, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 454–495.
Gudmundsson, Már (2001), The Icelandic Pension System (paper), Reykjavik: National 
Association of Pension Funds. 
Hilgeman, Christin, and Carter T. Butts (2009), ‘Women’s employment and fertility: A 
welfare regime paradox’, Social Science Research, 38 (1), pp. 105–119.
Hoem, Jan M. (2008), ‘Overview Chapter 8: The impact of public policies on European 
fertility’, Demographic Research, vol. 19, pp. 249–260.
Hytti, Helka (2006), ‘Why are Swedes sick but Finns unemployed?’, International Journal of 
Social Welfare, 15 (2), pp. 131–141.
Kangas, Olli (2007), ‘Finland: Labor markets against politics’, in Ellen M. Immergut, Karen 
M. Anderson and Isabelle Schultze (eds), The Handbook of West European Pension Politics, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 248–296.
Kangas, Olli, Urban Lundberg and Niels Ploug (2010), ‘Three Routes to Pension Reform: 
Politics and Institutions in Reforming Pensions in Denmark, Finland and Sweden’, 
Social Policy & Administration, 44 (3), pp. 265–284.
Kangas, Olli, and Päivi Luna (2011), ‘Finland: From statutory pension dominance towards 
voluntary private schemes’, in Bernhard Ebbinghaus (ed.), The Varieties of Pension 
Governance: Pension Privatization in Europe, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 
210–239.
Lindquist, Gabriella Sjögren, and Eskil Wadensjö (2011), ‘Sweden: A viable public–private 
pension system’, in Bernhard Ebbinghaus (ed.), The Varieties of Pension Governance: 
Pension Privatization in Europe, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 240–264.
Myles, John, and Paul Pierson (2001), ‘The comparative political economy of pension reform’, 
in Paul Pierson (ed.), The New Politics of the Welfare State. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, pp. 305-333.
Myrskylä, Mikko, Hans-Peter Hohler and Francesco C. Billari (2009), ‘Advances in 
development reverse fertility declines’, Nature, 460 (6), pp. 741–743.
NOSOSCO (Nordic Social-Statistical Committee) (2004), Social Protection in the Nordic 
Countries 2002. Scope, expenditure and financing, Copenhagen: NOSOSCO.
NOSOSCO (2009a), Social Protection in the Nordic Countries, 2007/2008. Scope, Expenditure 
and Financing, Copenhagen: NOSOSCO.
288
JØRGEN GOUL ANDERSEN AND AKSEL HATLAND
NOSOSCO (2009b), Old-age Pension Systems in the Nordic Countries, Copenhagen: 
NOSOSCO.
OECD (1999), Employment Outlook 1999, Paris: OECD.
OECD (2003), Transforming Disability into Ability. Policies to Promote Work and Income 
Security for Disabled People, Paris: OECD.
OECD (2010), Economic Policy Reforms 2010. Going for Growth, Paris: OECD.
OECD (2011), Pensions at a Glance: Retirement-Income Systems in OECD and G20 Countries, 
Paris; OECD.
OECD (2013a), Employment Outlook 2013, Paris: OECD.
OECD (2013b), Taxing Wages, 2011–2012, Paris: OECD.
OECD (2013c), Economic Outlook No 93, June 2013, available at http://stats.oecd.org/index.
aspx?queryid=48126
OECD, Key Short-Term Economic Indicators, available at http://stats.oecd.org/Index.
aspx?DataSetCode=KEI
Ploug, Niels (2001), ‘Det danska ålderspensionssystemet – ful ankung eller vacker svan?’, 
in Joakim Palme (ed.), Privata och offentlige pensionsreformer i Norden – slut på 
folkpensionsmodellen?, Stockholm: Pensionsforum, pp. 10–32.
Riksrevisionen (2005), Förtidspension utan återvändo, RiR 2005:14, Stockholm: Riksrevisonen.
Sleebos, Joelle (2003), Low Fertility Rates in OECD Countries: Facts and Policy Responses, 
OECD Labour Market and Social Policy Occasional Papers, No. 15, Paris: OECD.
Statistics Denmark (2013), Befolkningens udvikling 2012. Vital statistics, Copenhagen: Statistics 
Denmark.
Statistics Japan (2013), Statistical Yearbook 2013, Tokyo: Statistics Japan.
The United Nations (UN) (2012), World Population Prospects: The 2012 Revision. Mortality 
Data, available at http://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/Excel-Data/mortality.htm
The United Nations, Probabilistic Population Projections: Old-age Dependency Ratio, available 
at http://esa.un.org/unpd/ppp/Figures-Output/Population/PPP_Old-age-Dependency-
Ratio.htm
Wei, Chen, and Liu Jinju (2009), Future Population Trends in China: 2005–2050, Paper G-191, 
Centre of Policy Studies (COPS), Monash University.
West Pedersen, Axel (2008), ‘The emerging Norwegian pension reform. A softer version of 
the Swedish prototype?’, paper presented at Pension Systems for the Future. Reassessing the 
Nordic Welfare States, conference organised by the Social Research Centre, University of 
Iceland, REASSESS, and the Ministry of Welfare, Reykjavik, 7 May 2008.
World Bank (1994), Averting the Old Age Crisis, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
World Bank, World Development Indicators (WDI), available at http://data.worldbank.org/
indicator
Øverbye, Einar (2006), ‘Hvorfor bliver det flere uførepensionister?’, in Nanna Kildal and Kari 
Tove Elvbakken (eds), Velferdspolitiske utfordringer. Risiko, prioriteringer og rettferdighet, 
Oslo: Abstrakt Forlag, pp. 41–68.
289
Chapter 13
Status, challenges and innovative solutions for 
elderly care in China and the Nordic countries
Hua Fu and Rolf Rønning
An ageing population is seen as a challenge in many countries. But the 
size of the ‘problem’, its composition and the solutions proposed vary 
between countries. Many countries are seeking new and innovative 
solutions to these challenges. China and the Nordic countries are in 
quite different situations, but still there may be common elements in 
how they meet the challenge, and maybe they can learn from each other
1. Innovations
In this chapter we focus our attention on how the challenges in elderly care 
are met, especially in new and innovative ways. Innovation is therefore a 
key concept.
Innovation has for some decades now been seen as the engine for success 
in competition in the marketplace. Schumpeter (1975 [1942]) has been seen as 
the founder of the imperative for innovation within a competing economy. 
He used a wide definition of innovation, including new products, production 
processes and new organisation methods. The numerous definitions of 
innovation focus to a large extent on the implementation of new ideas 
(inventions), or ideas that are new in a specific context. In this context, 
bringing organising principles from the private sector to the public sphere, 
as New Public Management (NPM) did (Christensen & Lægreid 2011), 
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is definitely an innovation in that area, although the principles themselves 
were already well known. Many definitions stress that innovations are also 
improvements. At least some people must see it as an improvement when it is 
implemented, but the result gives rise to an empirical question. In a situation 
full of conflicts of interest, such as the public sector, it is relevant to ask for 
whom this is an improvement. It has been common in the Western world to 
see the private sector as innovative and the public sector as non-innovative. 
Recent research has challenged that view and pointed out that innovations 
are just as common in the public as in the private sector (Windrum 2008).
New products or technologies are easily seen as innovations, but it has 
been more difficult to see services as innovations. However, in Western 
economies now, more than 70% of GDP comes from services. And elderly 
care is definitely a service in which great challenges make it imperative to 
innovate. In this paper we will describe the situation and challenges in elderly 
care in China and the Nordic countries, and comment on some of the efforts 
to find innovative solutions to these challenges. 
2. Status and challenges of the ageing population in China
China is facing a rapid development of ageing. At the end of the 1940s, the 
average life expectancy in China was about 35 years. The figure had risen to 
67.8 years by 1981 and 71.4 years in 2000. In 2010, the average life expectancy 
reached 74.8 years based on the 6th National Census in Mainland China. People 
aged 60 and over represented 13.3% of the total population in China, adding 
up to 178 million. Compared to the 940 million working-age population (aged 
15–59 years), the elderly dependence ratio was 18.9%. It is expected that there 
will be 202 million people aged above 60 in 2013, accounting for 14.8% of 
the total population. But the working-age population will have reduced to 
936 million, so the elderly dependence ratio rises to 21.6%. The percentage 
of elderly people of an advanced age is increasing quickly. The percentage of 
those aged 80 and over out of the total population was 0.96% (12 million) 
in 2000. In 2012, there were 22 million persons aged 80 and over, and it will 
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be 23 million in 2013. It is expected that the number of people aged 80 and 
over will increase annually by one  million until 2025. There will be more 
than 101 million elderly aged 80 and over in 2050, accounting for 6.9% of 
the population, and there will be a further increase of 5.9% within 50 years. 
Together with the development of the ageing society, the progress of 
urbanisation is accelerating. Between 2000 and 2010 the percentage of the 
urban population among the total population in Mainland China increased 
from 36.1% to 49.7%. The trend is expected to continue: only one year later, 
the percentage of the urban population had reached 51.27%, and it is expected 
to be 70% in 2030. Urbanisation has multiple implications for ageing. The 
family structure immediately changes from the extended family which is 
the norm in rural areas to the more common pattern in urban areas, the 
nuclear family. Urbanisation usually starts with young adults moving away 
from rural areas, often leaving their children behind to be looked after by 
elderly relatives. A study on Chinese elderly left behind in the countryside 
by Ye Jingzhong in 2006 estimated that there were about 20 million left-
behind elderly in the countryside of China in 2006. Among them, 36.3% felt 
alone, and 35.8% experienced anxiety, irritability, and depression (Ye 2008). 
Another study indicated that the percentage of the elderly aged 60 and over 
in empty nests in China increased from 32.9% in 2000 to 45.6% in 2010 
(Ping & Gang 2009).
A higher percentage of elderly in the population will increase the 
prevalence of chronic diseases, disability and dementia. For example, there 
were 97 million elderly people with chronic diseases and 36 million disabled 
elderly people in 2012, and this will reach more than 100 million elderly people 
with chronic diseases and 37.5 million disabled elderly people in 2013. Based 
on a report on the status of the elderly in urban and rural areas made in a 
follow-up study (Wu 2013), the self-reported prevalence of non-communicable 
diseases (NCDs) among the elderly was 72.3% in urban areas and 57.5% in 
rural areas. But the prevalence of self-reported health was higher (27.9%) 
in urban areas than that (21.0%) in rural areas. More than one fifth of the 
elderly were partially (15.9%) or completely (6.8%) disabled. It was estimated 
that there are 9.71 million elderly people who are partially disabled (12.4%) 
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and 4.38 million with complete disability (5.6%) in urban areas, as well as 
18.47 million partially disabled (18.6%) and 7.75 million with complete disability 
(7.8%) in rural areas. Depression and dementia are the two predominant 
mental health disorders among the elderly. It was found that 16.5% and 28.6% 
of elderly felt lonely in urban and rural areas, respectively. These frail people 
will probably need extra attention from family, society and the government.
Facing the challenges of the disease burden in the ageing society, the 
Chinese government is expanding the coverage of basic medical insurance 
to reduce the economic burden imposed by health problems on individuals 
and families. In 2010, the coverage of basic medical insurance for elderly was 
95.3% in urban and 98.3% in rural areas. As the result, the percentage of older 
patients who did not see doctors but should have done so, because of their 
health conditions, decreased from 13.7% in 2003 to 9.7% in 2008. And the 
percentage of older patients who were not in hospital but should have been, 
due to their health conditions, decreased from 35.1% in 2003 to 31.9% in 2008.
3. The elderly population’s mental health and social capital 
As mentioned above, mental health among the elderly is a major problem. 
With the acceleration of urbanisation and population ageing, protecting and 
promoting the mental health of the elderly has attracted more and more 
attention, in addition to cardiovascular diseases, cancer, respiratory diseases 
and diabetes. Research has indicated an association between social factors 
and mental health. The reason for this has been explained by the changes 
in social life and relationships when people retire from their work positions. 
The personal social ties and relationships that had been established during 
their working life, and took place outside their residential communities, 
are weakened. They do not know their neighbours and cannot easily share 
information with each other. Such a lack of social integration in the resident 
communities where the elderly spend most of their time after retirement 
influences their mental health. These mental health problems could be even 
worse if they have some kinds of chronic disease and a sense of loss due to 
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retiring. The phenomenon described above can be seen as a lack of social 
capital (Kreuter & Lezin 2002). Social capital is a relatively new concept 
which has attracted significant attention in recent years. A burgeoning body of 
literature has linked social capital to mental health, which reflects increasing 
acknowledgement that social capital is an important determinant of mental 
health. The research on social capital’s influence on mental health may further 
demonstrate the social model of mental health. Social capital is connected 
to socio-cultural background, and represents the resources that a person can 
draw from their social relationships (Esser 2008).
There has been relatively little research on social capital in China, 
and no empirical evidence regarding the direction and strength of these 
linkages between social capital and mental health among the elderly in urban 
communities exists so far. A study was therefore conducted to explore the 
manifestation of social capital in among the elderly urban Shanghai, in order 
to assess the influence of social capital on the mental health of the elderly 
in urban communities in Shanghai.
Focus group discussions were conducted among 104 residents over 60 years 
old from three different types of community in Xuhui District, Shanghai. 
Twelve groups were set up based on the participants’ age and social economic 
status. Questions including structural/cognitive social capital were adopted 
to explore social capital among the elderly. Adopting multistage stratified 
cluster random sampling, a cross-sectional study was conducted among 1,225 
elderly people aged 60 and older in three communities in Shanghai, China. 
Mental health was measured with a 12-item General Health Questionnaire 
(GHQ-12). The instrument was used to measure social capital, including 
structural and cognitive social capital, and the items included in the social 
capital questionnaire were based on qualitative interviews and existing studies. 
The statistical methods included factor analysis, univariate and multivariate 
methods, etc.
Our study captured and analysed perceptions and experience related 
to social capital among the elderly. Structural social capital comprised 
organisation participation, social support and civic participation. Cognitive 
social capital included trust, social cohesion and social control. We found 
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that 17.4% of the sample was experiencing probable cases of mental ill health. 
Respondents in younger age groups, currently married, with higher housing 
satisfaction and higher income satisfaction had significantly better mental 
health status. In our factor analysis, we used four social capital components 
including social connectedness, social cohesion, social control and trust. 
Social connectedness included organisation participation, social support and 
civic participation. Female respondents with higher housing satisfaction as 
well as higher income satisfaction, had significantly higher social capital. 
After multiple adjustments for age, sex, marital status, education, income 
stratification and housing satisfaction, we found social capital to be a protective 
factor in the mental health problems of the elderly (OR=0.569, 95% CI: 0.479–
0.676). The social capital components of connectedness and trust showed 
statistically significant associations with the GHQ-12 scores. We also found 
that age and housing satisfaction were the main factors influencing mental 
health of the elderly. The mental health of older people with low housing 
satisfaction is worse than that of those who are younger with high housing 
satisfaction. Our study demonstrated that social capital is a protective factor 
in mental health problems, particularly two of its major components: social 
connectedness and trust. 
4. Innovation in the management of chronic non-
communicable diseases in the elderly
Levels of trust, civic involvement, organisational cooperation, social engagement 
and reciprocity are important determinants for social capital, which mediates 
and influences mental health and quality of life, especially for the ageing 
population with chronic diseases. In addition, an ageing population will 
probably increase the burden of non-communicable diseases, as mentioned 
earlier. The prevention and management of chronic diseases is important to 
the health of the elderly. Since the present major health care systems are 
unable to deal with chronic conditions, there is a need for a prompt policy 
and new approaches to those with chronic conditions. Self-management for 
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elderly people with chronic diseases is now widely recognised as a necessary 
part of treatment. Innovative approaches should focus on improving the 
mental health and quality of life of elderly people with chronic diseases. 
After reviewing international and domestic literature and the wide debates 
among researchers, we decided to adopt a chronic disease self-management 
approach to solve this urgent health problem for the elderly.
The Chronic Disease Self-Management (CDSM) approach has already 
been demonstrated to be useful for maintaining and improving patients’ health 
behaviour and health status while lowering health care utilisation through 
improved self-management skills, self-efficacy and better communication 
with health providers in the United States, Canada and Great Britain (Lorig 
et al. 1999; Holroyd & Creer 1986; Lorig et al. 1993; Watson et al. 1997; Fu 
et al. 2003).
In 2002, we conducted a randomised controlled trial of chronic disease 
self-management in Shanghai, China (Fu et al. 2003). The study showed that 
treatment subjects, when compared with controls, demonstrated significant 
improvement in one of four self-management behaviours. The people who 
were given treatment increased their scores by 0.33 in average when practising 
cognitive symptom management, and we found that the treatment group 
increased 0.69 and 0.63 in their scores, respectively, in self-efficacy (SE) 
to manage symptoms and SE to manage disease in general. They also 
demonstrated significant improvements in nine indexes of health status (self-
rated health, health distress, fatigue, shortness of breath, pain, disability, illness 
intrusiveness, depression and social/role activity limitation). They also had on 
average fewer visits to the emergency room and fewer hospitalisations. This 
study demonstrated that CDSM programmes were culturally acceptable to 
the Chinese. This generic self-management education programme improved 
participants’ health behaviour, self-efficacy, parts of their health status, and 
involved fewer visits to the emergency room and hospitalisation after 6 months 
through locally based delivery models and the integration of routines of 
community government and community health services.
In the second half of 2007, the Health Promotion Committee of Shanghai 
adopted the recommendation of the study of a “community-based project of 
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self-management of hypertension” run by the School of Public Health, Fudan 
University, and disseminated chronic disease self-management in Shanghai. 
Powerful policy support, defined responsibilities for the different actors and 
active participation from the relevant population promoted CDSMP as a 
tool for the prevention and control of chronic illness. Up until 2012, 280,000 
people (mostly elderly) participated in these activities. Under the principles 
of doctor-patient cooperation, mutual aid and self-management, CDSMP 
succeeded in creating a supportive environment for chronic disease prevention 
and control. 
Based on an evaluation of the CDSMP by us in 2011, 63.6% of group 
members had sufficient interactive health literacy. The survey of community 
residents indicated that the percentage of residents who participated in the 
chronic disease self-management groups and had sufficient interactive health 
literacy is higher than those who did not attend. Gender, age, education, having 
a chronic disease and self-efficacy are related to the interactive health literacy 
score. Out of the whole chronic disease group, members with hypertension 
had the highest morbidity. The others are arthritis, cerebrovascular disease and 
diabetes, in sequence. Gender and social support are related to the control of 
hypertension. In addition, 34.6% of group members increased their physical 
activity significantly, and 45.1 slightly; 32.5% of members increased their 
vegetable and fruit intake significantly and 46.0% slightly; 24.9% and 58.0% 
of members decreased their salt intake significantly and slightly respectively; 
and 28.3% and 55.4% of members decreased their oil intake significantly and 
slightly respectively. Women tend to be better at life behaviour improvement 
than men. 
The qualitative analysis showed that after members had participated in 
the self-management group, mutual exchange and gaining a good mood 
are the biggest harvest. The quantitative results show that education, self-
efficacy, interactive health literacy and social support are influencing factors 
for resilience. The quantitative and qualitative analysis indicated that group 
members participate widely in community activities. We found that 58.8% 
of members take part in voluntary activities, 50.6% take part in activities 
organised by residents’ committees or street agencies and 47.8% participate 
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in interest activities. Partial correlations analysis showed that structural social 
capital is positively correlated with cognitive social capital. The more members 
participate in social activities, the higher reciprocity and degree of trust they 
will have. While social role limitation is related to structural social capital, 
the social support that members obtain is related to cognitive social capital.
In conclusion, the effectiveness of the implementation of CDSMP in 
Shanghai is remarkable. The following actions are key elements: recruiting 
participants and volunteers through public announcement; providing a place 
with facilities, including teaching and training; linking with physicians and 
health providers; training across the levels; organising group activities, and; 
ensuring sustainability. Identified responsibilities, the integration of multiple 
resources, and emphasis on evaluation can make CDSMP an efficient and 
effective mechanism for preventing and controlling NCDs and achieving 
improved health outcomes in patients suffering from NCDs, especially the 
elderly. 
5. Innovations in elderly care in the Nordic countries
5.1. Introduction: Situation and challenges
Many European countries are experiencing concern about the demographic 
changes in the population. The declining fertility rate and numerous cohorts 
from the post-Second World War baby boom fading out of the labour market 
are challenges for both the pension system and the economy, as well as the 
caring system. The challenges faced by the caring system are the focus for 
this section, especially the need for labour, or caring hands. The diagnosis is 
that too few people have to care for too many frail and elderly people. But 
the Nordic countries1 do not have the most challenging ratios between the 
generations. In Japan, 15% of the population is already more than 70 years old, 
and the UN demographic trend analysis expects that by around 2050, 40% 
1   Only data from Denmark, Finland, Sweden and Norway are included in this chapter.
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will be more than 70 years old. Many countries in the South of Europe, as 
well as Asian countries such as South Korea and Singapore may have 30% 
of the population over 70 years by 2050. The Nordic countries are expected 
to be closer to 20%, rising from the situation today where about 10% of the 
population is aged above 70 years.
Immigration and a relatively high fertility rate are the reasons for the 
Nordic countries being in a comparatively fortunate situation. But there still 
is a demanding task to find a sustainable solution for care in the future. The 
rest of this discussion is about the efforts to find solutions to handle the 
situation. We find many similarities between the Nordic countries, but also 
some variations. These variations will not be covered in this chapter. Much has 
been written about the Nordic model: is it still a common model, and what 
are the main features? A relatively large public sector and public responsibility 
for elderly care are still common features, but different solutions are being 
tried and used to meet this responsibility. Most attention will be paid to the 
Norwegian situation.  Because of the fortunate economic situation in Norway, 
the country has probably been able to maintain the model with the strong 
public responsibility to a larger extent than its neighbours.
This chapter is about three of the main paths to innovations in elderly 
care in the Nordic countries, which we have labelled privatisation, use of 
caring technology and extended use of voluntary work.
It is important to underline that the choice of innovative solutions to the 
caring problem is not only a function of the democratic challenges and their 
connected needs: the choices of solutions are filtered through the ideological 
lenses of the decision makers as well. This is especially true for the debate 
about use of private providers.
One important starting point for discussing innovations in elderly care 
in the Nordic countries is that it is a public responsibility. Offspring are not 
automatically committed to caring for their parents. Many sons and daughters 
are heavily involved in helping their parents, but they cannot be expected to 
do it. Sustainable solutions for the elderly cannot take family care for granted.
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5.2. Privatisation
From a historical point of view, elderly care in the Nordic countries was for 
a long time a private concern, a duty for the family and the local community. 
With the introduction of the welfare state, and especially after the Second 
World War, the public authorities took the responsibility for establishing basic 
pension schemes, to ensure the economy. The pension system was constructed 
mainly to meet the demands in the workforce, modelled for male workers. 
Later on, public caring services were established (kindergartens, elderly 
services, etc.). This made it easier for women to join the workforce (Anttonen 
2002). At the end of the last century, all of the Nordic countries had a public 
caring system with nursing homes and home care as the cornerstones. The 
municipalities were responsible for most of the expected services within their 
borders. But the municipalities had difficulty meeting the expanding demands 
and costs. Since the 1980s, the political climate had changed in the Nordic 
countries, influenced by neo-liberal politicians such as Thatcher and Reagan. 
In some countries, right-wing political parties gained power in the elections, 
but in other countries the socio-democratic parties (left-centre) stayed in 
power, but adapted to the strong political winds and introduced New Public 
Management (NPM) ideas as part of their own policy (for instance, Persson 
in Sweden and Stoltenberg in Norway).2 In terms of elderly care, this meant 
that nursing homes and home care could be contracted out to private actors. 
Using market mechanisms in this context was supposed by its supporters to 
result in better and more efficient services.
Privatisation here means that we have private providers. But the 
responsibility for having an offer for the elderly, and the responsibility for 
financing the services, is still a public task. And the situation is far from a 
perfect market, since the ‘customers’ (the frail elderly) are not actors on the 
market. The actors on the market are public employees, acting on behalf of the 
municipalities. The level of service is decided by politicians and public officers 
in the municipalities. Seen in a ‘Post-Second World War’ perspective, the use 
2  Both were prime ministers from the Social Democratic Party
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of private actors was an innovation, and this way of using the market had 
never been tried before. Privatisation in the old days meant the involvement 
of civil society, mainly the family.
Contracting out services means that many actors can be invited. In some 
places, public employees were enabled to be a group in the competition, and 
both for- profit and non-profit actors participated in the competition. Non-
profit actors have often been idealistic organisations like the Salvation Army, 
The Church City Mission, the Red Cross and others. For-profit actors have 
been national and international firms.
In Denmark, ‘free choice of provider’ in home care was introduced in 
2003. This implies that the municipalities are obliged to ensure that there 
is both a public and a private provider to select from, so that users have a 
real choice. By 2011, 34% of home care users were making use of a private-
for profit provider. So far, no studies have reported economic effects, or 
changes in quality, caused by the introduction of private providers (Bertelsen 
& Rostgaard 2013). 
Finland had a late start of the market for for-profit provision in the 2000s. 
Within eldercare, intensive service housing is most extensively outsourced by 
municipalities: the share of public provision was 38% in 2010. Marketisation 
has been most intensive in services designed for people in vulnerable life 
situations (as eldercare) and in housing services (Anttonen & Karsio 2013).
In Sweden, 20% of home care hours and 20% of the beds in nursing 
homes are contracted out to private providers, and the large majority to for-
profit providers, in the form of international firms (Erlandsson et al. 2013). 
Statistics Sweden (2012) has estimated that the profit for private providers 
in welfare in 2010 was about 8.1 billon SEK (1 billion euro), equivalent to 
the salaries for 20,000 jobs in the services.
Norway still seems to be the most reluctant actor in privatising elderly 
care, since only 6.5% of the work was being conducted by private actors in 2011 
and only 8% of the total costs bought from private actors. Out of a total of 
1,050 nursing homes, only 16 are run by for-profit private actors. (Vabø 2013.)
Both Sweden and Norway have had scandals in private nursing homes, 
where the media has documented unacceptable conditions for both employees 
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and pensioners. The main expenditures in elderly care are salaries to the 
employees and the costs of the supplies given to the elderly (food, extra 
activities, etc.). If private actors are to be profitable for their shareholders, 
the firms will often have to find reductions in these areas.
A large status report on research about contracting out public tasks, based 
on international studies in 2000–2011, concludes that so far there is no support 
for a conclusion that private actors conduct their tasks cheaper or better 
than the public sector itself does. The documented effects for employees are 
mainly negative (Petersen et al. 2011).
5.3. Use of caring technology
None of the Nordic countries have been front-runners in developing 
technology in caring, in spite of  many projects testing single elements. New 
solutions for lifting and carrying patients have been used in nursing homes. 
Lifting patients is an important factor causing musculoskeletal problems for 
employees in the field. While lifters are obviously a great help in institutions, 
there has been hesitation to use this in home care, so as not to transform 
the private homes into mini-institutions.
As a general conclusion we may say that ethical considerations have 
been a constraint factor in using the available technological solutions. Using 
microchipping technologies on elderly people with dementia would make it 
easy to track them if (when) they wandered away. Up until now, the use of 
such chips has been seen as not respecting the dignity of the users.
But now the authorities recognise that they must take advantage of 
technological developments. Norway can serve as an example. In a White 
Paper to the Norwegian parliament (Meld. St. 29 (2012–2013)) many 
supporting devices are mentioned, and it is recommended that the public 
sector now tries to use accessible technological solutions in an innovative 
way, to improve matters for both users and employees. Saving money is a 
driver for change.
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The White Paper lists different sorts of devices, but it also mentions that 
these technological devices must be placed into their organisational context. 
Technology influence the organisation, and organisational frameworks may 
stimulate or undermine the use of technology.
Alarms, sensors and detectors have already been introduced, especially 
equipment that makes it possible for the frail elderly to call an alarm centre 
when needed. But much more advanced technology is available for checking 
sufficient dressing, whether the kitchen has been used, etc. the ‘intelligent 
home’ is a concept that can be filled with solutions that make it both safer 
and easier for frail people to stay in their own homes longer – which is seen 
as an important goal for elderly care in the Nordic countries.
Equipment for travelling are of course used already, both walkers and 
motorised chairs/cars. This is probably the area where it has been most easy 
to introduce technology, because it so obviously benefits the users. If mobile 
lifters are included in this category, they represent, as mentioned above, a 
more problematic device.
Robots are not used as assistants in care so far: here the non-human 
approach is seen to impact the dignity of the elderly. Robot animals are 
randomly used, and they seem (from the newspapers) to have been a success, 
but we do not yet have any systematic evaluations. Here the costs are also 
high now. Robot suits (external skeletons) that can make it possible to use 
limbs with reduced capacity are mentioned in the White Paper, but not used 
systematically so far.
Home carers in the Nordic countryside spend much time travelling to 
and between the users. Communications technology which enables helpers 
and the receivers to communicate can be time-saving and lead to better 
care, since some of the saved time can be used for contact. The field of 
telecommunications has developed quickly over recent last decades, and we 
used to say that the young generation adapted fastest to new technologies. 
But it is not impossible to use the new possibilities to improve the situations 
for the frail elderly. ‘Skype-parenting’ is used for parents at a distance. The 
Skype-grandparent is a similar category, but more important are the possible 
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innovations in care. Technology that is already available can be used much 
better for caring tasks, and this is a challenge for the authorities.
Much can be gained by using available technology, both in capacity and 
quality, but it will not give a dramatic reduction in costs. Technological 
devices can be expensive, need to be used by competent personnel and require 
maintenance.
5.4. Extended use of voluntary work
Despite the fact that the family has no formal obligation to give assistance to 
their elderly, many people do. In Norway, it is estimated from research that the 
voluntary work in caring is equivalent to 100,000 full-time workers (Rønning 
et al. 2009). Voluntary work for family, friends and the neighbourhood has 
always been important in the Nordic countries. Social capital at the system 
level is based on trust, and people can build up social capital helping others 
(Rønning & Starrin 2009). It is obvious that if all voluntary contributors 
withdrew their activity, the caring system in the Nordic countries would 
break down immediately. This is a good argument for nurturing the voluntary 
helpers and developing a systematic policy for more voluntary work. The 
above-mentioned Norwegian White paper (Meld. St. 29 (2012–2013)) about 
innovations in care introduces a programme for expanding voluntary work 
as an innovation.
Voluntary work in care can be organised in different ways. Traditionally, 
large non-profit organisations such as The Red Cross, the Salvation Army, 
and other religious and humanitarian organisations have been active in care. 
They have also been innovative at different stages, in building new institutions 
and establishing new services. They engage a many people in their caring 
activities, and they even give them training to practise their unpaid caring 
tasks in the proper manner. The non-profit organisations have also participated 
in competition for running nursing homes and other care tasks, but they do 
not seem to compete well with international firms in this respect (Erlandsson 
et al. 2013). Many people do not want to become a member of the above-
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mentioned organisations, and do not want to commit themselves to long-
term duties, but would like to do some voluntary work. To make use of these 
resources, voluntary centres have been set up to engage them. These centres 
are organised by different actors, or groups of organisations. They can also 
be organised by public actors, and obtain public support. Many kinds of 
care work can be done from these centres: visiting people, assisting them 
visit the doctor, shopping for (and with) them,  etc. Studies show that many 
voluntary hours of care are accumulated from these centres (Rønning 2011), 
but there is also a cost involved in the administration of the centres, which 
have to be registered. In a city with 10,000 inhabitants, the work generated 
was equivalent to 4.7 full-time jobs, but they needed one full-time position 
to organise it, so the gain for the community was only 3.7 full-time jobs.
A small study among people caring for family members (spouses) with 
dementia at home, revealed, amongst other results, two elderly persons 
(88 years) who were full-time care workers. It is estimated that 2.5 employees 
are needed to take care of one person in an institution, so these two elderly 
people saved society the cost of 5 full-time carers. It is therefore obvious that 
more money can be saved if spouses and other family members are supported 
to take on care duties that they can, and want, to take. 
This can be a main reason why cooperation with the informal voluntary 
caring activities (family, friends, neighbours, etc.) is focused on in the above-
mentioned White Paper.
The first thing to recognise is that there is not a large pool of unused 
caring resources out there. We do not have any empirical evidence to support 
such a conclusion. But we must believe that there is some unused capacity for 
more care, if the conditions are optimal. Besides the volume of the informal 
care, it is important that the quality of care given by people with a personal 
relation to the receiver is good. It is important to take care of the relation 
for the sake of both the giver and the receiver.
Innovations in this field can take different forms. It is important that public 
services are organised to meet the demands and situation of the voluntary 
actors. Voluntary actors cannot be forced to do anything. The public sector 
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has to take the role of a gardener who should nurture the voluntary resources 
to make them blossom.
This implies some challenges for public (and professional) services. The 
public services are formally organised and have their models and routines. 
If they believe that the informal helpers can be fitted into this same system, 
they may run into problems. Informal help must be met on the voluntary 
helper’s terms and conditions. The formal system will tend to use standardised 
(and evidence-based) models if possible, while cooperation with informal 
helpers needs to be flexible. If the public care services want to cooperate, 
they need to see every person`s informal network as unique and discover 
how they can find the best interaction. Contracting out home care may 
imply difficulties here, because an established relation between a purchaser 
(the municipality) and a provider will be based on a contract which defines 
duties and costs, since the duties towards informal carers not can be defined 
in advance. Use of contracts for the providers will imply a rigidity that make 
a flexible cooperation difficult.
Another challenge is for the professional actors to accept the competence 
of amateurs. What kind of tasks can be left for non-professionals to conduct? 
On one end of the scale, we have medical tasks that definitely should be 
left to qualified personnel. On the other end we have caring given to people 
with whom the carer has an affective relationship, where both parties want 
to give care to the other person. Here we are all amateurs. But in between is 
a large grey area. Reports from the field, and a nursing home that has tried 
to include volunteers systematically for twenty years, show that professionals 
are still sceptical about the presence of volunteers (Rønning 2011). In a study 
many years ago we clearly observed how professionals tried to avoid sharing 
tasks with informal helpers. The tasks that can be covered by amateurs can 
be expanded if the professionals educate them. This would be an innovation 
and could improve the quality of the care, give more tasks to the informal 
carers and result in a closer relationship between the two groups.
 Models for better cooperation between voluntary carers and professionals 
can easily be seen as incremental innovations and may result in improvements 
in terms of both quality and capacity. This can lighten the burden on the 
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public system, but it will not change the situation dramatically. Neither is 
there a huge pool of unused carers in the field, nor is it free to engage them 
in a cooperation. A voluntary/public model will need administrative resources.
A conclusion that can be drawn from this dive into the Nordic, and 
especially the Norwegian, debate about the future organisation of care is that 
no radical innovations have been mentioned so far. Technological innovations 
can be developed to show radical innovations, but it may be difficult to get 
political support for a model that leaves the elderly to robots and non-
human contact.
In Norway, the most radical proposal was mentioned in the Green paper on 
Innovations in care (NOU 2011:11), precursor to the above-mentioned White 
Paper. This proposes that all young people take a mandatory ‘Solidarity service’ 
in care. Mandatory military service has been reduced to only a small part 
of the cohort, so this opens up a new use of this group (including women). 
This proposal would expand the capacity in care significantly, and could be a 
radical innovation. But politically it may be controversial, and this proposal 
was omitted in the eventual White Paper.
The Nordic municipalities have an imperative to improve their services 
continuously, and some of the efforts here may also be quite useful for the 
care sector. Many municipalities are involved in LEAN work, more or less 
based on the Toyota model. If they can make services 10–15% more efficient 
without reducing the quality, that will help a great deal.
One of the most interesting and best known innovations in the Nordic 
countries is the Fredricia model, developed in the municipality of Fredricia in 
Denmark. Many municipalities both in Denmark and neighbouring countries 
have visited Fredricia to learn and draw inspiration. Their model for innovation 
in elderly care is well known now. The project is called ‘As long as possible in 
your own life’, and the basic idea is to see the elderly as active people with 
resources that can still be activated. Fredricia has a population of about 50,000 
inhabitants, and two years ago 600 people receiving home care were reported 
to have gone through a rehabilitation programme. Of this group, 4% came out 
as self-reliant, and 41% needed less care than before. The programme reduced 
the use of caring hours delivered by the public sector by 33%, which gave a 
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significant saving for the municipality (Danske kommuner 22/2011). If this 
model should turn out to be sustainable in the long run, this is probably the 
most innovative caring model with a documented effect so far.
6. Conclusion
The dimensions of the challenge of the ageing population are different in 
China and the Nordic countries. But both places are experiencing the need 
for the public authorities to engage in taking care of the elderly. In China, 
social changes, such as rapid urbanisation, have created a caring deficit. In the 
Nordic countries, the public authorities have long accepted the responsibility 
for taking care of the frail elderly. Different ways of solving the care deficit 
problem have been tried, but no one has found a robust way of handling it. 
A further exchange of ideas and innovations is needed.
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